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An Integrated Framework of Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation
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Recent empirical research shows evidence of a positive relationship between the quality of firm‐specific corporate governance and firm valuation. Instead of looking at one single corporate governance mechanism in isolation, we construct a broad corporate governance index and apply five additional variables related to ownership structure, board characteristics, and leverage to provide a comprehensive description of firm‐level corporate governance for a representative sample of Swiss firms. To control for potential endogeneity of these six governance mechanisms, we develop a system of simultaneous equations and apply three‐stage least squares (3SLS). Our results support the widespread hypothesis of a positive relationship between corporate governance and firm valuation.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Beiner, S., Drobetz, W., Schmid, M. M., & Zimmermann, H.
- Venue
- European Financial Management
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2006-02-13
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 249-283
- ISSN
- 1354-7798 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-036X
- OpenAlex
- W3121768109
- Cited by
- 534
- References
- 90
- FWCI
- 86.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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