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The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government
Abstract
We build a simple model to capture the major virtues and drawbacks of making public officials accountable (i.e., subjecting them to reelection): On the one hand, accountability allows the public to screen and discipline their officials; on the other, it may induce those officials to pander to public opinion and put too little weight on minority welfare. We study when decision-making powers should be allocated to the public directly (direct democracy), to accountable officials (called “politicians”), or to nonaccountable officials (called “judges”).
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Metadata
- Authors
- Maskin, E., & Tirole, J.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2004-09-01
- Volume
- 94
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1034-1054
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2143660551
- Cited by
- 904
- References
- 53
- FWCI
- 60.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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