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Payoff-based learning explains the decline in cooperation in public goods games
Abstract
Economic games such as the public goods game are increasingly being used to measure social behaviours in humans and non-human primates. The results of such games have been used to argue that people are pro-social, and that humans are uniquely altruistic, willingly sacrificing their own welfare in order to benefit others. However, an alternative explanation for the empirical observations is that individuals are mistaken, but learn, during the game, how to improve their personal payoff. We test between these competing hypotheses, by comparing the explanatory power of different behavioural rules, in public goods games, where individuals are given different amounts of information. We find: (i) that individual behaviour is best explained by a learning rule that is trying to maximize personal income; (ii) that conditional cooperation disappears when the consequences of cooperation are made clearer; and (iii) that social preferences, if they exist, are more anti-social than pro-social.
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“Network agreements are fundamental since, without a change in in centives, in games of common goods, non-cooperative behaviors would empirically prevail, leading to the natural selection of, or adaptation into, non-cooperative agents (Burton-Chellew et al., 2015; Perc et al., 2013).”
From Win Together or Lose Alone: Circular Economy and Hybrid Governance for Natural Resource Commons (2024) · cites this paper as Burton-Chellew et al., 2015
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Cited by
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The choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems: a survey of experimental research
Dannenberg, A., & Gallier, C. (2020) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-019-09629-8 · Cited by 75
Win Together or Lose Alone: Circular Economy and Hybrid Governance for Natural Resource Commons
Becchetti, L., Bova, D. M., & Raffaele, L. (2024) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4880178 · Cited by 16
Metadata
- Authors
- Burton-Chellew, M. N., Nax, H. H., & West, S. A.
- Affiliations
- Department of Zoology, University of Oxford, South Parks Road, Oxford OX1 3PS, UK
- Department of Social Sciences-SOMS, ETH Zurich, Clausiusstrasse 37, 8092 Zurich, Switzerland
- Venue
- Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Publisher
- The Royal Society
- Published
- 2015-02-22
- Volume
- 282
- Issue
- 1801
- Pages
- 20142678
- ISSN
- 0962-8452
- 1471-2954
- Cited by
- 63
- References
- 6
- Language
- en
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