The DOI matches its Crossref record; 51 of the 51 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Does Corruption Information Inspire the Fight or Quash the Hope? A Field Experiment in Mexico on Voter Turnout, Choice, and Party Identification
Abstract
Retrospective voting models assume that offering more information to voters about their incumbents’ performance strengthens electoral accountability. However, it is unclear whether incumbent corruption information translates into higher political participation and increased support for challengers. We provide experimental evidence that such information not only decreases incumbent party support in local elections in Mexico, but also decreases voter turnout and support for the challenger party, as well as erodes partisan attachments. While information clearly is necessary to improve accountability, corruption information is not sufficient because voters may respond to it by withdrawing from the political process. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings for studies of voting behavior.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
An Economic Theory of Democracy.
Banfield, E. C., & Downs, A. (1958) · Midwest Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2109186 · Cited by 18,594
An Economic Theory of Democracy
Marvick, D., & Downs, A. (1960) · The Western Political Quarterly · doi:10.2307/444355 · Cited by 4,109
Democracy, Accountability, and Representation
(1999) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139175104 · Cited by 1,796
Field Experiments: Design, Analysis, and Interpretation
Green, D. (2024) · doi:10.61700/sgeirzx0v0mjh1252 · Cited by 1,320
Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2008) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2008.123.2.703 · Cited by 1,319
Corruption, Political Allegiances, and Attitudes Toward Government in Contemporary Democracies
Anderson, C. J., & Tverdova, Y. V. (2003) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/1540-5907.00007 · Cited by 1,307
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association
(1917) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1944168 · Cited by 1,064
Besley, T., & Case, A. (1995) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2946699 · Cited by 1,044
The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries
Seligson, M. A. (2002) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1111/1468-2508.00132 · Cited by 1,025
Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments
Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.4.1274 · Cited by 975
Are You Being Served? Political Accountability and Quality of Government
Adsera, A. (2003) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/ewg017 · Cited by 801
Press Coverage and Political Accountability
Snyder, J. M., & Strömberg, D. (2010) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/652903 · Cited by 786
Fighting Corruption to Improve Schooling: Evidence from a Newspaper Campaign in Uganda
Reinikka, R., & Svensson, J. (2005) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/jeea.2005.3.2-3.259 · Cited by 719
Natural Experiments in the Social Sciences: A Design-Based Approach
Dunning, T. (2012) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139084444 · Cited by 705
Does Attack Advertising Demobilize the Electorate?
Ansolabehere, S., Iyengar, S., Simon, A., & Valentino, N. (1994) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082710 · Cited by 627
The Paradox of Not Voting: A Decision Theoretic Analysis
Ferejohn, J., & Fiorina, M. P. (1974) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400117368 · Cited by 578
Political institutions and policy choices: evidence from the United States
Besley, T. (2002) · Working Paper Series · doi:10.1920/wp.ifs.2002.0213 · Cited by 577
Social desirability bias in voter turnout reports: Tests using the item count technique
Holbrook, A. L., & Krosnick, J. A. (2010) · Public Opinion Quarterly · doi:10.1093/poq/nfp065 · Cited by 539
Corruption and Trust: Theoretical Considerations and Evidence From Mexico
Morris, S. D., & Klesner, J. L. (2010) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414010369072 · Cited by 523
Natural Experiments in the Social Sciences: A Design-Based Approach
Dunning, T. (2012) · Thammasat University Digital Collections · Cited by 466
Creating Political Legitimacy: Electoral Democracy Versus Quality of Government
Rothstein, B. (2009) · American Behavioral Scientist · doi:10.1177/0002764209338795 · Cited by 411
The Effects of Charges of Corruption on Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections
Peters, J. G., & Welch, S. (1980) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1958151 · Cited by 408
Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States
Besley, T., & Case, A. (2003) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.41.1.7 · Cited by 401
Politicians, Scandals, and Trust in Government
Bowler, S., & Karp, J. A. (2004) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1023/b:pobe.0000043456.87303.3a · Cited by 363
Lacking Information or Condoning Corruption: When Do Voters Support Corrupt Politicians?
Winters, M. S., & Weitz-Shapiro, R. (2013) · Comparative Politics · doi:10.5129/001041513x13815259182857 · Cited by 315
Legislative Malfeasance and Political Accountability
Chang, E. C. C., Golden, M. A., & Hill, S. J. (2010) · World Politics · doi:10.1017/s0043887110000031 · Cited by 308
Disentangling Accountability and Competence in Elections: Evidence from U.S. Term Limits
Alt, J., Bueno de Mesquita, E., & Rose, S. (2011) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381610000940 · Cited by 297
Abstention in Elections with Asymmetric Information and Diverse Preferences
Feddersen, T. J., & Pesendorfer, W. (1999) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2585402 · Cited by 260
Do Informed Voters Make Better Choices? Experimental Evidence from Urban India
Banerjee, A., Kumar, S., Pande, R., & Su, F. (2010) · Cited by 260
NINE. Social Capital, Beliefs in Government, and Political Corruption
Porta, D. D. (2000) · Disaffected Democracies · doi:10.1515/9780691186849-013 · Cited by 242
Electoral Competition, Participation, and Government Responsiveness in Mexico
Cleary, M. R. (2007) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00251.x · Cited by 239
Corruption and Confidence in Public Institutions: Evidence from a Global Survey
Clausen, B., Kraay, A., & Nyiri, Z. (2011) · The World Bank Economic Review · doi:10.1093/wber/lhr018 · Cited by 206
Lacking Information or Condoning Corruption: When Do Voters Support Corrupt Politicians?
Winters, M. S., & Weitz-Shapiro, R. (2013) · Comparative Politics · doi:10.5129/001041513806933583 · Cited by 203
McCann, J. A., & Domı́nguez, J. I. (1998) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/s0261-3794(98)00026-2 · Cited by 182
Abstain or Rebel: Corruption Perceptions and Voting in East European Elections
KOSTADINOVA, T. (2009) · Politics & Policy · doi:10.1111/j.1747-1346.2009.00194.x · Cited by 177
Political Selection and the Quality of Government: Evidence from South IndiaPreprint
Besley, T. J., Pande, R., & Rao, V. (2005) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · doi:10.22004/ag.econ.28426 · Cited by 143
The Impact of Corruption on Social Trust
Richey, S. (2009) · American Politics Research · doi:10.1177/1532673x09341531 · Cited by 130
Nickerson, D. W., Friedrichs, R. D., & King, D. C. (2006) · Political Research Quarterly · doi:10.1177/106591290605900108 · Cited by 127
Davis, C. L., Camp, R. A., & Coleman, K. M. (2004) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414004265879 · Cited by 126
The Effect of a Nonpartisan Get-Out-the-Vote Drive: An Experimental Study of Leafletting
Gerber, A. S., & GREEN, D. P. (2000) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1111/0022-3816.00035 · Cited by 119
Malesky, E. J., Schuler, P., & Tran, A. (2011) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055412000408 · Cited by 113
Political Corruption and Social Trust: An Experimental ApproachPreprint
Rothstein, B., & Eek, D. (2006) · SSRN Electronic Journal · Cited by 88
Humphreys, M., & Weinstein, J. M. (2012) · Cited by 88
Electoral Accountability and Corruption in Local Governments: Evidence from Audit ReportsPreprint
FERRAZ, C. B. O., & Finan, F. (2007) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.998235 · Cited by 84
Citizen Trust, Political Corruption, and Voting Behavior: Connecting the Dots
Caillier, J. G. (2010) · Politics & Policy · doi:10.1111/j.1747-1346.2010.00267.x · Cited by 81
Effects of Term Limits on Fiscal Performance: Evidence from Democratic Nations
Johnson, J., & Crain, W. M. (2004) · Public Choice · doi:10.1023/b:puch.0000024183.74743.13 · Cited by 73
Policing Politicians: Citizen Empowerment and Political Accountability in Uganda
Humphreys, M., & Weinstein, J. M. (2012) · Cited by 68
Dunning, Thad (2012): Natural Experiments in the Social Sciences: A DesignBased Approach. Cambridge:
Patrick, E. E. (2012) · Cited by 63
When Do Voters Punish Corrupt Politicians? Experimental Evidence from BrazilPreprint
de Figueiredo, M., Hidalgo, F. D., & Kasahara, Y. (2009) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1432277 · Cited by 60
Lacking Information or Condoning Corruption: When Will Voters Support Corrupt Politicians?Preprint
Winters, M. S., & Weitz‐Shapiro, R. (2013) · SSRN Electronic Journal · Cited by 45
The Market for Criminality: Money, Muscle and Elections in IndiaPreprint
Vaishnav, M. (2011) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1928011 · Cited by 37
Cited by
Transparency and Trust in Government. Evidence from a Survey Experiment
Alessandro, M., Cardinale Lagomarsino, B., Scartascini, C., Streb, J., & Torrealday, J. (2021) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.105223 · Cited by 210
Lights on the shadows of public procurement: Transparency as an antidote to corruption
Bauhr, M., Czibik, Á., de Fine Licht, J., & Fazekas, M. (2020) · Governance · doi:10.1111/gove.12432 · Cited by 131
Incumbent Advantage, Voter Information and Vote Buying
Cruz, C., Keefer, P., & Labonne, J. (2016) · doi:10.18235/0011746 · Cited by 16
Schechter, L., & Vasudevan, S. (2023) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2022.102976 · Cited by 12
Corruption and partisan polarization: evidence from the European Union
Apergis, N., & Pinar, M. (2023) · Empirical Economics · doi:10.1007/s00181-022-02247-z · Cited by 7
Metadata
- Authors
- Chong, A., De La O, A. L., Karlan, D., & Wantchekon, L.
- Venue
- The Journal of Politics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2015-01
- Volume
- 77
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 55-71
- ISSN
- 0022-3816 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-2508
- OpenAlex
- W2009710863
- Cited by
- 406
- References
- 51
- FWCI
- 108.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.