A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
A fundamental aspect of all biological systems is cooperation. Cooperative interactions are required for many levels of biological organization ranging from single cells to groups of animals. Human society is based to a large extent on mechanisms that promote cooperation. It is well known that in unstructured populations, natural selection favours defectors over cooperators. There is much current interest, however, in studying evolutionary games in structured populations and on graphs. These efforts recognize the fact that who-meets-whom is not random, but determined by spatial relationships or social networks. Here we describe a surprisingly simple rule that is a good approximation for all graphs that we have analysed, including cycles, spatial lattices, random regular graphs, random graphs and scale-free networks: natural selection favours cooperation, if the benefit of the altruistic act, b, divided by the cost, c, exceeds the average number of neighbours, k, which means b/c > k. In this case, cooperation can evolve as a consequence of 'social viscosity' even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity.
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“Here we emphasize that when dynamic transitions occur between two random networks or two random scale-free networks that lack community structure, then cooperation is impeded (relative to a static random or a static scale-free network) - for the intuitive reason that random switches disrupt cooperative clusters [1].”
From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“The mechanism underlying this cooperation-promoting effect is that spatial structure enables the formation of cooperative clusters of individuals, who have high payoffs and are capable of resisting invasion by defectors.”
From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“A well-known and illustrative finding [1] is that population structure can favor cooperation provided the ratio of the benefit from cooperative behavior, b , to its cost, c , exceeds the average number of neighbors, d .”
From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“Theoretical models suggest that social networks influence the evolution of cooperation, but to date there have been few experimental studies.”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [2]
In the citing paper
“Interacting with others in large populations without structure greatly reduces the likelihood of cooperation ( 11 ), but in a fixed social network, cooperation can evolve as a consequence of repeated interactions because of 'social viscosity,' even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity ( 1-2 ).”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [2]
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Liu, T., Wang, Y., & Cheng, D. (2017) · Machine Intelligence Research · doi:10.1007/s11633-017-1056-0 · Cited by 15
Sorrentino, F., Siddique, A. B., & Pecora, L. M. (2019) · Chaos An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science · doi:10.1063/1.5081023 · Cited by 18
“ects of the underlying network symmetries on the network dynamics. Our study indicates that network symmetries play a role in all the dynamical models considered and in particular: evolutionary games [17, 36], network traffic [25, 4, 6, 7, 24, 8, 13, 15, 16], and propagation of excitation among excitable systems [9, 18…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialPromotion of cooperation in evolutionary game dynamics under asymmetric information
Liu, X., Pan, Q., He, M., & Liu, A. (2019) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2019.01.032 · Cited by 16
Ranking the invasions of cheaters in structured populations
Yang, G., Cavaliere, M., Zhu, C., & Perc, M. (2020) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-020-59020-4 · Cited by 17
Third party interventions mitigate conflicts on interdependent networks
Song, Z., Guo, H., Jia, D., Perc, M., Li, X., & Wang, Z. (2021) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2021.126178 · Cited by 15
Punishment Leads to Cooperative Behavior in Structured Societies
Shutters, S. T. (2011) · Evolutionary Computation · doi:10.1162/evco_a_00062 · Cited by 17
Lion, S. (2009) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.05.035 · Cited by 17
“Recently, evolutionary graph theory has emphasised the importance of network structure vs. spatial structure, and considered various declinations of the biased voter model* on graphs (Lieberman et al., 2005; Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Taylor et al., 2007a; Sood et al., 2008).”
BackgroundMethodHeterogeneity Improves Cooperation in Continuous Snowdrift Game
Li-Xin, Z., Qiu, T., & Xu, J. (2008) · Chinese Physics Letters · doi:10.1088/0256-307x/25/6/107 · Cited by 15
An evolutionary view on social innovation and the process of economic changePreprint
Reinstaller, A. (2013) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 19
Evolution of cooperation and competition in multilayer networks
Zhu, W., Wang, X., Wang, C., Xing, W., Liu, L., Zheng, H., Jingwu, Z., & Tang, S. (2025) · Nonlinear Dynamics · doi:10.1007/s11071-025-11693-0 · Cited by 18
Effects of stochastic games on evolutionary dynamics in structured populations
Zhang, Y., Feng, M., Li, Q., Perc, M., & Szolnoki, A. (2026) · Communications Physics · doi:10.1038/s42005-026-02536-4 · Cited by 20
The paradox of cooperation benefits
Németh, A., & Takács, K. (2010) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.02.005 · Cited by 15
AYDOĞMUŞ, Ö. H. (2018) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.01.016 · Cited by 14
“There are a variety of microscopic rules describing the game dynamics in finite populations such as birth-death update, death-birth update or pairwise comparison rules [38].”
BackgroundYang, X., Kong, L., & Qu, S. (2024) · Technology in Society · doi:10.1016/j.techsoc.2024.102631 · Cited by 14
Metadata
- Authors
- Ohtsuki, H., Hauert, C., Lieberman, E., & Nowak, M. A.
- Affiliations
- Kyushu University (JP)
- Corresponding author
- Nowak, Martin A.
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2006-05
- Volume
- 441
- Issue
- 7092
- Pages
- 502-505
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- PMC
- PMC2430087
- OpenAlex
- W2040301417
- Cited by
- 2,208
- References
- 34
- Citations by year
- 2026: 111 · 2025: 118 · 2024: 128 · 2023: 133 · 2022: 101 · 2021: 113 · 2020: 92 · 2019: 107 · 2018: 136 · 2017: 103 · 2016: 116 · 2015: 122 · 2014: 133 · 2013: 126 · 2012: 132
- FWCI
- 277.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- John Templeton Foundation
- Harvard University
- National Institute of General Medical Sciences (R01GM078986)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Genetics › Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
- Life Sciences › Agricultural and Biological Sciences › Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics › Animal Behavior and Reproduction
- Keywords
- evolution of cooperation, structured populations, graphs, social networks, benefit-cost ratio, spatial games, yeast competition, cheaters, scale-free networks, random regular graphs
- MeSH terms
- Altruism, Animals, Cooperative Behavior, Costs and Cost Analysis, Biological Evolution, Game Theory, Humans, Models, Biological, Selection, Genetic, Social Support
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