A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
A fundamental aspect of all biological systems is cooperation. Cooperative interactions are required for many levels of biological organization ranging from single cells to groups of animals. Human society is based to a large extent on mechanisms that promote cooperation. It is well known that in unstructured populations, natural selection favours defectors over cooperators. There is much current interest, however, in studying evolutionary games in structured populations and on graphs. These efforts recognize the fact that who-meets-whom is not random, but determined by spatial relationships or social networks. Here we describe a surprisingly simple rule that is a good approximation for all graphs that we have analysed, including cycles, spatial lattices, random regular graphs, random graphs and scale-free networks: natural selection favours cooperation, if the benefit of the altruistic act, b, divided by the cost, c, exceeds the average number of neighbours, k, which means b/c > k. In this case, cooperation can evolve as a consequence of 'social viscosity' even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Here we emphasize that when dynamic transitions occur between two random networks or two random scale-free networks that lack community structure, then cooperation is impeded (relative to a static random or a static scale-free network) - for the intuitive reason that random switches disrupt cooperative clusters [1].”
From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“The mechanism underlying this cooperation-promoting effect is that spatial structure enables the formation of cooperative clusters of individuals, who have high payoffs and are capable of resisting invasion by defectors.”
From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“A well-known and illustrative finding [1] is that population structure can favor cooperation provided the ratio of the benefit from cooperative behavior, b , to its cost, c , exceeds the average number of neighbors, d .”
From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“Theoretical models suggest that social networks influence the evolution of cooperation, but to date there have been few experimental studies.”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [2]
In the citing paper
“Interacting with others in large populations without structure greatly reduces the likelihood of cooperation ( 11 ), but in a fixed social network, cooperation can evolve as a consequence of repeated interactions because of 'social viscosity,' even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity ( 1-2 ).”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [2]
Citations
Cites
Collective dynamics of ‘small-world’ networks
Watts, D. J., & Strogatz, S. H. (1998) · Nature · doi:10.1038/30918 · Cited by 43,060 · cited 1×
“Moreover, we find that the rule also holds for random graphs 25 and scale-free networks 26,27 , where individuals differ in the number of their neighbours.”
BackgroundEmergence of Scaling in Random Networks
Barabási, A.-L., & Albert, R. (1999) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.286.5439.509 · Cited by 36,135
Statistical mechanics of complex networks
Albert, R., & Barabási, A.-L. (2002) · Reviews of Modern Physics · doi:10.1103/revmodphys.74.47 · Cited by 20,471
Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7466396 · Cited by 20,065
The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I
Hamilton, W. D. (1964) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4 · Cited by 15,725
The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism
Trivers, R. L. (1971) · The Quarterly Review of Biology · doi:10.1086/406755 · Cited by 11,010
Bollobás, B. (1985) · Cited by 6,196
Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
Hofbauer, J., & Sigmund, K. (1998) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173179 · Cited by 5,502
Evolutionary games and spatial chaos
Nowak, M. A., & May, R. M. (1992) · Nature · doi:10.1038/359826a0 · Cited by 4,463
Self-citationAn introduction to population genetics theory
Crow, J. F., & Kimura, M. (1970) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 4,223
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Wilson, E. O. Sociobiology (Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1975)
Cited by
Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation
Nowak, M. A. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1133755 · Cited by 5,894
Self-citationSzabó, G., & Fáth, G. (2007) · Physics Reports · doi:10.1016/j.physrep.2007.04.004 · Cited by 2,974
“search towards these models in recent years has started to provide a more complete picture about the emergence of cooperation in social dilemmas in general (Santos et al., 2006b; Hauert et al., 2006; Ohtsuki et al., 2006)). 106 One of the most striking features of evolutionary games is the occurrence of self-organizin…”
BackgroundA 61-million-person experiment in social influence and political mobilization
Bond, R. M., Fariss, C. J., Jones, J. J., Kramer, A. D. I., Marlow, C., Settle, J. E., & Fowler, J. H. (2012) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature11421 · Cited by 2,575
Coevolutionary games—A mini review
Perc, M., & Szolnoki, A. (2010) · Biosystems · doi:10.1016/j.biosystems.2009.10.003 · Cited by 1,971
“Key words: evolutionary games, coevolution, social dilemmas, cooperation PACS:02.50.”
InfluentialStatistical physics of human cooperation
Perc, M., Jordan, J. J., Rand, D. G., Wang, Z., Boccaletti, S., & Szolnoki, A. (2017) · Physics Reports · doi:10.1016/j.physrep.2017.05.004 · Cited by 1,590
“A closer inspection of the theory reveals a potential explanation for this mismatch: one particularly influential line of theoretical work found that cooperation is only evolutionary stable on networks when the benefit-to-cost ratio of cooperation is larger than the average number of network neighbors [150] (see also…”
ResultNowak, M. A., Tarnita, C. E., & Wilson, E. O. (2010) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature09205 · Cited by 1,491
“Assumption (1) also holds for Moran type processes (Moran 1962) with either Death-Birth (DB) or Birth-Death (BD) updating (Ohtsuki et al 2006, Ohtsuki & Nowak 2006).”
BackgroundSelf-citationSocial diversity promotes the emergence of cooperation in public goods games
Santos, F. C., Santos, M. D., & Pacheco, J. M. (2008) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature06940 · Cited by 1,442
Evolutionary dynamics of group interactions on structured populations: a review
Perc, M., Gómez-Gardeñes, J., Szolnoki, A., Floría, L. M., & Moreno, Y. (2013) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2012.0997 · Cited by 1,340
Rand, D. G., & Nowak, M. A. (2013) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.06.003 · Cited by 1,308
Self-citationSumpter, D. J. T. (2010) · doi:10.1515/9781400837106 · Cited by 914
Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks
Fowler, J. H., & Christakis, N. A. (2010) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0913149107 · Cited by 767
Decety, J., Bartal, I. B.-A., Uzefovsky, F., & Knafo-Noam, A. (2016) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2015.0077 · Cited by 740
Social networks and cooperation in hunter-gatherers.
Apicella, C. L., Marlowe, F. W., Fowler, J. H., & Christakis, N. A. (2012) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature10736 · Cited by 698
Coevolution of Strategy and Structure in Complex Networks with Dynamical Linking
Pacheco, J. M., Traulsen, A., & Nowak, M. A. (2006) · Physical Review Letters · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.97.258103 · Cited by 697
Self-citationJusup, M., Holme, P., Kanazawa, K., Takayasu, M., Romić, I., Wang, Z., Geček, S., Lipić, T., Podobnik, B., Wang, L., et al. (2022) · Physics Reports · doi:10.1016/j.physrep.2021.10.005 · Cited by 643
Reputation-based partner choice promotes cooperation in social networks
Fu, F., Hauert, C., Nowak, M. A., & Wang, L. (2008) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.78.026117 · Cited by 682
Self-citationDynamic social networks promote cooperation in experiments with humans
Rand, D. G., Arbesman, S., & Christakis, N. A. (2011) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1108243108 · Cited by 653
“This result is also consistent with theoretical predictions (11), given that the average number of neighbors exceeds the benefit-to-cost ratio of cooperation.”
ResultEvolutionary dynamics of higher-order interactions in social networks
Alvarez-Rodriguez, U., Battiston, F., de Arruda, G. F., Moreno, Y., Perc, M., & Latora, V. (2021) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-020-01024-1 · Cited by 576
Universal scaling for the dilemma strength in evolutionary games
Wang, Z., Kokubo, S., Jusup, M., & Tanimoto, J. (2015) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2015.04.033 · Cited by 586
“We select the Death-Birth (DB) updating rule for the evolutionary dynamics [57].”
BackgroundMethodPrisoner’s dilemma game model Based on historical strategy information
Gou, Z., & Li, Y. (2023) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-022-26890-9 · Cited by 561
Bascompte, J. (2009) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1170749 · Cited by 529
Cooperation Prevails When Individuals Adjust Their Social Ties
Santos, F. C., Pacheco, J. M., & Lenaerts, T. (2006) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0020140 · Cited by 556
“None of the previous results on strong [7] and weak [8] selection on graphs is capable of explaining how cooperation thrives on such social networks.”
BackgroundResultInfluentialDynamical Organization of Cooperation in Complex Topologies
Gómez-Gardeñes, J., Campillo, M., Floría, L. M., & Moreno, Y. (2007) · Physical Review Letters · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.98.108103 · Cited by 555
Evolutionary dynamics on any population structure
Allen, B., Lippner, G., Chen, Y.-T., Fotouhi, B., Momeni, N., Yau, S.-T., & Nowak, M. A. (2017) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature21723 · Cited by 534
“Evolution proceeds according to Death-Birth (DB) updating [5]: A random individual dies and a neighbor is chosen, with probability proportional to reproductive rate, to reproduce into the vacancy.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citationSocial network theory in the behavioural sciences: potential applications
Krause, J., Croft, D. P., & James, R. (2007) · Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology · doi:10.1007/s00265-007-0445-8 · Cited by 489
“Spider monkeys (Ateles geoffroyi) Pastor-Nieto (2001) Food sharing Pigtailed macaques (Macaca nemestrina) Flack et al.”
BackgroundInfluentialEvolutionary dynamics in structured populations
Nowak, M. A., Tarnita, C. E., & Antal, T. (2010) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2009.0215 · Cited by 512
“We can derive a replicator equation on graphs (Ohtsuki & Nowak 2006), discuss evolutionary stability (Ohtsuki & Nowak 2008) and calculate fixation probabilities (Ohtsuki et al 2006).”
InfluentialSelf-citationSocial Networks and Collective Action
Siegel, D. A. (2009) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00361.x · Cited by 458
Social network theory: new insights and issues for behavioral ecologists
Sih, A., Hanser, S. F., & McHugh, K. A. (2009) · Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology · doi:10.1007/s00265-009-0725-6 · Cited by 443
“Recent theory formalized this intuition, showing that, given some simplifying assumptions, cooperation is favored if b /c>k, where b and c are the benefits and costs of the cooperative act, and k is the average number of interacting neighbors in the social group, or in SN metrics, the group’s mean degree (Ohtsuki et a…”
BackgroundInfluentialBering, J. M. (2006) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x06009101 · Cited by 458
“According to Ohtsuki et al. (2006), cooperation is a fundamental aspect of all biological systems, and among humans it can evolve even in the absence of reputation effects, but Henrich (2006), points out that the reputation effect may act to stabilize maladaptive and immoral behaviors.”
The dynamics of animal social networks: analytical, conceptual, and theoretical advances
Pinter-Wollman, N., Hobson, E. A., Smith, J. E., Edelman, A. J., Shizuka, D., de Silva, S., Waters, J. S., Prager, S. D., Sasaki, T., Wittemyer, G., et al. (2014) · Behavioral Ecology · doi:10.1093/beheco/art047 · Cited by 436
The replicator equation on graphs
Ohtsuki, H., & Nowak, M. A. (2006) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.06.004 · Cited by 460
“…Nakamaru et al 1997, 1998, Epstein 1998, Szabó & Tőke 1998, Van Baalen & Rand 1998, Watts & Strogatz 1998, Eshel et al 1999, Hartvigsen et al 2000, Page et al 2000, Szabó et al 2000, Skyrms & Pemantle 2000, Abramson & Kuperman 2001, Hauert 2001, Irwin & Taylor 2001, Ebel & Bornholdt 2002,…”
BackgroundSelf-citationImitation dynamics of vaccination behaviour on social networks
Fu, F., Rosenbloom, D. I., Wang, L., & Nowak, M. A. (2011) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2010.1107 · Cited by 448
“It is widely known that population structure can promote the evolution of cooperative behav-219 ior (Hauert & Doebeli 2004, Nowak & May 1992, Nowak 2006b, Nowak et al. 2010, Ohtsuki et al. 2006, Tarnita et al. 2009a;b).”
BackgroundSelf-citationMulti-agent Reinforcement Learning in Sequential Social Dilemmas
Leibo, J. Z., Zambaldi, V., Lanctot, M., Marecki, J., & Graepel, T. (2017) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1702.03037 · Cited by 263
“, direct reciprocity [4, 5, 6, 7], indirect reciprocity [8], norm enforcement [9, 10], simple reinforcement learning variants [3], multiagent reinforcement learning [11, 12, 13, 14, 15], spatial structure [16], emotions [17], and social network effects [18, 19].”
BackgroundHuman strategy updating in evolutionary games
Traulsen, A., Semmann, D., Sommerfeld, R. D., Krambeck, H.-J., & Milinski, M. (2010) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0912515107 · Cited by 412
Evolutionary dynamics of higher-order interactions in social networks
Alvarez-Rodriguez, U., Battiston, F., de Arruda, G. F., Moreno, Y., Perc, M., & Latora, V. (2021) · Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich) · doi:10.5167/uzh-214990 · Cited by 403
Heterogeneous Aspirations Promote Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Perc, M., & Wang, Z. (2010) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015117 · Cited by 367
“Notably, a simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks is that natural selection favors cooperation if b/c > k, where b is the benefit of the altruistic act, c is its cost, while k is the average number of neighbors [30].”
BackgroundGraph Convolutional Reinforcement LearningPreprint
Jiang, J., Dun, C., Huang, T., & Lu, Z. (2018) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1810.09202 · Cited by 433
“The development of human cooperation is facilitated by the underlying graph of human societies (Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Apicella et al., 2012), where the mutual interplay between humans is abstracted by their relations.”
BackgroundAnimal social networks: an introduction
Krause, J., Lusseau, D., & James, R. (2009) · Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology · doi:10.1007/s00265-009-0747-0 · Cited by 347
“More recent “evolutionary graph theory” models (for example Ohtsuki et al. 2006; Santos et al. 2008) use networks to quantify social heterogeneity, and account for it, in models of, for example, the evolution and maintenance of cooperation.”
BackgroundMethodUpstream reciprocity and the evolution of gratitude
Nowak, M. A., & Roch, S. (2007) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2006.0125 · Cited by 339
“For the evolutionary dynamics, let us consider 'imitation updating' (Ohtsuki et al. 2006): at each time-step, an individual is chosen at random to update its strategy.”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationXia, C., Wang, J., Perc, M., & Wang, Z. (2023) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2023.05.002 · Cited by 339
Onymity promotes cooperation in social dilemma experiments
Wang, Z., Jusup, M., Wang, R.-W., Shi, L., Iwasa, Y., Moreno, Y., & Kurths, J. (2017) · Science Advances · doi:10.1126/sciadv.1601444 · Cited by 343
Emotions as infectious diseases in a large social network: the SISa model
Hill, A. L., Rand, D. G., Nowak, M. A., & Christakis, N. A. (2010) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2010.1217 · Cited by 334
“Networks also play an important role in evolutionary biology, where population structure determining interactions can facilitate the evolution of cooperative behaviour (Ohtsuki et al. 2006; Tarnita et al. 2009a,b; Nowak & May 1992; Fu et al. 2007).”
Self-citationCao, Y., Fanning, S., Proos, S., Jordan, K., & Srikumar, S. (2017) · Frontiers in Microbiology · doi:10.3389/fmicb.2017.01829 · Cited by 298
Evolutionary dynamics of collective action in N -person stag hunt dilemmas
Pacheco, J. M., Santos, F. C., Souza, M. O., & Skyrms, B. (2009) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2008.1126 · Cited by 310
“…of organization (Axelrod & Hamilton 1981; Maynard-Smith 1982; Axelrod 1984; Boyd & Richerson 1985; Hofbauer & Sigmund 1998; Skyrms 2001, 2004; Macy & Flache 2002; Hammerstein 2003; Nowak & Sigmund 2004; Nowak et al. 2004; Santos & Pacheco 2005; Nowak 2006; Ohtsuki et al. 2006; Santos et al. 2006).”
BackgroundEvolution of cooperation in a finite homogeneous graph
Taylor, P. D., Day, T., & Wild, G. (2007) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature05784 · Cited by 302
Towards effective payoffs in the prisoner’s dilemma game on scale-free networks
Szolnoki, A., Perc, M., & Danku, Z. (2008) · Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2007.11.021 · Cited by 297
Static network structure can stabilize human cooperation
Rand, D. G., Nowak, M. A., Fowler, J. H., & Christakis, N. A. (2014) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1400406111 · Cited by 290
“It has been shown by (1) that cooperation can spread under this framework as long as b/c>k, which causes the network structure to generate enough clustering to make cooperators earn high payoffs.”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationBehavioural trait assortment in a social network: patterns and implications
Croft, D. P., Krause, J., Darden, S. K., Ramnarine, I. W., Faria, J. J., & James, R. (2009) · Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology · doi:10.1007/s00265-009-0802-x · Cited by 271
“17 that behavioural assortment by co-operative behaviour may be important in maintaining 361 co-operation (Wilson and Dugatkin 1997; Ohtsuki et al. 2006; Santos et al. 2006).”
BackgroundStrategy selection in structured populations
Tarnita, C. E., Ohtsuki, H., Antal, T., Fu, F., & Nowak, M. A. (2009) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.03.035 · Cited by 281
“For example, for DB updating on regular graphs of degree k we know that ðb=cÞ* 1⁄4 k (Ohtsuki et al., 2006).”
InfluentialSelf-citationHunter-Gatherer Inter-Band Interaction Rates: Implications for Cumulative Culture
Hill, K. R., Wood, B. M., Baggio, J., Hurtado, A. M., & Boyd, R. T. (2014) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0102806 · Cited by 269
Reality mining of animal social systems
Krause, J., Krause, S., Arlinghaus, R., Psorakis, I., Roberts, S., & Rutz, C. (2013) · Trends in Ecology & Evolution · doi:10.1016/j.tree.2013.06.002 · Cited by 269
Breaking the Symmetry between Interaction and Replacement in Evolutionary Dynamics on Graphs
Ohtsuki, H., Nowak, M. A., & Pacheco, J. M. (2007) · Physical Review Letters · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.98.108106 · Cited by 271
Self-citationEvolutionary dynamics in set structured populations
Tarnita, C. E., Antal, T., Ohtsuki, H., & Nowak, M. A. (2009) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0903019106 · Cited by 264
“The mechanism for the evolution of cooperation in our model is similar to the clustering that occurs in spatial games [8] and games on graphs [9], [10].”
MethodSelf-citationActive linking in evolutionary games
Pacheco, J. M., Traulsen, A., & Nowak, M. A. (2006) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.06.027 · Cited by 258
Self-citationKerth, G., Perony, N., & Schweitzer, F. (2011) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2010.2718 · Cited by 245
Temporal dynamics and network analysis
Blonder, B., Wey, T. W., Dornhaus, A., James, R., & Sih, A. (2012) · Methods in Ecology and Evolution · doi:10.1111/j.2041-210x.2012.00236.x · Cited by 254
Model of genetic variation in human social networks
Fowler, J. H., Dawes, C. T., & Christakis, N. A. (2009) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0806746106 · Cited by 245
Nowak, M. A. (2012) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.01.014 · Cited by 232
“Evolutionary graph theory studies evolution on constant graphs (Lieberman et al., 2005; Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2006, 2008; Taylor et al., 2007; Fu et al., 2009; Perc, 2009; Liu et al., 2010).”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe evolutionary and ecological consequences of animal social networks: emerging issues
Kurvers, R. H. J. M., Krause, J., Croft, D. P., Wilson, A. D. M., & Wolf, M. (2014) · Trends in Ecology & Evolution · doi:10.1016/j.tree.2014.04.002 · Cited by 227
Anti-social punishment can prevent the co-evolution of punishment and cooperation
Rand, D. G., Armao IV, J. J., Nakamaru, M., & Ohtsuki, H. (2010) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.06.010 · Cited by 233
Self-citationInfectious Disease Modeling of Social Contagion in Networks
Hill, A. L., Rand, D. G., Nowak, M. A., & Christakis, N. A. (2010) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000968 · Cited by 229
Self-citationSelf‐structuring in spatial evolutionary ecology
Lion, S., & Baalen, M. V. (2008) · Ecology Letters · doi:10.1111/j.1461-0248.2007.01132.x · Cited by 232
Evolution of in-group favoritism
Fu, F., Tarnita, C. E., Christakis, N. A., Wang, L., Rand, D. G., & Nowak, M. A. (2012) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep00460 · Cited by 216
Self-citationOhtsuki, H., & Nowak, M. A. (2006) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2006.3576 · Cited by 230
“…& Nordahl 1994, Nowak et al 1994, Killingback & Doebeli 1996, Nakamaru et al 1997, 1998, Epstein 1998, van Baalen & Rand 1998, Eshel et al 1999, Page et al 2000, Skyrms & Pemantle 2000, Abramson & Kuperman 2001, Irwin & Taylor 2001, Ebel & Bornholdt 2002, Hauert et al 2002, Brandt et al 2003,…”
BackgroundSelf-citationRewarding evolutionary fitness with links between populations promotes cooperation
Wang, Z., Szolnoki, A., & Perc, M. (2014) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.01.037 · Cited by 228
“…have all been shown to extend the boundaries of traditional network reciprocity (Nowak and May, 1992) past its limits on isolated networks (Santos et al., 2006; Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Preprint submitted to Journal of Theoretical Biology April 4, 2014 Szabó and Fáth, 2007; Perc et al., 2013).”
BackgroundStochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics
Traulsen, A., & Hauert, C. (2009) · Reviews of Nonlinear Dynamics and Complexity · doi:10.1002/9783527628001.ch2 · Cited by 220
Self-citationLearning and Innovative Elements of Strategy Adoption Rules Expand Cooperative Network Topologies
Wang, S., Szalay, M. S., Zhang, C., & Csermely, P. (2008) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001917 · Cited by 223
“Network evolution is full of stochastic ‘errors’, and often results in the development of a higher average degree [25], which makes cooperation more difficult [15,16].”
BackgroundEvolution of cooperation by phenotypic similarity
Antal, T., Ohtsuki, H., Wakeley, J., Taylor, P. D., & Nowak, M. A. (2009) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0902528106 · Cited by 224
Self-citationPersonality in the context of social networks
Krause, J., James, R., & Croft, D. P. (2010) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2010.0216 · Cited by 215
“Recent models that explore the evolution of behavioural strategies on networks indicate that the social fine-structure of populations (as revealed by networks) is of crucial importance for an understanding of evolutionary processes (Ohtsuki et al. 2006; Santos et al. 2006a,b).”
BackgroundInfluentialAdaptive Networks: Theory, Models and Applications
(2009) · Understanding Complex Systems · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-01284-6 · Cited by 218
How life history and demography promote or inhibit the evolution of helping behaviours
Lehmann, L., & Rousset, F. (2010) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2010.0138 · Cited by 222
“Another factor promoting the selective pressure on helping is thus the presence of overlapping generations (Taylor & Irwin 2000; Irwin & Taylor 2001), or, in other words, the presence of ‘asynchronous’ rather than ‘synchronous’ updating (Nakamaru et al. 1997; Koella 2000; Ohtsuki et al. 2006).”
BackgroundInfluentialEnhancement of cooperation in highly clustered scale-free networks
Assenza, S., Gómez-Gardeñes, J., & Latora, V. (2008) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.78.017101 · Cited by 228
Evolution of cooperation under -person snowdrift games
Souza, M. O., Pacheco, J. M., & Santos, F. C. (2009) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.07.010 · Cited by 229
“Evolutionary game theory has been widely employed in the study of the evolution of cooperation at different levels of organization (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Maynard-Smith, 1982; Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Skyrms, 2001, 2004; Macy and Flache, 2002; Hammerstein, 2003; Nowak and Sigmund, 200…”
MethodFehl, K., van der Post, D. J., & Semmann, D. (2011) · Ecology Letters · doi:10.1111/j.1461-0248.2011.01615.x · Cited by 220
Partner switching stabilizes cooperation in coevolutionary prisoner’s dilemma
Fu, F., Wu, T., & Wang, L. (2009) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.79.036101 · Cited by 228
Evidence of social communities in a spatially structured network of a free-ranging shark species
Mourier, J., Vercelloni, J., & Planes, S. (2012) · Animal Behaviour · doi:10.1016/j.anbehav.2011.11.008 · Cited by 207
Spatial dynamics of ecological public goods
Wakano, J. Y., Nowak, M. A., & Hauert, C. (2009) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0812644106 · Cited by 226
Self-citationComplex Cooperative Networks from Evolutionary Preferential Attachment
Poncela, J., Gómez-Gardeñes, J., Floría, L. M., Sánchez, A., & Moreno, Y. (2008) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002449 · Cited by 212
Böckler, A., Tusche, A., & Singer, T. (2016) · Social Psychological and Personality Science · doi:10.1177/1948550616639650 · Cited by 189
“…behavior (Leiberg et al., 2011) and complies with driving factors that are suggested by previous research (Boyd & Richerson, 2009; Fowler, 2005; Henrich et al., 2006; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005; Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Peysakhovich et al., 2014; Steinbeis et al., 2012; Warneken & Tomasello, 2009).”
BackgroundMethodViscous medium promotes cooperation in the pathogenic bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa
Kümmerli, R., Griffin, A. S., West, S. A., Buckling, A., & Harrison, F. (2009) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2009.0861 · Cited by 209
Tit-for-tat or win-stay, lose-shift?
Imhof, L. A., Fudenberg, D., & Nowak, M. A. (2007) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.03.027 · Cited by 203
“Various mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation have been proposed including kin selection (Hamilton, 1964), group selection (Wilson, 1975; Wynne-Edwards, 1962), indirect reciprocity (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998, 2005) and spatial (or network) reciprocity (Nowak and May, 1992; Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Skyrms, 2004).”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe validity and value of inclusive fitness theory
Bourke, A. F. G. (2011) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2011.1465 · Cited by 175
Evolution of Cooperation on Stochastic Dynamical Networks
Wu, B., Zhou, D., Fu, F., Luo, Q., Wang, L., & Traulsen, A. (2010) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011187 · Cited by 193
The first-mover advantage in scientific publication
Newman, M. E. J. (2009) · EPL (Europhysics Letters) · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/86/68001 · Cited by 187
Potential banana skins in animal social network analysis
James, R., Croft, D. P., & Krause, J. (2009) · Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology · doi:10.1007/s00265-009-0742-5 · Cited by 186
“2003) and the structure of cooperative patterns in populations (Croft et al. 2006; Ohtsuki et al. 2006).”
BackgroundEvolutionary graph theory: Breaking the symmetry between interaction and replacement
Ohtsuki, H., Pacheco, J. M., & Nowak, M. A. (2007) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.01.024 · Cited by 192
Self-citationParticipation costs dismiss the advantage of heterogeneous networks in evolution of cooperation
Masuda, N. (2007) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2007.0294 · Cited by 188
“Third, we have used the additive payoff (Nowak et al. 1994; Abramson & Kuperman 2001; Ebel & Bornholdt 2002; Ifti et al. 2004; Santos & Pacheco 2005; Santos & Pacheco 2006; Duran & Mulet 2005; Santos et al. 2006a; Santos et al. 2006b).”
MethodAnalytical Results for Individual and Group Selection of Any Intensity
Traulsen, A., Shoresh, N., & Nowak, M. A. (2008) · Bulletin of Mathematical Biology · doi:10.1007/s11538-008-9305-6 · Cited by 179
“The evolutionary dynamics of group selection and graph selection (Ohtsuki et al., 2006) are very different, although some aspects of both can be captured by inclusive fitness calculations.”
BackgroundSelf-citationBehavioural evidence for a transparency–efficiency tradeoff in human–machine cooperation
Ishowo-Oloko, F., Bonnefon, J.-F., Soroye, Z., Crandall, J., Rahwan, I., & Rahwan, T. (2019) · Nature Machine Intelligence · doi:10.1038/s42256-019-0113-5 · Cited by 178
Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning in Sequential Social Dilemmas
Leibo, J. Z., Zambaldi, V., Lanctot, M., Marecki, J., & Graepel, T. (2017) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.5555/3091125.3091194 · Cited by 150
Universality of weak selection
Wu, B., Altrock, P. M., Wang, L., & Traulsen, A. (2010) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.82.046106 · Cited by 174
Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma on heterogeneous Newman-Watts small-world network
Fu, F., Liu, L.-H., & Wang, L. (2007) · The European Physical Journal B · doi:10.1140/epjb/e2007-00124-5 · Cited by 179
Coevolutionary dynamics in large, but finite populations
Traulsen, A., Claussen, J. C., & Hauert, C. (2006) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.74.011901 · Cited by 172
Self-citationRandomness enhances cooperation: A resonance-type phenomenon in evolutionary games
Ren, J., Wang, W.-X., & Qi, F. (2007) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.75.045101 · Cited by 177
Evolutionary dynamics with game transitions
Su, Q., McAvoy, A., Wang, L., & Nowak, M. A. (2019) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1908936116 · Cited by 168
“[5] Nowak MA, May RM (1992) Evolutionary games and spatial chaos.”
BackgroundSelf-citationAllen, B., & Nowak, M. A. (2014) · EMS Surveys in Mathematical Sciences · doi:10.4171/emss/3 · Cited by 168
“Birth-Death (BD) [68]: An individual i 2 G is chosen at random, with probability proportional to Fi , to reproduce.”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationA simple model of bipartite cooperation for ecological and organizational networks
Saavedra, S., Reed-Tsochas, F., & Uzzi, B. (2009) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature07532 · Cited by 168
Risking Your Life without a Second Thought: Intuitive Decision-Making and Extreme Altruism
Rand, D. G., & Epstein, Z. G. (2014) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0109687 · Cited by 159
Graph fission in an evolving voter model
Durrett, R., Gleeson, J. P., Lloyd, A. L., Mucha, P. J., Shi, F., Sivakoff, D., Socolar, J. E. S., & Varghese, C. (2012) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1200709109 · Cited by 174
LIMITED DISPERSAL, BUDDING DISPERSAL, AND COOPERATION: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
Kümmerli, R., Gardner, A., West, S. A., & Griffin, A. S. (2009) · Evolution · doi:10.1111/j.1558-5646.2008.00548.x · Cited by 168
Metadata
- Authors
- Ohtsuki, H., Hauert, C., Lieberman, E., & Nowak, M. A.
- Affiliations
- Kyushu University (JP)
- Corresponding author
- Nowak, Martin A.
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2006-05
- Volume
- 441
- Issue
- 7092
- Pages
- 502-505
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- PMC
- PMC2430087
- OpenAlex
- W2040301417
- Cited by
- 2,208
- References
- 34
- Citations by year
- 2026: 111 · 2025: 118 · 2024: 128 · 2023: 133 · 2022: 101 · 2021: 113 · 2020: 92 · 2019: 107 · 2018: 136 · 2017: 103 · 2016: 116 · 2015: 122 · 2014: 133 · 2013: 126 · 2012: 132
- FWCI
- 277.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- John Templeton Foundation
- Harvard University
- National Institute of General Medical Sciences (R01GM078986)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Genetics › Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
- Life Sciences › Agricultural and Biological Sciences › Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics › Animal Behavior and Reproduction
- Keywords
- evolution of cooperation, structured populations, graphs, social networks, benefit-cost ratio, spatial games, yeast competition, cheaters, scale-free networks, random regular graphs
- MeSH terms
- Altruism, Animals, Cooperative Behavior, Costs and Cost Analysis, Biological Evolution, Game Theory, Humans, Models, Biological, Selection, Genetic, Social Support
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.