Cited by 64Action Observation and SynchronizationChild and Animal Learning DevelopmentSocial Robot Interaction and HRI

What makes the dorsomedial frontal cortex active during reading the mental states of others?

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Isoda, Masaki, Noritake, Atsushi·2013·Frontiers in Neuroscience

Abstract

The dorsomedial frontal part of the cerebral cortex is consistently activated when people read the mental states of others, such as their beliefs, desires, and intentions, the ability known as having a theory of mind (ToM) or mentalizing. This ubiquitous finding has led many researchers to conclude that the dorsomedial frontal cortex (DMFC) constitutes a core component in mentalizing networks. Despite this, it remains unclear why the DMFC becomes active during ToM tasks. We argue that key psychological and behavioral aspects in mentalizing are closely associated with DMFC functions. These include executive inhibition, distinction between self and others, prediction under uncertainty, and perception of intentions, all of which are important for predicting others' intention and behavior. We review the literature supporting this claim, ranging in fields from developmental psychology to human neuroimaging and macaque electrophysiology. Because perceiving intentions in others' actions initiates mentalizing and forms the basis of virtually all types of social interaction, the fundamental issue in social neuroscience is to determine the aspects of physical entities that make an observer perceive that they are intentional beings and to clarify the neurobiological underpinnings of the perception of intentionality in others' actions.

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  • The dorsomedial prefrontal cortex is functionally involved when an individual reflects on unobservable mental states of others, known as social person knowledge, or predicts them under uncertainty.

    “The dorsomedial prefrontal cortex is functionally involved when an individual reflects on unobservable mental states of others, known as social person knowledge ( Dixon et al., 2017 ;Wagner et al., 2012 ), or predicts them under uncertainty (for a review see Isoda and Noritake, 2013 ).”
  • This evaluation is made particularly with regard to outcomes that can potentially affect one's well-being and either facilitate or hinder one's goals.

    “This evaluation is made particularly with regard to outcomes that can potentially affect one's well-being and either facilitate or hinder one's goals ( Isoda and Noritake, 2013 ).”

    From Male brain processing of the body odor of ovulating women compared to that of pregnant women (2021) · cites this paper as Isoda and Noritake, 2013

    The Executive inhibition section discusses suppressing immediate behavior to achieve a later goal, and Prediction under uncertainty discusses decisions and anxiety. Neither addresses the claimed evaluation of outcomes according to their effects on well-being or whether they facilitate or hinder goals. Searches for those terms and for evaluation of consequences found no supporting passage in our copy; page numbers were not available. (LLM, conf=0.72)

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  1. Bates E. (1990). Language about me and you: pronominal reference and the emerging concept of self, in The Self in Transition: Infancy to Childhood, eds Cicchetti D. Beeghly M. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press), 165– 182

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Authors
Isoda, M., & Noritake, A.
Affiliations
Kansai Medical University (JP)
Corresponding author
Isoda, Masaki
Venue
Frontiers in Neuroscience
Published
2013
Volume
7
Pages
232-232
ISSN
1662-453X (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1988828685
Cited by
64
References
241
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 10 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 11 · 2017: 7 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 4 · 2014: 4
FWCI
0.52
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by
Locations
  • Frontiers in Neuroscience (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Funders
  • Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (24300125)
  • Precursory Research for Embryonic Science and Technology
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Action Observation and Synchronization
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Social Robot Interaction and HRI
Keywords
dorsomedial frontal cortex, theory of mind, mentalization, intention perception, self-other distinction, prediction under uncertainty, social cognition

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