A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
A fundamental aspect of all biological systems is cooperation. Cooperative interactions are required for many levels of biological organization ranging from single cells to groups of animals. Human society is based to a large extent on mechanisms that promote cooperation. It is well known that in unstructured populations, natural selection favours defectors over cooperators. There is much current interest, however, in studying evolutionary games in structured populations and on graphs. These efforts recognize the fact that who-meets-whom is not random, but determined by spatial relationships or social networks. Here we describe a surprisingly simple rule that is a good approximation for all graphs that we have analysed, including cycles, spatial lattices, random regular graphs, random graphs and scale-free networks: natural selection favours cooperation, if the benefit of the altruistic act, b, divided by the cost, c, exceeds the average number of neighbours, k, which means b/c > k. In this case, cooperation can evolve as a consequence of 'social viscosity' even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity.
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“Here we emphasize that when dynamic transitions occur between two random networks or two random scale-free networks that lack community structure, then cooperation is impeded (relative to a static random or a static scale-free network) - for the intuitive reason that random switches disrupt cooperative clusters [1].”
From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“The mechanism underlying this cooperation-promoting effect is that spatial structure enables the formation of cooperative clusters of individuals, who have high payoffs and are capable of resisting invasion by defectors.”
From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“A well-known and illustrative finding [1] is that population structure can favor cooperation provided the ratio of the benefit from cooperative behavior, b , to its cost, c , exceeds the average number of neighbors, d .”
From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“Theoretical models suggest that social networks influence the evolution of cooperation, but to date there have been few experimental studies.”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [2]
In the citing paper
“Interacting with others in large populations without structure greatly reduces the likelihood of cooperation ( 11 ), but in a fixed social network, cooperation can evolve as a consequence of repeated interactions because of 'social viscosity,' even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity ( 1-2 ).”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [2]
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Asymmetrical interactions driven by strategic persistence effectively alleviate social dilemmas
Li, X., Wang, Z., Xu, Y., Zhang, H., & Yu, G. (2024) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2024.115054 · Cited by 23
The evolution of cooperation in mixed games
Wardil, L. L., & da Silva, J. K. L. (2013) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2013.07.018 · Cited by 22
Belief-Oriented Segregation in Policy Networks
Henry, A. D. (2011) · Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.sbspro.2011.07.052 · Cited by 25
“However, more recent work demonstrates that equilibrium conditions can change radically when different assumptions are made about underlying network structures (Ohtsuki et al., 2006).”
BackgroundEvolutionary snowdrift game incorporating costly punishment in structured populations
Chan, N. W. H., Xu, C., Tey, S. K., Yap, Y. J., & Hui, P. M. (2012) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2012.07.078 · Cited by 25
The Co-Evolution of Fairness Preferences and Costly Punishment
Hetzer, M., & Sornette, D. (2013) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0054308 · Cited by 24
Cooperation and the Fate of Microbial Societies
Allen, B., & Nowak, M. A. (2013) · PLoS Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001549 · Cited by 26
Self-citationMoment equations in spatial evolutionary ecology
Lion, S. (2015) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.10.014 · Cited by 23
Fairness and Trust in Structured Populations
Tarnita, C. (2015) · Games · doi:10.3390/g6030214 · Cited by 19
“Population structure has been very powerful to explain the evolution of cooperation and social behavior both theoretically [12–14] and empirically [15,16].”
BackgroundLiu, Y., Yang, C., Huang, K., & Wang, Z. (2019) · Chaos An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science · doi:10.1063/1.5088932 · Cited by 24
Metadata
- Authors
- Ohtsuki, H., Hauert, C., Lieberman, E., & Nowak, M. A.
- Affiliations
- Kyushu University (JP)
- Corresponding author
- Nowak, Martin A.
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2006-05
- Volume
- 441
- Issue
- 7092
- Pages
- 502-505
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- PMC
- PMC2430087
- OpenAlex
- W2040301417
- Cited by
- 2,208
- References
- 34
- Citations by year
- 2026: 111 · 2025: 118 · 2024: 128 · 2023: 133 · 2022: 101 · 2021: 113 · 2020: 92 · 2019: 107 · 2018: 136 · 2017: 103 · 2016: 116 · 2015: 122 · 2014: 133 · 2013: 126 · 2012: 132
- FWCI
- 277.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- John Templeton Foundation
- Harvard University
- National Institute of General Medical Sciences (R01GM078986)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Genetics › Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
- Life Sciences › Agricultural and Biological Sciences › Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics › Animal Behavior and Reproduction
- Keywords
- evolution of cooperation, structured populations, graphs, social networks, benefit-cost ratio, spatial games, yeast competition, cheaters, scale-free networks, random regular graphs
- MeSH terms
- Altruism, Animals, Cooperative Behavior, Costs and Cost Analysis, Biological Evolution, Game Theory, Humans, Models, Biological, Selection, Genetic, Social Support
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.