The DOI matches its Crossref record; 77 of the 77 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
Open accessAbstract
There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not in bilateral bargaining situations. There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish free riders, stable cooperation is maintained, although punishment is costly for those who punish. This paper asks whether there is a simple common principle that can explain this puzzling evidence. We show that if some people care about equity the puzzles can be resolved. It turns out that the economic environment determines whether the fair types or the selfish types dominate equilibrium behavior.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“would be consistent with evidence and theorizing that people are concerned with increasing social welfare (Charness and Rabin 2002;Fehr and Schmidt 1999).”
From Do Investors Value Sustainability? A Natural Experiment Examining Ranking and Fund Flows (2019) · cites this paper as Fehr and Schmidt 1999
In the citing paper
“Research on human social preferences provides behavioral (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000;Charness and Rabin, 2002;Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) and neural (Tricomi et al., 2010) evidence that other-regarding behaviors and motives depend on the initial payoff allocation between the subject and the subject's partner.”
From Linking Brain Structure and Activation in Temporoparietal Junction to Explain the Neurobiology of Human Altruism (2012) · cites this paper as Fehr and Schmidt, 1999
In the citing paper
“since it has been shown that the inclination to altruistically punish uncooperative behavior with no egoistic material benefits is a crucial factor for the sustainability of cooperation (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004).”
From Oxytocin promotes altruistic punishment (2017) · cites this paper as Fehr and Schmidt, 1999
In the citing paper
“We therefore conclude that participants treated with OT show a higher inclination to deter uncooperative behavior, which transforms the cooperation incentives from a classical prisoner’s dilemma into a coordination game (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Fehr and Gächter, 2000, 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004).”
From Oxytocin promotes altruistic punishment (2017) · cites this paper as Fehr and Schmidt, 1999
In the citing paper
“These theories4,7 suggest that people value the gains of others positively if they are perceived to behave fairly, but value others' gains negatively if they behave unfairly.”
From Empathic neural responses are modulated by the perceived fairness of others (2006) · cites this paper as [7]
Citations
Cites
A theory of social comparison processes
Festinger, L. (1954) · Human Relations · doi:10.1177/001872675400700202 · Cited by 20,926
Filders, R. (1992) · International Journal of Forecasting · doi:10.1016/0169-2070(92)90130-2 · Cited by 16,765
Journal of personality and social psychology
Armstrong, J. (1988) · International Journal of Forecasting · doi:10.1016/0169-2070(88)90126-4 · Cited by 10,544
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Kuznets, S. (2024) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781003549741-8 · Cited by 7,177
Loss aversion in riskless choice: A reference-dependent model.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1991) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2937956 · Cited by 6,432
Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1995.1027 · Cited by 5,548
Towards an understanding of inequity
Adams, J. S. (1963) · The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0040968 · Cited by 5,146
An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining
Güth, W., Schmittberger, R., & Schwarze, B. (1982) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-2681(82)90011-7 · Cited by 4,868
Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms
Hollander, E. P., & Homans, G. C. (1963) · The American Journal of Psychology · doi:10.2307/1419191 · Cited by 4,708
Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics
Rabin, M. (2011) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctvcm4j8j.15 · Cited by 4,614
Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market
Kahneman, D. J., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (2000) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511803475.019 · Cited by 3,127
Satisfaction and comparison income
Clark, A. E., & Oswald, A. J. (1996) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(95)01564-7 · Cited by 2,960
Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games
McKelvey, R. D., & Palfrey, T. R. (1995) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1995.1023 · Cited by 2,624
Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments
Forsythe, R. S., Horowitz, J. L., Savin, N. E., & Sefton, M. (1994) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1994.1021 · Cited by 2,383
(2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.4.i · Cited by 2,304
Relative Deprivation and Social Justice
Runciman, W. G. (2026) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781042033027 · Cited by 1,813
Roth, A. E., & Erev, I. (1995) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/s0899-8256(05)80020-x · Cited by 1,685
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology.
(1962) · Anthropology News · doi:10.1111/an.1962.3.1.6.1 · Cited by 1,576
Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation
Fehr, E., Kirchsteiger, G., & Riedl, A. M. (1993) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118338 · Cited by 1,482
Self-citationModeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments
Levine, D. K. (1998) · Review of Economic Dynamics · doi:10.1006/redy.1998.0023 · Cited by 1,374
Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners
Camerer, C. F., & Thaler, R. H. (1995) · The Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.9.2.209 · Cited by 1,371
Sdol, E. (2009) · Cited by 1,342
Mueller, D. C. (1989) · Cited by 1,284
James Andreoni, A. (1988) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(88)90043-6 · Cited by 1,184
Choosing the right pond: Human behavior and the quest for status
(1988) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00052075 · Cited by 1,158
Social utility and decision making in interpersonal contexts.
Loewenstein, G. F., Thompson, L., & Bazerman, M. H. (1989) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.57.3.426 · Cited by 1,122
Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism
Isaac, R. M., & Walker, J. M. (1988) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1882648 · Cited by 1,085
An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior
Smith, V. L. (1991) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528354.003 · Cited by 1,039
2. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research
Ledyard, J. O. (1995) · The Handbook of Experimental Economics · doi:10.1515/9780691213255-004 · Cited by 1,033
James Andreoni, A. (1995) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118508 · Cited by 919
Thaler, R. H. (1988) · The Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.2.4.195 · Cited by 834
When Social Outcomes Aren′t Fair: The Effect of Causal Attributions on Preferences
Blount, S. (1995) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1006/obhd.1995.1068 · Cited by 814
Group size and the voluntary provision of public goods
Isaac, R. M., Walker, J. M., & Williams, A. W. (1994) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(94)90068-x · Cited by 735
RAISING THE STAKES IN THE ULTIMATUM GAME: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM INDONESIA
Cameron, L. (1999) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1999.tb01415.x · Cited by 551
The Reasons for Wage Rigidity: Evidence from a Survey of Firms
Campbell, C. M., & Kamlani, K. S. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355397555343 · Cited by 517
Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic
Slonim, R., & Roth, A. E. (1998) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2998575 · Cited by 512
The Double Auction Market Institutions, Theories, and Evidence
Friedman, D. (2018) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780429492532 · Cited by 503
McConagha, G. L., & Stauffer, A. A. (1949) · The American Historical Review · doi:10.2307/1841149 · Cited by 500
A Formal Interpretation of the Theory of Relative Deprivation
Davis, J. A. (1959) · Sociometry · doi:10.2307/2786046 · Cited by 453
Roth, A. E. (1995) · The Handbook of Experimental Economics · doi:10.1515/9780691213255-006 · Cited by 430
Journal of economic psychology
Collopy, F. (1995) · International Journal of Forecasting · doi:10.1016/0169-2070(95)90069-1 · Cited by 406
Güth, W., & Tietz, R. (1990) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/0167-4870(90)90021-z · Cited by 396
The British Journal of Sociology
(2010) · British Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1111/(issn)1468-4446 · Cited by 361
Scandinavian Journal of Economics
(2010) · Scandinavian Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/(issn)1467-9442 · Cited by 352
A Simple Mechanism for the Efficient Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence
Falkinger, J., Fehr, E., Gächter, S., & Winter-Ebmer, R. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.1.247 · Cited by 338
Self-citationWage Rigidity in a Competitive Incomplete Contract Market
Fehr, E., & Falk, A. (1999) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250052 · Cited by 325
Self-citationTypes and patterns: an experimental East-West-German comparison of cooperation and solidarity
Ockenfels, A., & Weimann, J. (1999) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(98)00072-3 · Cited by 293
Theories of Pay and Unemployment: Survey Evidence from Swedish Manufacturing Firms
Agell, J., & Lundborg, P. (1995) · Scandinavian Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3440530 · Cited by 291
The Relevance of Quasi Rationality in Competitive Markets: Reply
Russell, T., & Thaler, R. (1985) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511598951.025 · Cited by 280
Kalai, E. (1989) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/0899-8256(89)90002-x · Cited by 267
A Depressed Labor Market as Explained by Participants
Bewley, T. F. (2016) · American Economic Review · Cited by 252
Bewley, T. F. (1998) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(98)00002-6 · Cited by 252
Choosing the Wrong Pond: Social Comparisons in Negotiations That Reflect a Self-Serving Bias
Babcock, L., Wang, X., & Loewenstein, G. (1996) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2946655 · Cited by 238
RECIPROCITY, TRUST, AND THE SENSE OF CONTROL
Hayashi, N., Elinor Ostrom, B., Walker, J. M., & Yamagishi, T. (1999) · Rationality and Society · doi:10.1177/104346399011001002 · Cited by 229
AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE ON TAX EVASION
Skinner, J., & Slemrod, J. (1985) · National Tax Journal · doi:10.1086/ntj41792031 · Cited by 155
International Journal of Game Theory
(2013) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/182.1432-1270 · Cited by 155
Do Anglo-Saxons free-ride more?
Burlando, R. M., & Hey, J. D. (1997) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(96)01609-x · Cited by 141
Measuring motivations for the reciprocal responses observed in a simple dilemma game
Bolton, G. E., Brandts, J., & Ockenfels, A. (1998) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/bf01669343 · Cited by 133
On Expectations and the Monetary Stakes in Ultimatum Games
Hoffman, E. N., McCabe, K., & Smith, V. L. S. (2000) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528347.010 · Cited by 132
Fairness: Effect on Temporary and Equilibrium Prices in Posted-Offer Markets
Franciosi, R., Kujal, P., Michelitsch, R., et al. (1995) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2235160 · Cited by 127
(1999) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/516558 · Cited by 122
The Journal of Economic Perspectives
(1987) · South African Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1813-6982.1987.tb01110.x · Cited by 110
Games and Economic BehaviorPreprint
NOUSSAIR, C. N., de Castro, L. I., & Galvao, A. F. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.5009629 · Cited by 86
Rational Expectations and the Limits of Rationality: An Analysis of HeterogeneityPreprint
Haltiwanger, J., & Waldman, M. (1983) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 81
Giving according to GARP: an experimental study of rationality and altruismPreprint
Andreoni, J., & Miller, J. H. (1997) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 75
The Boundaries of Competitive Price Theory: Convergence, Expectations, and Transaction Costs
Smith, V. L., & Williams, A. W. (2000) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528347.018 · Cited by 72
(2004) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/426891 · Cited by 66
Kachelmeier, S. J., & Shehata, M. (1992) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-2681(92)90088-s · Cited by 61
A Shred of Evidence on Theories of Wage Stickiness
Blinder, A. S., & Choi, D. H. (1989) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w3105 · Cited by 61
A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and CompetitionPreprint
Bolton, G. E., & Ockenfels, A. (1997) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 53
The Journal of Economic Perspectives
(1995) · The Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.9.4.i · Cited by 51
Cooperation in the One-shot Prisoner's Dilemma Based on Expectations of Reciprocity
Watabe, M., Terai, S., Hayashi, N., & Yamagishi, T. (1996) · THE JAPANESE JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY · doi:10.2130/jjesp.36.183 · Cited by 38
Economic theory and policy : essays in honour of Dipak Banerjee
Dutta, B. (1990) · Oxford University Press eBooks · Cited by 36
Japanese transplants: After the honeymoon
Rehder, R. R. (1990) · Business Horizons · doi:10.1016/0007-6813(90)90076-n · Cited by 25
Partners contribute more to Public Goods than Strangers: Conditional CooperationPreprint
Keser, C., & van Winden, F. A. A. M. (1997) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 15
The Alternating Double Auction Market
Sadrieh, A. (1998) · Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-58953-9 · Cited by 13
On the reliability of reprocal fairness -An experimental study-Preprint
Güth, W., Marchand, N., & Rullière, J. (1997) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 8
Research works printed but not linked: 33
- Simon, 1997, University of Virginia, Working Paper No., 304
- 1995, American Economic Review, 891
- Wang Xianghong, 1996, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1
- 1995, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 250
- Alan, 1990, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1003
- 1995, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Procesess, 131
- Andrew, 1996, Journal of Public Economics, 359
- 1996, Economics Letters, 25
- Davis, Douglas, and Charles Holt, Experimental Economics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1993).
- J., 1959, Sociometry, 280
- Gachter Simon, 1996, Econometrica, 833
- Kirchsteiger Georg, 1993, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 437
- L., 1954, Human Relations, 117
- Kujal Praveen, 1995, Economic Journal, 938
- Schmittberger Rolf, 1982, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 367
- Waldman Michael, 1985, American Economic Review, 326
- Mark, 1988, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 179
- Isaac, Mark R., and James M. Walker, ``Costly Communication: An Experiment in a Nested Public Goods Problem,'' in Thomas R. Palfrey, ed., Laboratory Research in Political Economy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991).
- Mark, 1994, Journal of Public Economics, 1
- Steven, 1992, Journal of Economic Organization and Behavior, 145
- Knetsch Jack L., 1986, American Economic Review, 728
- Richard, 1995, Games and Economic Behavior, 6
- Ostrom, Elinor, and James M. Walker, ``Cooperation without External Enforcement,'' in Thomas R. Palfrey, ed., Laboratory Research in Political Economy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991).
- 1990, Business Horizons (, 87
- Erev Ido, 1995, Games and Economic Behavior, 164
- Alvin, 1991, American Economic Review, 1068
- Thaler Richard, 1985, American Economic Review, 1071
- Slemrod Joel, 1985, National Tax Journal, 345
- Roth Alvin E., 1997, Econometrica, 569
- 1982, American Economic Review, 923
- Richard, 1988, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 195
- Kahneman D., 1991, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1039
- Terai M., S., 1996, Japanese Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 183
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547
Self-citationCollective action and the evolution of social norms.
Ostrom, E. (2000) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.14.3.137 · Cited by 4,195
Oxytocin increases trust in humans
Kosfeld, M., Heinrichs, M., Zak, P. J., Fischbacher, U., & Fehr, E. (2005) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature03701 · Cited by 3,690
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2003) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature02043 · Cited by 3,475
Self-citationThe neural basis of economic decision-making in the Ultimatum Game.
Sanfey, A. G., Rilling, J. K., Aronson, J. A., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2003) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1082976 · Cited by 3,375
Metadata
- Authors
- Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M.
- Affiliations
- University of Zurich (CH)
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (DE)
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1999-08-01
- Volume
- 114
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 817-868
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W3022808291
- Cited by
- 11,264
- References
- 77
- Citations by year
- 2026: 384 · 2025: 565 · 2024: 457 · 2023: 431 · 2022: 477 · 2021: 610 · 2020: 569 · 2019: 586 · 2018: 549 · 2017: 485 · 2016: 495 · 2015: 558 · 2014: 537 · 2013: 583 · 2012: 585
- FWCI
- 445.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- HighWire Press Open Archive (submittedVersion)
- Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Funders
- National Science Foundation
- John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung (119614)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Keywords
- fairness, equity, competition, cooperation, free-riding, punishment, bargaining power, voluntary cooperation, equilibrium selection, costly punishment
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
