A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
A fundamental aspect of all biological systems is cooperation. Cooperative interactions are required for many levels of biological organization ranging from single cells to groups of animals. Human society is based to a large extent on mechanisms that promote cooperation. It is well known that in unstructured populations, natural selection favours defectors over cooperators. There is much current interest, however, in studying evolutionary games in structured populations and on graphs. These efforts recognize the fact that who-meets-whom is not random, but determined by spatial relationships or social networks. Here we describe a surprisingly simple rule that is a good approximation for all graphs that we have analysed, including cycles, spatial lattices, random regular graphs, random graphs and scale-free networks: natural selection favours cooperation, if the benefit of the altruistic act, b, divided by the cost, c, exceeds the average number of neighbours, k, which means b/c > k. In this case, cooperation can evolve as a consequence of 'social viscosity' even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity.
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“Here we emphasize that when dynamic transitions occur between two random networks or two random scale-free networks that lack community structure, then cooperation is impeded (relative to a static random or a static scale-free network) - for the intuitive reason that random switches disrupt cooperative clusters [1].”
From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“The mechanism underlying this cooperation-promoting effect is that spatial structure enables the formation of cooperative clusters of individuals, who have high payoffs and are capable of resisting invasion by defectors.”
From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“A well-known and illustrative finding [1] is that population structure can favor cooperation provided the ratio of the benefit from cooperative behavior, b , to its cost, c , exceeds the average number of neighbors, d .”
From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“Theoretical models suggest that social networks influence the evolution of cooperation, but to date there have been few experimental studies.”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [2]
In the citing paper
“Interacting with others in large populations without structure greatly reduces the likelihood of cooperation ( 11 ), but in a fixed social network, cooperation can evolve as a consequence of repeated interactions because of 'social viscosity,' even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity ( 1-2 ).”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [2]
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Smerlak, M., Stoll, B., Gupta, A., & Magdanz, J. S. (2015) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0130948 · Cited by 30
Wang, Y., Han, H., Yang, J. Y., Lindsey, M. L., & Jin, Y. (2010) · BMC Systems Biology · doi:10.1186/1752-0509-4-s1-s5 · Cited by 28
“While we used an exit-entry strategy presented by game theory [28,29], our stability analysis provided not only the stability property but also the convergence states of the system, which is broader than the previous evaluations [28].”
MethodThe formal darwinism project in outline: response to commentaries
Grafen, A. (2014) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-013-9413-z · Cited by 30
Transitivity and structural balance in marmot social networks
Wey, T. W., Jordán, F., & Blumstein, D. T. (2019) · Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology · doi:10.1007/s00265-019-2699-3 · Cited by 29
Evolution of cooperation in a conformity-driven evolving dynamic social network
Yang, Z., Li, Z., & Wang, L. (2020) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2020.125251 · Cited by 27
Universal evolution patterns of degree assortativity in social networks
Zhou, B., Lu, X. B., & Holme, P. (2020) · Social Networks · doi:10.1016/j.socnet.2020.04.004 · Cited by 30
Empty nodes affect conditional cooperation under reinforcement learning
Jia, D., Li, T., Zhao, Y., Zhang, X., & Wang, Z. (2021) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2021.126658 · Cited by 35
Quan, J., Cui, S., Chen, W., & Wang, X. (2022) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2022.127703 · Cited by 43
Heterogeneity in background fitness acts as a suppressor of selection
Hauser, O., Traulsen, A., & Nowak, M. A. (2013) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.10.013 · Cited by 32
Self-citationWhy mussels stick together: spatial self-organization affects the evolution of cooperation
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“…highly viscous populations, where cooperative traits are transferred locally, the effects of network structure and neighborhood size have been studied extensively (Pfeiffer and Bonhoeffer 2003; Rainey and Rainey 2003; Santos and Pacheco 2005; Ohtsuki et al. 2006; Santos et al. 2006; Masuda 2007).”
InfluentialReward depending on public funds stimulates cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma games
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Diverse strategic identities induce dynamical states in evolutionary games
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“In structured populations, natural selection favors cooperation if the benefit of the altruistic act b divided by cost c exceeds the average degree of the network 〈k〉 [12].”
BackgroundZhang, B., Cao, Z., Qin, C., & Yang, X. (2018) · Operations Research · doi:10.1287/opre.2018.1744 · Cited by 34
“Technically, this transformation relies crucially on recent developments of the pair approximation and diffusion approximation skills in the field of theoretical biology (Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2006, 2008).”
Social networks in elasmobranchs and teleost fishes
Wilson, A. D. M., Croft, D. P., & Krause, J. (2013) · Fish and Fisheries · doi:10.1111/faf.12046 · Cited by 31
“2013), cooperation (Ohtsuki et al. 2006; Santos et al. 2006), parasite transmission and social learning (Krause et al.”
Intelligent tit-for-tat in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma game
Baek, S. K., & Kim, B. J. (2008) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.78.011125 · Cited by 31
EFFECTS OF LEARNING ACTIVITY ON COOPERATION IN EVOLUTIONARY PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME
Chen, X., Fu, F., & Wang, L. (2008) · International Journal of Modern Physics C · doi:10.1142/s0129183108012972 · Cited by 28
Evolutionary dynamics of public goods games with diverse contributions in finite populations
Wang, J., Wu, B., Chen, X., & Wang, L. (2010) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.81.056103 · Cited by 31
Evolutionary games for cooperation in open data management
Benko, T. P., Pi, B., Li, Q., Feng, M., Perc, M., & Vošner, H. B. (2025) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2025.129364 · Cited by 45
“…for studying the emergence and maintenance of various self-organizing behaviors in both natural and social systems [22], attracting attention from researchers across a variety of fields, including biology [23,24], physics [25,26], mathematics [27,28], computer science [29,30], and so on [31–33].”
Metadata
- Authors
- Ohtsuki, H., Hauert, C., Lieberman, E., & Nowak, M. A.
- Affiliations
- Kyushu University (JP)
- Corresponding author
- Nowak, Martin A.
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2006-05
- Volume
- 441
- Issue
- 7092
- Pages
- 502-505
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- PMC
- PMC2430087
- OpenAlex
- W2040301417
- Cited by
- 2,208
- References
- 34
- Citations by year
- 2026: 111 · 2025: 118 · 2024: 128 · 2023: 133 · 2022: 101 · 2021: 113 · 2020: 92 · 2019: 107 · 2018: 136 · 2017: 103 · 2016: 116 · 2015: 122 · 2014: 133 · 2013: 126 · 2012: 132
- FWCI
- 277.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- John Templeton Foundation
- Harvard University
- National Institute of General Medical Sciences (R01GM078986)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Genetics › Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
- Life Sciences › Agricultural and Biological Sciences › Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics › Animal Behavior and Reproduction
- Keywords
- evolution of cooperation, structured populations, graphs, social networks, benefit-cost ratio, spatial games, yeast competition, cheaters, scale-free networks, random regular graphs
- MeSH terms
- Altruism, Animals, Cooperative Behavior, Costs and Cost Analysis, Biological Evolution, Game Theory, Humans, Models, Biological, Selection, Genetic, Social Support
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