A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
A fundamental aspect of all biological systems is cooperation. Cooperative interactions are required for many levels of biological organization ranging from single cells to groups of animals. Human society is based to a large extent on mechanisms that promote cooperation. It is well known that in unstructured populations, natural selection favours defectors over cooperators. There is much current interest, however, in studying evolutionary games in structured populations and on graphs. These efforts recognize the fact that who-meets-whom is not random, but determined by spatial relationships or social networks. Here we describe a surprisingly simple rule that is a good approximation for all graphs that we have analysed, including cycles, spatial lattices, random regular graphs, random graphs and scale-free networks: natural selection favours cooperation, if the benefit of the altruistic act, b, divided by the cost, c, exceeds the average number of neighbours, k, which means b/c > k. In this case, cooperation can evolve as a consequence of 'social viscosity' even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity.
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“Here we emphasize that when dynamic transitions occur between two random networks or two random scale-free networks that lack community structure, then cooperation is impeded (relative to a static random or a static scale-free network) - for the intuitive reason that random switches disrupt cooperative clusters [1].”
From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“The mechanism underlying this cooperation-promoting effect is that spatial structure enables the formation of cooperative clusters of individuals, who have high payoffs and are capable of resisting invasion by defectors.”
From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“A well-known and illustrative finding [1] is that population structure can favor cooperation provided the ratio of the benefit from cooperative behavior, b , to its cost, c , exceeds the average number of neighbors, d .”
From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“Theoretical models suggest that social networks influence the evolution of cooperation, but to date there have been few experimental studies.”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [2]
In the citing paper
“Interacting with others in large populations without structure greatly reduces the likelihood of cooperation ( 11 ), but in a fixed social network, cooperation can evolve as a consequence of repeated interactions because of 'social viscosity,' even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity ( 1-2 ).”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [2]
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“Axelrod’s work and the related research, we refer to [2], [3], Chapter 3 of [4], and [5], [6], among many others.”
Backgroundvan den Bergh, J. C. J. M. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108564922.014 · Cited by 12
Effect of the migration mechanism based on risk preference on the evolution of cooperation
Li, Y., & Ye, H. (2017) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2017.10.023 · Cited by 14
The Is and Ought of Sharing: The Equality Heuristic Across the Lifespan
Keller, M., Gummerum, M., Canz, T., Gigerenzer, G., & Takezawa, M. (2012) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195388435.003.0006 · Cited by 20
Co-evolutionary Learning in the N-player Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma with a Structured Environment
Chiong, R., & Kirley, M. (2009) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-10427-5_4 · Cited by 12
“Recently, there has been much interest in studying evolutionary games in structured populations, where who-meets-whom is not random but determined by spatial relationships or social networks (see [ 14-17 ] for a glimpse of these studies).”
BackgroundLinking Network Structure and Diffusion Through Stochastic DominancePreprint
Lamberson, P. J. (2009) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1479866 · Cited by 12
“Network structure affects the speed and extent to which information, disease, behavior, and innovations diffuse (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1997; Newman 2002; Sander et al. 2002; Young 2003; Cowan and Jonard 2004; Centola, Willer, and Macy 2005; Ohtsuki et al. 2006).”
Two conceptions of evolutionary games: reductive vs effectivePreprint
Kaznatcheev, A. (2017) · bioRxiv (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory) · doi:10.1101/231993 · Cited by 12
“We know that space can promote cooperation (Nowak and May 1992; Ohtsuki et al. 2006), or inhibit it (Hauert and Doebeli 2004), or complicate the whole discussion around it (Killingback and Doebeli 1996).”
BackgroundEvolutionary Games and Applications: Fifty Years of ‘The Logic of Animal Conflict’
Hilbe, C., Kleshnina, M., & Staňková, K. (2023) · Dynamic Games and Applications · doi:10.1007/s13235-023-00545-4 · Cited by 14
Wu, Y., & Pan, L. (2024) · Information Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.ins.2024.120842 · Cited by 11
Unbending strategies shepherd cooperation and suppress extortion in spatial populations
Chen, Z., Geng, Y., Chen, X., & Fu, F. (2024) · New Journal of Physics · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/ad668b · Cited by 13
“This formula is derived using the discrete random walk approach as [25] (see equation (A.16) in appendix A.1), but it can also be obtained by the diffusion approximation method [22].”
Evolutionary cooperation with game transitions via Markov decision chain in networked population
Luo, C., Zhang, Y., Feng, M., & Szolnoki, A. (2025) · Applied Mathematical Modelling · doi:10.1016/j.apm.2025.116710 · Cited by 18
“In such a situation, participants who cooperate often take a risk to enhance the overall benefits of the group [1].”
Payoff-based accumulative effect promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma
Yong-Kui, L., Zhi, L., Chen, X., & Long, W. (2010) · Chinese Physics B · doi:10.1088/1674-1056/19/9/090203 · Cited by 13
Metadata
- Authors
- Ohtsuki, H., Hauert, C., Lieberman, E., & Nowak, M. A.
- Affiliations
- Kyushu University (JP)
- Corresponding author
- Nowak, Martin A.
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2006-05
- Volume
- 441
- Issue
- 7092
- Pages
- 502-505
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- PMC
- PMC2430087
- OpenAlex
- W2040301417
- Cited by
- 2,208
- References
- 34
- Citations by year
- 2026: 111 · 2025: 118 · 2024: 128 · 2023: 133 · 2022: 101 · 2021: 113 · 2020: 92 · 2019: 107 · 2018: 136 · 2017: 103 · 2016: 116 · 2015: 122 · 2014: 133 · 2013: 126 · 2012: 132
- FWCI
- 277.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- John Templeton Foundation
- Harvard University
- National Institute of General Medical Sciences (R01GM078986)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Genetics › Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
- Life Sciences › Agricultural and Biological Sciences › Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics › Animal Behavior and Reproduction
- Keywords
- evolution of cooperation, structured populations, graphs, social networks, benefit-cost ratio, spatial games, yeast competition, cheaters, scale-free networks, random regular graphs
- MeSH terms
- Altruism, Animals, Cooperative Behavior, Costs and Cost Analysis, Biological Evolution, Game Theory, Humans, Models, Biological, Selection, Genetic, Social Support
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