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Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing
Abstract
Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes of philosophy, but sometimes we would do well to focus instead on injustice. In epistemology, the very idea that there is a first-order ethical dimension to our epistemic practices — the idea that there is such a thing as epistemic justice — remains obscure until we adjust the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space that is epistemic injustice. This book argues that there is a distinctively epistemic genus of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower, wronged therefore in a capacity essential to human value. The book identifies two forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. In doing so, it charts the ethical dimension of two fundamental epistemic practices: gaining knowledge by being told and making sense of our social experiences. As the account unfolds, the book travels through a range of philosophical problems. Thus, the book finds an analysis of social power; an account of prejudicial stereotypes; a characterization of two hybrid intellectual-ethical virtues; a revised account of the State of Nature used in genealogical explanations of the concept of knowledge; a discussion of objectification and ‘silencing’; and a framework for a virtue epistemological account of testimony. The book reveals epistemic injustice as a potent yet largely silent dimension of discrimination, analyses the wrong it perpetrates, and constructs two hybrid ethical-intellectual virtues of epistemic justice which aim to forestall it.
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In the citing paper
“Epistemic forms of exclusion and injustice are of course politically relevant and impact democracy.”
From Democracy, epistemic agency, and AI: political epistemology in times of artificial intelligence (2023) · cites this paper as [20]
In the citing paper
“Indigenous knowledge undervalued in formal accreditation and rankings.”
From Whose Knowledge Counts? Western Accreditation, University Rankings, and the Marginalization of Indigenous Institutions (2026) · cites this paper as Fricker (2007)
In the citing paper
“Epistemic justice frameworks emphasize the moral imperative of ensuring that Indigenous scholars and institutions are afforded credibility and interpretive recognition, allowing for the meaningful inclusion of alternative knowledge systems (Fricker, 2007; Ajmani et al., 2024).”
From Whose Knowledge Counts? Western Accreditation, University Rankings, and the Marginalization of Indigenous Institutions (2026) · cites this paper as Fricker, 2007
In the citing paper
“The marginalization of Indigenous epistemologies represents not only a structural inequity but also an epistemic injustice, encompassing both testimonial and hermeneutical dimensions, which undermines the visibility, credibility, and legitimacy of Indigenous scholars and institutions (Fricker, 2007; Duria, 2025).”
From Whose Knowledge Counts? Western Accreditation, University Rankings, and the Marginalization of Indigenous Institutions (2026) · cites this paper as Fricker, 2007
In the citing paper
“show how algorithmic profiling can prevent individuals from accessing and meaningfully interpreting important aspects of their experiences (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2017; Pohlhaus, 2017).”
From Algorithmic profiling as a source of hermeneutical injustice (2025) · cites this paper as Fricker, 2007
In the citing paper
“Hermeneutical injustice, by contrast, concerns the interpretive conditions under which experience becomes intelligible: it occurs when a gap in collective interpretive resources places someone at an unfair disadvantage in making sense of their social experience, and thus in making themselves understood within shared discourse (ibid.).”
From Hallucination as epistemic pollution: epistemic injustice and credibility in futures-oriented science education (2026) · cites this paper as [10]
In the citing paper
“Fricker's framework begins from a simple but far-reaching claim, namely that credibility is not merely a cognitive estimate but also a moral relation, because to treat another as unworthy of belief on grounds that track social prejudice is to deny them a form of respect owed to rational agency (ibid.).”
From Hallucination as epistemic pollution: epistemic injustice and credibility in futures-oriented science education (2026) · cites this paper as [10]
In the citing paper
“Testimonial injustice, on this account, arises when the hearer's reception of a speaker's word is corrupted by identity prejudice, such that the speaker is assigned a credibility deficit not because the reasons are weak, but because the person is socially marked as less authoritative (ibid.).”
From Hallucination as epistemic pollution: epistemic injustice and credibility in futures-oriented science education (2026) · cites this paper as [10]
In the citing paper
“The injustice becomes visible when this displacement interacts with testimonial injustice, understood as the assignment of credibility deficits that track prejudice or status hierarchies rather than reasons [10].”
From Hallucination as epistemic pollution: epistemic injustice and credibility in futures-oriented science education (2026) · cites this paper as [10]
In the citing paper
“This exploration has great potential and it suggests, for example, that contemporary concerns with epistemic trust in political communication (Dahlgren, 2018) pay insufficient attention to issues of social power and to the idea that 'social disadvantage can produce unjust epistemic disadvantage' (Fricker, 2007, p. 2).”
From Epistemic injustice and education in the digital age: Introduction (2024) · cites this paper as Fricker, 2007
In the citing paper
“Arguably, these women experience what Miranda Fricker (2007) calls a 'hermeneutical injustice', that is, an inability to make sense of their own experiences due to marginalization from the collective framework of understanding-in particular, I claim, due to a color-blind ideology that centers White experience and ignores racial dynamics salient from other points of view.”
From Why Yellow Fever Isn't Flattering: A Case Against Racial Fetishes (2016) · cites this paper as Fricker 2007
In the citing paper
“The foundational insight of this literature is that trust must be dynamically calibrated against a source's reliability, the stakes of the claim and the availability of independent verification.”
From Beyond prompt literacy: Towards a critical epistemological framework for artificial intelligence literacy in higher education (2026) · cites this paper as Fricker 2007
In the citing paper
“They seemed to have prospective concerns for what philosopher Miranda Fricker calls ‘hermeneutical injustice’”
From Is it Still Ok to be Ok? Mental Health Labels as a Campus Technology (2023) · cites this paper as Fricker 2007
In the citing paper
“Fricker warns that hermeneutical injustice can leave a person ‘deeply troubled, confused and isolated’ (ibid:151).”
From Is it Still Ok to be Ok? Mental Health Labels as a Campus Technology (2023) · cites this paper as Fricker 2007
In the citing paper
“Perceived credibility is an important source of epistemic power (Archer et al., 2020; Fricker, 2007);”
From The epistemic power of the police (2024) · cites this paper as Fricker, 2007
In the citing paper
“As for dimensions, this can take place in a relationship between two knowers (interpersonal), or entire classes of knowers (systemic), while being an exception (incidental) or pertaining to the organization of society (structural).”
From A taxonomy of epistemic injustice in the context of AI and the case for generative hermeneutical erasure (2025) · cites this paper as [11]
In the citing paper
“Miranda Fricker's characterization of epistemic injustice as encompassing testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice will be taken as starting points”
From A taxonomy of epistemic injustice in the context of AI and the case for generative hermeneutical erasure (2025) · cites this paper as [11]
In the citing paper
“In Fricker's major work Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, she distinguishes two kinds of epistemic injustice.”
From A taxonomy of epistemic injustice in the context of AI and the case for generative hermeneutical erasure (2025) · cites this paper as [11]
In the citing paper
“Its 'background condition', hermeneutical marginalization, precedes the 'eruption' of hermeneutical injustice itself.”
From A taxonomy of epistemic injustice in the context of AI and the case for generative hermeneutical erasure (2025) · cites this paper as [11]
In the citing paper
“Like testimonial injustice, hermeneutical injustice can have an equally structural dimension.”
From A taxonomy of epistemic injustice in the context of AI and the case for generative hermeneutical erasure (2025) · cites this paper as [11]
In the citing paper
“The testimonial injustices that are mainly of interest to the political philosopher are those which are systematic: structural patterns of prejudice that lead the credibility of a social group (e.g., women, immigrants, elderly people) to be structurally doubted [11], pp.21; 28).”
From A taxonomy of epistemic injustice in the context of AI and the case for generative hermeneutical erasure (2025) · cites this paper as [11]
In the citing paper
“Hermeneutical injustice can thus occur in societies where some social groups' experiences are structurally marginalized, that is: where an inequality exists in how their experiences are made intelligible to society as a whole, or when the means the society presents as dominant are inadequate for rendering sensible what one lives through.”
From A taxonomy of epistemic injustice in the context of AI and the case for generative hermeneutical erasure (2025) · cites this paper as [11]
In the citing paper
“This, in brief, is the injustice that occurs when some significant area of a person's social experience--that is, an area of social experience that it is in their interests to grasp clearly--is subject to failures of collective understanding, owing to the prior exclusion of certain groups from the social practices that determine our shared conceptual and terminological resources.”
From Agency and authority: A differentiated model of hermeneutical power (2025) · cites this paper as Fricker 2007
In the citing paper
“Fricker notes that we shape our shared hermeneutical resources through participation in practices of social meaning-making.”
From Agency and authority: A differentiated model of hermeneutical power (2025) · cites this paper as Fricker 2007
In the citing paper
“These practices are often conducted in ways that exclude or subordinate members of certain social groups; the sites where concepts, terms, and narratives are developed and disseminated--sites like journalism, politics, law, academia, or medicine-tend to be dominated by those with greater social power (2007 : 148).”
From Agency and authority: A differentiated model of hermeneutical power (2025) · cites this paper as Fricker 2007
In the citing paper
“it misrepresents the systematic ways in which men can struggle to develop and convey adequate understandings of some of their gendered experiences”
From Agency and authority: A differentiated model of hermeneutical power (2025) · cites this paper as Fricker 2007
In the citing paper
“at the same time it dilutes the concept of hermeneutical marginalization, making the concept so expansive as to include members of groups who do not face structural barriers to sites of public meaning-making.”
From Agency and authority: A differentiated model of hermeneutical power (2025) · cites this paper as Fricker 2007
In the citing paper
“Epistemic injustice scholarship shows that power affects who is heard as a knower and what interpretive resources are available for making sense of experience (Dotson, 2011;Fricker, 2007;Medina, 2013;Pohlhaus, 2012).”
From Hermeneutic Sovereignty under Generative AI: A Humanities Framework for Protecting Human Meaning-Making from Interpretive Foreclosure (2026) · cites this paper as Fricker, 2007
In the citing paper
“The epistemic injustice literature shows why collective sense-making matters for experiences that are difficult to name within dominant categories (Fricker, 2007;Medina, 2013;Milano & Prunkl, 2025).”
From Hermeneutic Sovereignty under Generative AI: A Humanities Framework for Protecting Human Meaning-Making from Interpretive Foreclosure (2026) · cites this paper as Fricker, 2007
In the citing paper
“Formal opportunities to speak do not guarantee fair interpretive uptake (Dotson, 2011;Fricker, 2007).”
From Hermeneutic Sovereignty under Generative AI: A Humanities Framework for Protecting Human Meaning-Making from Interpretive Foreclosure (2026) · cites this paper as Fricker, 2007
In the citing paper
“his attempt to undermine her own assessment of herself as a credible epistemic agent surely is an attempt to wrong her ' speci fi cally in her capacity as a knower ' , and so is an epistemic injustice in Miranda Fricker ' s sense of this term (Fricker 2007, 20).”
From Epistemic dimensions of gaslighting: peer-disagreement, self-trust, and epistemic injustice (2023) · cites this paper as Fricker 2007, 20
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Key research projects with selected publications
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Metadata
- Authors
- Fricker, M.
- Affiliations
- University of London (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Fricker, Miranda
- ORCID
- Fricker, Miranda
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2007-06-01
- OpenAlex
- W4252633962
- Cited by
- 9,198
- References
- 41
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2488 · 2025: 1853 · 2024: 1152 · 2023: 800 · 2022: 627 · 2021: 593 · 2020: 547 · 2019: 291 · 2018: 244 · 2017: 160 · 2016: 105 · 2015: 79 · 2014: 61 · 2013: 65 · 2012: 41
- FWCI
- 28.81
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Keywords
- epistemic injustice, testimonial injustice, hermeneutical injustice, epistemic justice, social power, intellectual virtues, moral virtues, state of nature, genealogy of knowledge, objectification, silencing, discrimination, human values
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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