A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
A fundamental aspect of all biological systems is cooperation. Cooperative interactions are required for many levels of biological organization ranging from single cells to groups of animals. Human society is based to a large extent on mechanisms that promote cooperation. It is well known that in unstructured populations, natural selection favours defectors over cooperators. There is much current interest, however, in studying evolutionary games in structured populations and on graphs. These efforts recognize the fact that who-meets-whom is not random, but determined by spatial relationships or social networks. Here we describe a surprisingly simple rule that is a good approximation for all graphs that we have analysed, including cycles, spatial lattices, random regular graphs, random graphs and scale-free networks: natural selection favours cooperation, if the benefit of the altruistic act, b, divided by the cost, c, exceeds the average number of neighbours, k, which means b/c > k. In this case, cooperation can evolve as a consequence of 'social viscosity' even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity.
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“Here we emphasize that when dynamic transitions occur between two random networks or two random scale-free networks that lack community structure, then cooperation is impeded (relative to a static random or a static scale-free network) - for the intuitive reason that random switches disrupt cooperative clusters [1].”
From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“The mechanism underlying this cooperation-promoting effect is that spatial structure enables the formation of cooperative clusters of individuals, who have high payoffs and are capable of resisting invasion by defectors.”
From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“A well-known and illustrative finding [1] is that population structure can favor cooperation provided the ratio of the benefit from cooperative behavior, b , to its cost, c , exceeds the average number of neighbors, d .”
From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“Theoretical models suggest that social networks influence the evolution of cooperation, but to date there have been few experimental studies.”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [2]
In the citing paper
“Interacting with others in large populations without structure greatly reduces the likelihood of cooperation ( 11 ), but in a fixed social network, cooperation can evolve as a consequence of repeated interactions because of 'social viscosity,' even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity ( 1-2 ).”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [2]
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“Substituting m0 ¼ 1/(k + 1) and mj ¼ 1/(k + 1) for the k nearest neighbour nodes gives ‘imitation’ instead of ‘death–birth’ updating and we recover the appropriate rule B/C > 4 ) 18/(nd ) 6) of Ohtsuki et al. (2006) for k ¼ 2 and the rule B/C > k + 2 of Ohtsuki & Nowak (2006) for large nd.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialA Networked ${N}$ -Player Trust Game and Its Evolutionary Dynamics
Chica, M., Chiong, R., Kirley, M., & Ishibuchi, H. (2018) · IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation · doi:10.1109/tevc.2017.2769081 · Cited by 95
“These realizations led to spatial approaches for evolutionary game dynamics [17], [27], [32] and later evolutionary graph theory [33].”
BackgroundFormalizing Darwinism and inclusive fitness theory
Grafen, A. (2009) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2009.0056 · Cited by 95
“The second example is interesting new work using graph theory, where Ohtsuki et al. (2006) claim that their conclusions bear some resemblance to, but are distinct from, inclusive fitness.”
BackgroundMapping collective behavior in the big-data era
Bentley, R. A., O’Brien, M. J., & Brock, W. A. (2014) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x13000289 · Cited by 109
Exploring optimal institutional incentives for public cooperation
Wang, S., Chen, X., & Szolnoki, A. (2019) · Communications in Nonlinear Science and Numerical Simulation · doi:10.1016/j.cnsns.2019.104914 · Cited by 105
“This is referred to as social dilemma of cooperation [4, 5, 6, 7], which has received considerable attention in recent years [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28].”
Reinforcement learning facilitates an optimal interaction intensity for cooperation
Song, Z., Guo, H., Jia, D., Perc, M., Li, X., & Wang, Z. (2022) · Neurocomputing · doi:10.1016/j.neucom.2022.09.109 · Cited by 103
Social goods dilemmas in heterogeneous societies
McAvoy, A., Allen, B., & Nowak, M. A. (2020) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-020-0881-2 · Cited by 94
“Using the pair-approximation method on regular graphs, Ohtsuki et al. (2006) showed that weak selection favors the evolution of cooperation if b/c > d.”
MethodSelf-citationWu, Z.-X., & Wang, Y.-H. (2007) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.75.041114 · Cited by 103
Kaveh, K., Komarova, N. L., & Kohandel, M. (2015) · Royal Society Open Science · doi:10.1098/rsos.140465 · Cited by 112
“(Ohtsuki and Nowak [8] call this an ”imitation” updating in the context of game theory on graphs.)”
BackgroundInfluentialThe option to leave: Conditional dissociation in the evolution of cooperation
Izquierdo, S. S., Izquierdo, L. R., & Vega‐Redondo, F. (2010) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.07.039 · Cited by 94
Evolution of honesty in higher-order social networks
Kumar, A., Chowdhary, S., Capraro, V., & Perc, M. (2021) · Physical review. E · doi:10.1103/physreve.104.054308 · Cited by 101
Networking effects on cooperation in evolutionary snowdrift game
Zhong, L.-X., Zheng, D. F., Zheng, B., Xu, C., & Hui, P. M. (2006) · Europhysics Letters (EPL) · doi:10.1209/epl/i2006-10323-2 · Cited by 98
How mutation affects evolutionary games on graphs
Allen, B., Traulsen, A., Tarnita, C. E., & Nowak, M. A. (2012) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.03.034 · Cited by 90
“F can be any increasing differentiable function satisfying Fð0Þ 1⁄4 F 0ð0Þ 1⁄4 1, for example FðdpÞ 1⁄4 1þdp (Nowak et al., 2004; Ohtsuki et al., 2006) or FðdpÞ 1⁄4 edp (Traulsen et al.”
InfluentialSelf-citationUnderstanding Social Networks From a Multiagent Perspective
Jiang, Y., & Jiang, J. (2013) · IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems · doi:10.1109/tpds.2013.254 · Cited by 97
McAvoy, A., & Hauert, C. (2015) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004349 · Cited by 104
“…Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC) (http://www.nserc-crsng. gc.ca/index_eng.asp) and CH from the Foundational Questions in Evolutionary Biology Fund (FQEB), grant RFP-12-10…”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationFear of predation drives stable and differentiated social relationships in guppies
Heathcote, R. J. P., Darden, S. K., Franks, D. W., Ramnarine, I. W., & Croft, D. P. (2017) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep41679 · Cited by 98
Sexual networks: measuring sexual selection in structured, polyandrous populations
McDonald, G. C., James, R., Krause, J., & Pizzari, T. (2013) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2012.0356 · Cited by 100
Interactive diversity promotes the evolution of cooperation in structured populations
Su, Q., Li, A., Zhou, L., & Wang, L. (2016) · New Journal of Physics · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/18/10/103007 · Cited by 94
Cities That Think like Planets: Complexity, Resilience, and Innovation in Hybrid Ecosystems
Alberti, M. (2016) · University of Washington Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9780295806600 · Cited by 153
Social network reciprocity as a phase transition in evolutionary cooperation
Floría, L. M., Gracia-Lázaro, C., Gómez‐Gardeñes, J., & Moreno, Y. (2009) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.79.026106 · Cited by 93
Strategy evolution on dynamic networks
Su, Q., McAvoy, A., & Plotkin, J. B. (2023) · Nature Computational Science · doi:10.1038/s43588-023-00509-z · Cited by 97
“A well-known and illustrative finding 1 is that population structure can favor cooperation provided that the ratio of the benefit from cooperative behavior ( b ) to its cost ( c ) exceeds the average number of neighbors ( d ).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Ohtsuki, H., Hauert, C., Lieberman, E., & Nowak, M. A.
- Affiliations
- Kyushu University (JP)
- Corresponding author
- Nowak, Martin A.
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2006-05
- Volume
- 441
- Issue
- 7092
- Pages
- 502-505
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- PMC
- PMC2430087
- OpenAlex
- W2040301417
- Cited by
- 2,208
- References
- 34
- Citations by year
- 2026: 111 · 2025: 118 · 2024: 128 · 2023: 133 · 2022: 101 · 2021: 113 · 2020: 92 · 2019: 107 · 2018: 136 · 2017: 103 · 2016: 116 · 2015: 122 · 2014: 133 · 2013: 126 · 2012: 132
- FWCI
- 277.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- John Templeton Foundation
- Harvard University
- National Institute of General Medical Sciences (R01GM078986)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Genetics › Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
- Life Sciences › Agricultural and Biological Sciences › Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics › Animal Behavior and Reproduction
- Keywords
- evolution of cooperation, structured populations, graphs, social networks, benefit-cost ratio, spatial games, yeast competition, cheaters, scale-free networks, random regular graphs
- MeSH terms
- Altruism, Animals, Cooperative Behavior, Costs and Cost Analysis, Biological Evolution, Game Theory, Humans, Models, Biological, Selection, Genetic, Social Support
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Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.