A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
A fundamental aspect of all biological systems is cooperation. Cooperative interactions are required for many levels of biological organization ranging from single cells to groups of animals. Human society is based to a large extent on mechanisms that promote cooperation. It is well known that in unstructured populations, natural selection favours defectors over cooperators. There is much current interest, however, in studying evolutionary games in structured populations and on graphs. These efforts recognize the fact that who-meets-whom is not random, but determined by spatial relationships or social networks. Here we describe a surprisingly simple rule that is a good approximation for all graphs that we have analysed, including cycles, spatial lattices, random regular graphs, random graphs and scale-free networks: natural selection favours cooperation, if the benefit of the altruistic act, b, divided by the cost, c, exceeds the average number of neighbours, k, which means b/c > k. In this case, cooperation can evolve as a consequence of 'social viscosity' even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity.
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“Here we emphasize that when dynamic transitions occur between two random networks or two random scale-free networks that lack community structure, then cooperation is impeded (relative to a static random or a static scale-free network) - for the intuitive reason that random switches disrupt cooperative clusters [1].”
From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“The mechanism underlying this cooperation-promoting effect is that spatial structure enables the formation of cooperative clusters of individuals, who have high payoffs and are capable of resisting invasion by defectors.”
From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“A well-known and illustrative finding [1] is that population structure can favor cooperation provided the ratio of the benefit from cooperative behavior, b , to its cost, c , exceeds the average number of neighbors, d .”
From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“Theoretical models suggest that social networks influence the evolution of cooperation, but to date there have been few experimental studies.”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [2]
In the citing paper
“Interacting with others in large populations without structure greatly reduces the likelihood of cooperation ( 11 ), but in a fixed social network, cooperation can evolve as a consequence of repeated interactions because of 'social viscosity,' even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity ( 1-2 ).”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [2]
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“This would require extending the pair approximation methods used in [49, 98] to apply to the form of the update rule used here.”
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Powers, S. T., & Lehmann, L. (2016) · Biological reviews/Biological reviews of the Cambridge Philosophical Society · doi:10.1111/brv.12260 · Cited by 54
“As an example, under iteroparous reproduction modelled by the Moran death–birth process, with dispersal completely localised to the neighbourhood where interactions occur, corresponding to a network or lattice structure, κN = 1/(N − 1) (Ohtsuki et al., 2006).”
MethodCooperation and strategy coexistence in a tag-based multi-agent system with contingent mobility
Hadzibeganovic, T., & Xia, C. (2016) · Knowledge-Based Systems · doi:10.1016/j.knosys.2016.08.024 · Cited by 47
Emerging Behavioral Consensus of Evolutionary Dynamics on Complex Networks
Tan, S., Lü, J., & Lin, Z. (2016) · SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization · doi:10.1137/151004276 · Cited by 49
Guppies occupy consistent positions in social networks: mechanisms and consequences
Krause, S., Wilson, A. D. M., Ramnarine, I. W., Herbert‐Read, J. E., Clément, R. J. G., & Krause, J. (2016) · Behavioral Ecology · doi:10.1093/beheco/arw177 · Cited by 47
Artificial intelligence development races in heterogeneous settings
Cimpeanu, T., Santos, F. C., Pereira, L. M., Lenaerts, T., & Han, T. A. (2022) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-022-05729-3 · Cited by 65
“It has been shown that particular networks of contacts can promote the evolution of positive behaviours in various settings, including cooperation [19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24], fairness [25, 26, 27, 28, 29] and trust [30].”
BackgroundWhen selection pays: Structured public goods game with a generalized interaction mode
Han, J., Chen, X., & Szolnoki, A. (2024) · Chaos An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science · doi:10.1063/5.0201582 · Cited by 48
Random allocation of pies promotes the evolution of fairness in the Ultimatum Game
Wang, X., Chen, X., & Wang, L. (2014) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep04534 · Cited by 46
A study of knowledge supernetworks and network robustness in different business incubators
Zhang, H., Wu, W., & Zhao, L. (2015) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2015.12.051 · Cited by 53
Multiscale Information Theory and the Marginal Utility of Information
Allen, B., Stacey, B. C., & Bar-Yam, Y. (2017) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e19060273 · Cited by 56
“In particular, we envision applications to spin systems [1,17,83,84], gene regulatory systems [85–91], neural systems [92–94], biological swarming [95–97], spatial evolutionary dynamics [82,98,99], and financial markets [22,59,81,100–105].”
MethodReciprocity and behavioral heterogeneity govern the stability of social networks
Dakin, R., & Ryder, T. B. (2020) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1913284117 · Cited by 51
“Recent work has begun to demonstrate how changes to social network topology can have diverse costs (2, 7– 48 10) and benefits (11–13), and may even influence the evolution of behavior (14).”
BackgroundEvolution of Cooperation in Arbitrary Complex Networks
Ranjbar-Sahraei, B., Ammar, H. B., Bloembergen, D., Tuyls, K., & Weiß, G. (2014) · Cited by 45
Quan, J., Liu, W., Chu, Y., & Wang, X. (2017) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-017-16140-8 · Cited by 45
Feng, M., Zeng, Z., Li, Q., Perc, M., & Kurths, J. (2024) · IEEE Transactions on Systems Man and Cybernetics Systems · doi:10.1109/tsmc.2024.3389095 · Cited by 46
“Accordingly, the evolving network sizes are from 200 to 500, which are enough for the study of fixation probability [49].”
BackgroundZhao, G., & Wang, Y. (2016) · Nonlinear Analysis Hybrid Systems · doi:10.1016/j.nahs.2016.03.009 · Cited by 45
Global dynamics of microbial communities emerge from local interaction rules
van Vliet, S., Hauert, C., Fridberg, K., Ackermann, M., & Co, A. D. (2022) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1009877 · Cited by 48
“Pair approximation assumes that the dynamics of a spatial system can be described by only specifying how often the different cell types are found in each others neighborhoods (Fig 2A) [30, 34, 35].”
Self-citationInequality and cooperation in social networks
Melamed, D., Simpson, B., Montgomery, B., & Patel, V. (2022) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-022-10733-8 · Cited by 49
“More specifically, we conducted a large-scale behavioral experiment using human subjects to answer several interrelated questions about how inequality shapes cooperation, network dynamics, and macro-level inequalities: (1) How do baseline wealth and wealth productivity affect cooperation in networks? (2) Does wealth p…”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Ohtsuki, H., Hauert, C., Lieberman, E., & Nowak, M. A.
- Affiliations
- Kyushu University (JP)
- Corresponding author
- Nowak, Martin A.
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2006-05
- Volume
- 441
- Issue
- 7092
- Pages
- 502-505
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- PMC
- PMC2430087
- OpenAlex
- W2040301417
- Cited by
- 2,208
- References
- 34
- Citations by year
- 2026: 111 · 2025: 118 · 2024: 128 · 2023: 133 · 2022: 101 · 2021: 113 · 2020: 92 · 2019: 107 · 2018: 136 · 2017: 103 · 2016: 116 · 2015: 122 · 2014: 133 · 2013: 126 · 2012: 132
- FWCI
- 277.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- John Templeton Foundation
- Harvard University
- National Institute of General Medical Sciences (R01GM078986)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Genetics › Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
- Life Sciences › Agricultural and Biological Sciences › Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics › Animal Behavior and Reproduction
- Keywords
- evolution of cooperation, structured populations, graphs, social networks, benefit-cost ratio, spatial games, yeast competition, cheaters, scale-free networks, random regular graphs
- MeSH terms
- Altruism, Animals, Cooperative Behavior, Costs and Cost Analysis, Biological Evolution, Game Theory, Humans, Models, Biological, Selection, Genetic, Social Support
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