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Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments
Abstract
One lingering puzzle is why voluntary contributions to public goods decline over time in experimental and real-world settings. We show that the decline of cooperation is driven by individual preferences for imperfect conditional cooperation. Many people's desire to contribute less than others, rather than changing beliefs of what others will contribute over time or people's heterogeneity in preferences makes voluntary cooperation fragile. Universal free riding thus eventually emerges, despite the fact that most people are not selfish. (D12, D 83, H41, Z13)
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Cited by
Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature
Chaudhuri, A. (2011) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-010-9257-1 · Cited by 1,445
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Metadata
- Authors
- Fischbacher, U., & Gächter, S.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2010-03-01
- Volume
- 100
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 541-556
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3123807625
- Cited by
- 1,316
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 226.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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