The DOI matches its Crossref record; 242 of the 242 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 2 of the 18 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
The Economics of Two-Sided Markets
Open accessAbstract
Broadly speaking, a two-sided market is one in which 1) two sets of agents interact through an intermediary or platform, and 2) the decisions of each set of agents affects the outcomes of the other set of agents, typically through an externality. In the case of a video game system, the intermediary is the console producer—Sony in the scenario above—while the two sets of agents are consumers and video game developers. Neither consumers nor game developers will be interested in the PlayStation if the other party is not. Similarly, a successful payment card requires both consumer usage and merchant acceptance, where both consumers and merchants value each others' participation. Many more products fit into this paradigm, such as search engines, newspapers, and almost any advertiser-supported media (examples in which consumers typically negatively value, rather than positively value, the participation of the other side), as well as most software or title-based operating systems and consumer electronics. This paper seeks to explain what two-sided markets are and why they interest economists. I discuss the strategies that firms typically consider, and I highlight a number of puzzling outcomes from the perspective of the economics of two-sided markets. Finally, I consider the implications for public policy, particularly antitrust and regulatory policy, where there have been a number of recent issues involving media, computer operating systems, and payment cards.
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2 of 18 cited sources checked · 1 supported · 0 flagged · accuracy not yet measured
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In the paper
“In fact, two-sided markets often seem to evolve toward to a situation where members of one side use a single platform and the other side uses multiple platforms; Armstrong (2006, Section 5) makes this point and provides formal analysis.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Pricing
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Armstrong (2006, Section 5) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 5, “Competitive bottlenecks” (page unavailable), formally analyzes a market in which one group uses a single platform and the other uses multiple platforms. The discussion preceding Section 5 says several important markets resemble this configuration. The paper does not establish that markets evolve toward it over time. (LLM, conf=0.83)
Strength:hedged· not yet calibratedCausal:correlational· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passes- Partly supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Hence, firms compete aggressively on the side that uses a single network in order to charge monopoly prices to the other side that is trying to reach them (Armstrong, 2006).”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Pricing
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Armstrong, 2006 source
In “Fixed fees or per-transaction charges” (page unavailable), Armstrong says platforms compete for single-homing agents but have monopoly power over access to them, leading to high prices for the multi-homing side. Section 5, “Competitive bottlenecks” (page unavailable), describes each platform as holding a local monopoly over that access. The claim is a fair paraphrase of this competitive-bottleneck result. (LLM, conf=0.91)
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passes- Supported
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In addition, two-sided markets allow for a new form of price discrimination: discrimination based on heterogeneity in the attractiveness of an agent to the other side.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Pricing
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesA conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“These markets seem much less flexible in terms of the choice of two-sidedness.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Openness
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesThe paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Advertising prices depend on consumer demand for advertising as well, with relatively low prices for advertisements that consumers more highly value (such as classified advertisements and some local advertisements).”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Abstract
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:direct· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesA conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Hence, the “twosidedness” of pricing can be more pronounced in competitive markets.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Pricing
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesA conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“If there are multiple competing market intermediaries, the effect of participation of one side on the other has even more bite.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Pricing
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesThe paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The main result is that pricing to one side of the market depends not only on the demand and costs that those consumers bring but also on how their participation affects participation on the other side and the profit that is extracted from that participation.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Pricing
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesA conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In this sense, Microsoft is more open than Apple.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Openness
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesA conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In this scenario, the interchange fee primarily affects the terms that merchants and consumers face and the total volume of transactions.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Abstract
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passes
- Probably not a substantial claim. 34
- It may state two separate claims as one. 39
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Of great controversy is that the merchant's bank must pay the consumer's bank an “interchange fee,” a percent of each transaction.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Abstract
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Providers of platforms often prefer incompatibility on the grounds that it locks in current customers and locks out competitors.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Openness
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The interchange fee presumably explains why banks can offer generous rewards programs to consumers for using their credit cards.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Abstract
Strength:hedged· not yet calibratedCausal:conditional· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“This result might explain why payment card pricing has increasingly favored consumers over time rather than merchants (for instance, with the rise of rewards programs), since consumers and not merchants typically use a single network and competition among card networks has become more important relative to competition between card networks and cash.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Pricing
Strength:hedged· not yet calibratedCausal:conditional· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Hence, payment associations offered supermarkets relatively low interchange fees, which led to low bank fees and ultimately to the adoption of payment card usage by supermarkets.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Pricing
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:direct· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“These changes do not appear to have led to a strategic change with respect to interchange policy.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Abstract
Strength:hedged· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
In the paper
“However, as Rochet and Tirole (2002) point out, if serving consumers and merchants is perfectly competitive, then the interchange fee does not affect the profits of the member banks.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Abstract
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Rochet and Tirole (2002) source
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Thus, it may be better to discuss two-sided “strategies” rather than two-sided “markets,” because two-sidedness is an endogenous choice in some markets, not a technologically determined outcome.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Openness
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✗ Checkable: fails✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The interchange fee is set by the card association, and in this sense is set cooperatively by the member banks.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Abstract
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:direct· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Merchants typically accept payment on multiple networks-for example, Visa, Mastercard, American Express, and Discover-as well as via alternatives such as on-line debit cards and personal checks.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Pricing
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Newspapers are a canonical two-sided market, where the newspaper provides a platform for communication from advertisers to consumers.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Abstract
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“For instance, in any market, prices typically fall as the price elasticity of demand increases, but in a two-sided market the effect can be even larger: The low price on one side not only attracts elastic consumers on that side but also, as a result, leads to higher prices or more participation on the other side.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Pricing
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“But now, lowering the consumer price attracts consumers from the competing platform, which degrades the value of the competitor to buyers, and hence leads to a larger increase in buyer interest in the original platform.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Pricing
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The merchant's fee is set to reflect this cost and is usually only slightly higher than the interchange fee.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Abstract
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:direct· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“A successful operating system requires consumer adoption as well as software development by software vendors.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Abstract
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:direct· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“Thus, discrimination increases the value extracted on one side, which leads to lower prices on the other side which has now become more valuable (Weyl, 2009).”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Pricing
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Weyl, 2009 source
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“That is, we can characterize Microsoft as managing a three-sided market between consumers, software providers, and hardware providers, whereas Apple manages only a two-sided market between consumers and software providers.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Openness
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Note that Mastercard and Visa incorporated in 2006 and 2007 and so are organized as for-profit corporations rather than as associations or cooperatives.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Abstract
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:direct· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Payment cards like Visa, MasterCard, and American Express are two-sided in the sense that they require consumer usage and merchant acceptance to be successful.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Abstract
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Similarly, it is common to establish a technological standard through free distribution of a basic product (for instance, Adobe's free distribution of Reader popularizes the PDF standard) and then profit on peripheral products (such as Adobe Acrobat).”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Pricing
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:direct· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Similarly, a successful payment card requires both consumer usage and merchant acceptance, where both consumers and merchants value each others' participation.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Abstract
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In markets with multiple newspapers, consumers typically read only one newspaper whereas advertisers appear in all of them.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Pricing
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In addition, there is a more subtle effect through mark-ups: advertising to one side that raises the mark-up on that side leads to lower prices on the other side, and vice versa.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Other Strategies
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:direct· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“If there is no antitrust violation in setting interchange fees but the equilibrium outcome diverges from the social optimum (as in Rochet and Tirole, 2002), then price regulation may be a reasonable solution.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Regulation
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Rochet and Tirole, 2002 source
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✗ Checkable: fails✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“As such, it is unlikely that the theory of two-sided markets will have much effect here, although there is some movement to make predatory pricing easier to prosecute(Brodley, Bolton, and Riordan, 2000).”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > y I thank Mark Armstrong, David Evans, Marshall Van Alstyne, Pai Ying Li, and Glen
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Brodley, Bolton, and Riordan, 2000
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Strength:hedged· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- Not matched
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“If the sellers cannot differentiate aside from adopting a standard, they must differentiate by choosing separate standards, which leads to the adoption of multiple standards (Ellison and Fudenberg, 2003) or even adoption failure (Augereau, Greenstein, and Rysman, 2006;Kretschmer, 2008).”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Openness
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Ellison and Fudenberg, 2003 source
- Not matchedcites Augereau, Greenstein, and Rysman, 2006;Kretschmer, 2008
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“For instance, cash is more costly to process than credit card payments, whereas electronic debit is cheaper (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2007).”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Regulation
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Reserve Bank of Australia, 2007
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
- Not matched
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The economics of two-sided markets can play an important role in guiding the determination of the optimal fee, although it does not appear to have done so to date.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Regulation
Strength:hedged· not yet calibratedCausal:conditional· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“Knittel and Stango (2008) argue that deregulating surcharges for ATMs had a major role in causing the expansion.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Regulation
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Knittel and Stango (2008) source
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:direct· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Two-sided markets typically have network effects and as such are likely to tip toward a single dominant platform.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Antitrust
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Hence, fees were deregulated in this market, in contrast with the current trend toward regulation in payment cards.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Regulation
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- Rests on an assumption: Increased prices led to more consumer usage rather than less because ATMs were much more conveniently located.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Thus, persuasive advertising on one side can lead to lower prices on the other side, whereas informative advertising on one side leads to higher prices on the other.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Other Strategies
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:direct· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Video games compete with a host of leisure activities for consumer attention, but not for game developer attention.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Antitrust
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“It seems clear that the economics of two-sided markets is highly relevant for pricing analysis in antitrust.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Antitrust
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✗ Checkable: fails✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The literature has important policy implications for pricing analysis, an important feature of regulation and a large part of antitrust analysis.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Conclusion
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✗ Checkable: fails✓ Load-bearing: passes✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In general, my prediction is that two-sided analysis will grow in importance in areas where pricing analysis is important, whereas the effect will be more limited in exclusionary conduct cases such as monopolization and conditional sales.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Antitrust
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“However, the technical legal question was about cooperation and the nature of the Visa association, not about two-sided markets.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Antitrust
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“For example, newspapers compete with billboards for advertising, but not for consumer readership.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Antitrust
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The interchange fees imposed in Australia may or may not raise social welfare, but the process for determining the fee surely diverges from the prescription of the economics of two-sided markets.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Regulation
Load-bearingStrength:hedged· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Here, pricing issues were crucial and two-sided market concerns were relatively important.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Antitrust
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Economic theory suggests that any determination of the optimal interchange fee should consider the marginal costs of serving both consumers and merchants as well as price elasticities of demand and interaction elasticities of demand to usage on the other side of the market.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Regulation
Load-bearingStrength:hedged· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“From different perspectives, the same business may have different numbers of sides.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > y I thank Mark Armstrong, David Evans, Marshall Van Alstyne, Pai Ying Li, and Glen
Strength:hedged· not yet calibratedCausal:conditional· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Certain more subtle strategies are more common in two-sided than in onesided markets.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Other Strategies
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:correlational· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✗ Checkable: fails✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Advertising on one side raises participation and usage on that side, which raises demand on the other side, and so advertising on one side can lead to higher prices on the other.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Other Strategies
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“That is, determining the difference between optimal and equilibrium prices has little role in establishing the legality of an action in a monopolization case (although it may have an important role in determining the requisite question of whether a firm has market power).”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Antitrust
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- Rests on an assumption: Inefficient pricing is not an antitrust violation by itself.
- Rests on an assumption: Monopolization and vertical contracting cases typically hinge on whether a firm has excluded competitors from the market in a way that did not benefit consumers or reduce costs.
In the paper
“The court deemed that system unworkable, and hence the collectively set interchange fee was legal as it was necessary to provide the Visa card.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Antitrust
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites National Bancard Corp.(Nabanco) v. Visa U.S.A., Inc. (779 F.2d 592 [11 th Cir.1986])
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- Not matched
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The Internet service providers can be seen as platforms matching Internet users to content providers and hence, the concept of net neutrality is often evaluated from the perspective of two-sided markets.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > y I thank Mark Armstrong, David Evans, Marshall Van Alstyne, Pai Ying Li, and Glen
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:direct· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The economics of two-sided markets provides insights primarily into pricing and so is likely to be particularly important for the parts of antitrust enforcement that focus on pricing issues.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Antitrust
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In a two-sided market, we should consider multiple prices and, potentially, different measures of competition for each side.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Antitrust
Load-bearingStrength:hedged· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✗ Checkable: fails✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The economics of two-sided markets are important for a wide variety of public policy issues.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Public Policy
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✗ Checkable: fails✗ Load-bearing: fails✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Pricing issues are the main thrust of a great deal of economic regulation, and as such, the economics of two-sided markets can make a large contribution.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Regulation
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:conditional· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✗ Checkable: fails✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Also, a platform firm must be concerned not only with its own quality and advertising, but also that of the vendors who operate over its network.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Other Strategies
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Similarly, the effects of quality investment will depend on whether it generates relatively price-elastic or -inelastic consumers on the margin, and on whether it attracts consumers that are more or less responsive to participation on the other side.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Other Strategies
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:conditional· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Pricing was not a primary issue in this calculation, and it is unclear that two-sided market economics offers much guidance.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Antitrust
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedSingle caseTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“A network of ATMs is two-sided in the sense that it is more valuable to consumers if it can reach more banks and more valuable to banks if more consumers use it, which is often a function of how many locations a network reaches.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Regulation
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Common strategies in one-sided markets like innovation, advertising, and quality investment can take on added dimensions in a two-sided market.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Other Strategies
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:correlational· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
The paper relies on this without support.
Two-sidedness may exist in practically all markets.
“That is, although two-sidedness may exist in practically all markets, it is not always quantitatively important.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The difference in industries between the two-sided markets literature and the network effects literature is not crucial.
“However, the difference in industries is not crucial, and there are exceptions on both sides.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The two-sided markets literature and the network effects literature have a lot in common.
“Many papers that study operating systems identify themselves with network effects rather than two-sided markets so perhaps this example is less canonical, but as I have argued, the two literatures have a lot in common.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Antitrust authorities typically use the size of cross-price elasticities to determine what products should be included in a relevant market.
“Antitrust authorities typically use the size of cross-price elasticities to determine what products should be included in a relevant market.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Inefficient pricing is not an antitrust violation by itself.
“Although inefficient pricing is the hallmark of the economic criticism of monopoly power, inefficient pricing is not an antitrust violation by itself.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Monopolization and vertical contracting cases typically hinge on whether a firm has excluded competitors from the market in a way that did not benefit consumers or reduce costs.
“Monopolization and vertical contracting cases typically hinge on whether a firm has excluded competitors from the market in a way that did not benefit consumers or reduce costs.”
The paper relies on this without support.
In December 2007, the European Commission ruled that the interchange fee at MasterCard for cross-border transactions is collusive and illegal.
“In December 2007, the European Commission ruled that the interchange fee at MasterCard (for crossborder transaction) is collusive and illegal.”
The paper relies on this without support.
MasterCard can exist with a zero-interchange fee.
“Since MasterCard can exist with a zero-interchange fee, the exemption to the joint behavior was eliminated.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Increased prices led to more consumer usage rather than less because ATMs were much more conveniently located.
“Furthermore, increased prices led to more consumer usage rather than less because ATMs were much more conveniently located.”
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Conflicting RAND journal volumes for the same 2006 issue
MinorThe references assign volume 37, issue 3 and volume 35, issue 3 of The RAND Journal of Economics to 2006. Both cannot identify that journal's third issue in the same year.
“Armstrong, Mark. 2006. "Competition in Two- Sided Markets." The RAND Journal of Economics, 37(3): 668 -91.”
“Rochet, Jean-Charles, and Jean Tirole. 2006. "Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report." The RAND Journal of Economics, 35(3): 645-67.”
Citations
Cites
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Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship*
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Competition in two-sided markets
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Competition and innovation: an inverted U relationship
Aghion, P., Bloom, N., Blundell, R. W., Griffith, R., & Howitt, P. W. (2017) · doi:10.1920/wp.ifs.2002.0204 · Cited by 2,113
Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers
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Two-Sided Network Effects: A Theory of Information Product Design
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Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship*
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Journal of the European Economic Association
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Flagged first, then by citations
Research works printed but not linked: 5
- Boudreau Kevin, 2007, MIT Sloan Research Paper, 4611
- Brodley Joseph F, 2000, Georgetown Law Journal, 88, 2239
- Ellison Glenn, 2009, Econometrica, 77, 427
- Evans David S, 2003, Yale Journal on Regulation, 20, 325
- Rysman Marc, 2007, Competition Policy International, 3, 197
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Items 901–1,000 of 1,281
Research on Platform Operation Strategy Considering Consumers’ Hassle Costs
Liu, H., Liu, F., & Du, F. (2022) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su14052634 · Cited by 1
Digital Platform Modelling: Delineating the Foundations of Their Business Models
Bounfour, A., Kim, K., & Phung, T. N. (2022) · Progress in IS · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-90192-9_1 · Cited by 1
An introduction to digital entrepreneurship: concepts and themes
Keyhani, M., Ashjari, A., Sorgner, A., et al. (2022) · Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks · doi:10.4337/9781800373631.00006 · Cited by 1
Analysis of the Market Definition of Non-Intermediary Service Platform in Antitrust Law
Huimin, Y., & Liu, J. (2022) · Studies in Law and Justice · doi:10.56397/slj.2022.11.01 · Cited by 1
EKİNGEN, E. (2022) · Selçuk Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi dergisi · doi:10.15337/suhfd.1082006 · Cited by 1
Muditomo, A., Syaukat, Y., Andati, T., et al. (2023) · Advances in economics, business and management research/Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research · doi:10.2991/978-94-6463-144-9_5 · Cited by 1
Taxation on duopoly e-commerce platforms and their search environments
Poddar, S., Banerjee, T., & Banerjee, S. (2023) · SN Business & Economics · doi:10.1007/s43546-023-00509-1 · Cited by 1
“Better software technology represents a favourable way for exploring wide-ranging 2 Several existing works by Jeon and Rochet (2010), Jullien (2005), Rysman (2009) have studied the social welfare in the context of two-sided market.”
MethodDigital Services as a Stage of Ecosystem Development in Modern Russian Politics
Sokolov, A. V., Frolov, A. A., & Grebenko, E. D. (2023) · Vestnik Volgogradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta Serija 4 Istorija Regionovedenie Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenija · doi:10.15688/jvolsu4.2023.3.19 · Cited by 1
Markets as dualistic, semi-decentralized organizations
Jackson, W. A. (2023) · Review of Evolutionary Political Economy · doi:10.1007/s43253-023-00111-z · Cited by 1
“In a multisided market, the trading platform varies in its treatment of different groups of users, bringing outcomes that are optimal in some respects but not neutral or even (Evans and Schmalensee 2008; Rysman 2009).”
Strategic Scenario Study of Industry 4.0 Prospects
Harno, J. (2024) · Procedia Computer Science · doi:10.1016/j.procs.2024.05.117 · Cited by 1
Iwańczuk-Kaliska, A. (2024) · Krakow Review of Economics and Management/Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Krakowie · doi:10.15678/krem.2024.1004.0202 · Cited by 1
“Many studies have explored the interplay between consumers and merchants on the basis of the concept of two-sided markets, described among others by: Rochet and Tirole (2003), Eisennman, Parker and Van Alstyne (2006), Rysman (2009), McAndrews and Wang (2012), and Rysman and Wright (2014).”
BackgroundStrategic Design for Value Co-creation in the Third Sector: Setting Organisational Encounters
Pei, X. (2025) · Springer series in design and innovation · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-90306-9_5 · Cited by 1
An experimental study of competition in two-sided markets
Loke, K. N. (2012) · Cited by 1
Competition of Banks as Two-Sided Markets
Xiao, S. (2014) · International Joint Conference on Computational Sciences and Optimization (CSO) · doi:10.1109/cso.2014.121 · Cited by 1
“Two-sided markets have different strategies, the two most important strategies that a potential platform chooses are price and openness (Rysman, 2009).”
BackgroundKazan, E., & Damsgaard, J. (2013) · Cited by 1
김상봉, & 노재확 (2013) · 통상정보연구 · doi:10.15798/kaici.15.2.201306.131 · Cited by 1
Essays on Pricing and Matching on Two-Sided Platforms
Nungsari, M. (2019) · Carolina Digital Repository (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) · doi:10.17615/g883-jz18 · Cited by 1
Platform intermediation to sponsor alternative fuel vehicles
Dietrich, A.-M. (2016) · Transport Policy · doi:10.1016/j.tranpol.2016.12.001 · Cited by 1
Jung, R., Radić, D., & Radić, M. (2016) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-658-12393-2_4 · Cited by 1
The trusted online platform of cross-border e-commerce: a managerial model
Wen, L., Du, J. T., Zhang, J., et al. (2019) · IEEE Information Technology, Networking, Electronic and Automation Control Conference (ITNEC) · doi:10.1109/itnec.2019.8729478 · Cited by 1
Network effects, trade, and productivity
Song, T., & Wang, S. (2019) · Managerial and Decision Economics · doi:10.1002/mde.3045 · Cited by 1
Cordella, A., & Gualdi, F. (2019) · International Conference on E-Commerce, E-Business and E-Government (ICEEG) · doi:10.1145/3340017.3340029 · Cited by 1
“Moreover, these marketplaces are affected by different competitive forces [28].”
BackgroundHow to Tax a Monopoly Platform in a Product Differentiation Set-Up?
Mukherjee, S. (2019) · Advances in e-business research series · doi:10.4018/978-1-7998-1125-1.ch027 · Cited by 1
Regulating mediators of internet piracy: P2P websites and cyberlockers
Walter, J. M. (2019) · Digital Policy Regulation and Governance · doi:10.1108/dprg-05-2019-0035 · Cited by 1
Predatory Pricing in the Online Transportation Platforms: Is It Really Predatory?
Nurcahyawan, T., Lewiandy, & Huang, M. V. (2020) · Tarumanagara International Conference on the Applications of Social Sciences and Humanities (TICASH) · doi:10.2991/assehr.k.200515.092 · Cited by 1
“To create a clear distinction between the two markets, in a pipeline market, we can characterize the price cost mark-up in terms of elasticity of demand and the marginal cost [4] therefore a price set under the marginal cost will be classified as predatory pricing.”
BackgroundAn Appraisal of Aadhaar and Digital Payments Strategies in India
Dayanandan, A., & Many, R. (2021) · Advances in e-business research series · doi:10.4018/978-1-7998-5015-1.ch007 · Cited by 2
Ducci, F. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108867528.004 · Cited by 1
Business model as an innovation
Romanowski, R., & Wieja, M. (2021) · doi:10.18559/978-83-8211-084-5/1 · Cited by 1
İktisat Teorisinde İki Taraflı Piyasalar
Kar, M. (2021) · Finans Ekonomi ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi · doi:10.29106/fesa.948372 · Cited by 1
What’s the tally? An Investigation into the Field(s) of Dominant Designs and Platforms
Sobota, V., Ortt, R., van de Kaa, G., & van Beers, C. (2022) · Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS) · doi:10.24251/hicss.2022.818 · Cited by 1
Orsato, R. J., Barakat, S. R., & de Campos, J. G. F. (2020) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198868378.013.22 · Cited by 1
Bank, W. (2016) · World Bank, Washington, DC eBooks · doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-0671-1_ch1 · Cited by 1
Dewenter, R., & Rösch, J. (2014) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-658-08555-1_1 · Cited by 1
Analysis on the in-app advertising contract of a mobile platform and two competitive app developers
Hu, W. P., Sun, X., & Zhou, W.-F. (2022) · Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization · doi:10.3934/jimo.2022220 · Cited by 1
The Multi-Level Marketing as a Two-Sided MarketPreprint
Agbo, M. (2013) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2345289 · Cited by 1
Price Discrimination by a Two-Sided Platform: With Applications to Advertising and Privacy DesignPreprint
Jeon, D., Kim, B., & Menicucci, D. (2015) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2672058 · Cited by 1
Firm/Market Equivalency: How Platforms are Shaping Markets Through Market FailuresPreprint
Lescop, D., & Lescop, E. (2013) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2264423 · Cited by 1
From Win-Win to Winner-Take-AllPreprint
Ko, C. Y., & Shen, B. (2015) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2676452 · Cited by 1
Tubaro, P. (2015) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-08-097086-8.03060-9 · Cited by 1
BUSINESS MODEL ANALYSIS ON ANDROID APP STORES
Heikkinen, L. (2013) · Jyväskylä University Digital Archive (University of Jyväskylä) · Cited by 1
White, L. J. (2016) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2748718 · Cited by 1
Digital Content StrategiesPreprint
Halbheer, D., Stahl, F., Koenigsberg, O., & Lehmann, D. R. (2013) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · doi:10.5167/uzh-75374 · Cited by 1
A Dynamic Contest Model of Platform Competition in Two-Sided MarketsPreprint
Grossmann, M., & Lang, M. (2016) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2841011 · Cited by 1
“Typical examples are issuers of credit cards, who enable merchants to interact with consumers [1], PC operating systems, which enable software developers to interact with users [2], newspapers, which enable advertisers to interact with readers [3], and video game consoles, which enable game developers to interact with…”
Why Discrete Price Fragments U.S. Stock Exchanges and Disperses Their Fee StructuresPreprint
Chao, Y., Yao, C., & Ye, M. (2014) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2530572 · Cited by 1
Managing a Supply-Chain Based Two-Sided Market
Rong, K., Liu, T., & Lin, Y. (2016) · Academy of Management Proceedings · doi:10.5465/ambpp.2016.10819abstract · Cited by 1
“In two-sided market, the key thing is how to govern different sides by developing an accepted pricing model (Hagiu 2009, Rysman 2009).”
BackgroundBrooks, A. L. (2017) · eScholarship (California Digital Library) · Cited by 1
Launching a Two-sided Platform
Solheim, M. T., & Tovsen, O. K. S. (2017) · NORA - Norwegian Open Research Archives · Cited by 1
Loyalty Programs in the Sharing Economy: Optimality and CompetitionPreprint
Fang, Z., Huang, L., & Wierman, A. (2018) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1805.03581 · Cited by 1
“, see [29, 30, 35] and related references for an overview.”
BackgroundDolfsma, W. A. (2013) · Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks · doi:10.4337/9781782547167.00017 · Cited by 1
Platform Competition With User Rebates Under No Surcharge RulesPreprint
Schwartz, M., & Vincent, D. R. (2017) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3080888 · Cited by 1
Content Providers Volunteering to Pay Network Providers: Better than Neutrality?Preprint
Maillé, P., & Schwartz, G. A. (2016) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1602.07615 · Cited by 1
“We develop a game-theoretic model in which the network regime (neutral or non-neutral) affects strategic provider choices, such as: investments of last-mile access providers (ISPs) and content providers (CPs); ISP pricing of their endusers; and CPs entry decisions and choices of side payments to…”
MethodLong, D. H., Chu, J., & Yao, D. (2019) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3342473 · Cited by 1
How Do Marketplaces Compete? The View From Stripe ConnectPreprint
Hilger, N. (2018) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3232470 · Cited by 1
Prediction and Identification in Two-Sided MarketsPreprint
Boik, A. (2018) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3104846 · Cited by 3
online platforms, economics of
White, A. (2013) · The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics · doi:10.1057/9780230226203.3885 · Cited by 1
Breuer, C., Dietl, H., Weingaertner, C., et al. (2014) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2493702 · Cited by 1
Digital Multisided Platforms and Women's Health: An Empirical Analysis of Peer-to-Peer LendingPreprint
Ozer, G. T., Greenwood, B. N., & Gopal, A. (2019) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3389838 · Cited by 1
“Digital multisided platforms create markets by facilitating transactions and efficiently charging the participants who elect to use the platform as an economic space without taking ownership of the transacting entities (Hagiu & Wright, 2013; Rochet & Tirole, 2004; Rysman, 2009).”
Garz, S., Xavier Giné, A., Karlan, D., Mazer, R., Sanford, C., & Zinman, J. (2020) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3750236 · Cited by 1
“Consumer protection regulators and researchers often overlook several bodies of theory on market and decision failures that question this premise (e.g., Rysman 2009; Heidhues and .”
BackgroundPlatform Dynamics and Economic DevelopmentPreprint
Xie, D., & Yang, B. (2020) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3748484 · Cited by 1
Open Data Attracting Third Party Innovations
Ofe, H., & Tinnsten, C. (2014) · KTH Publication Database DiVA (KTH Royal Institute of Technology) · doi:10.13140/rg.2.2.24280.03845 · Cited by 1
Convergence in ICT Industries: A Challenge for Competition Law AuthoritiesPreprint
Gupta, S., & Tyagi, K. (2015) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2592310 · Cited by 1
Nedelescu, D. M. (2022) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4022685 · Cited by 1
Merchant Payment Steering: Evidence From the 2009 Bank of Canada Methods of Payment Survey
Welte, A. (2014) · doi:10.22215/etd/2014-10244 · Cited by 1
(2013) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-408066-9.09999-9 · Cited by 1
Assessing Incentives to Increase Digital Payment Acceptance and Usage: A Machine Learning ApproachPreprint
Allen, J., Valverde, S. C., Chakravorti, S., et al. (2022) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4167356 · Cited by 1
Identifying Cross-Sided Liquidity ExternalitiesPreprint
Skjeltorp, J. A., Sojli, E., & Tham, W. W. (2012) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2019084 · Cited by 1
Conflicts of Interest and PlatformsPreprint
Kifer, A., & Prince, J. T. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4575050 · Cited by 1
Jacobides, M. G., Cennamo, C., & Gawer, A. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4601477 · Cited by 1
Global Digital Platform Economy, The
Ács, Z. J. (2023) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-68128-9_7-1 · Cited by 1
Revisiting Mobile Effects: Interdependent Decisions in High-Stakes PlatformsPreprint
Fang, S., Kwon, H. E., Lu, T., & Zhang, Y. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4635856 · Cited by 1
The Welfare Effects of Selling Leads in a Two-Sided MarketplacePreprint
Shi, P. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4727198 · Cited by 1
Digital Technology and Legal Capacity of the State: Evidence from China's Internet Judicial AuctionsPreprint
Cao, G., Ding, H. D., & Zhou, L. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4859221 · Cited by 1
Domon, K. (2025) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_842-1 · Cited by 1
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Lescop, D., & Vogeleer, E. D. (2011) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1945776 · Cited by 1
“Recently, Rysman (2009) argued that the existence of a multi-sided market is tied more to the company’s strategic intent than to the market’s intrinsic structure: As this distinction often depends on the decisions of the intermediary rather than on purely technological features of the market, it…”
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“Rysman (2009) argues that a market is two-sided if there is an intermediary in the market and if there is some kind of interdependence or externality between the two groups the market serves.”
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Russell, F. M. (2012) · San Jose State University Scholar Works (San Jose State University) · doi:10.31979/etd.d3yb-esqj
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“In addition, Forand (2010) 4For surveys, see Rysman (2009) and Hagiu and Wright (2011). and Troncoso-Valverde (2011) explore the incentives of competing sellers who post mechanisms and choose disclosure policies that reveal sellers’ private information to (potential) buyers and examine whether full…”
Essays on Industrial Organization and Multi-market Contact
Lee, P. Y. (2011) · OpenGrey (Institut de l'Information Scientifique et Technique)
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Huang, C., & Ye-an, Z. (2011) · International Conference on E-Business and E-Government · doi:10.1109/icebeg.2011.5886813
“I. B2B C2C B2C Rysman 2009 1 2 1 Matutues Regibean (1988) Economides 1989 2 Caillaud Jullien (2003) Rochet Tirole (2003) Rabin(1998) Camerer Loewenstein 2004 Angner Loewenstein 2007 Gabaix 2004 T1 TN t t-1 t-1 t-1 t 978-1-4244-8694-6/11/$26.00 ©2011 IEEE II. eq eq sp en ( , , ) ( ( ))e e e e es s sU q n p q f n pα β=…”
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Fink, N. (2011) · Empirica · doi:10.1007/s10663-010-9157-9
“literature on two-sided markets deals only with situations where the externality is paid by consumers and there is some sort of interaction of two different sets of agents. See for example Rysman (2009) .”
BackgroundUtilizing the access value of customers
Lai, P. (2013) · Business Horizons · doi:10.1016/j.bushor.2013.09.002
Axelsson, J., & Pontus, K. (2010) · KTH Publication Database DiVA (KTH Royal Institute of Technology)
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Kim, Y. S. (2015) · doi:10.7916/d8br8qw3
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Lai, Z. (2015) · Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University)
Visintini, M., & Rörström, E. D. (2014) · doi:10.13140/rg.2.2.17853.23520
Metadata
- Authors
- Rysman, M.
- Affiliations
- Boston University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Rysman, Marc
- ORCID
- Rysman, Marc
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2009-08-01
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 125-143
- ISSN
- 0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1982461819
- Semantic Scholar
- 1c0c366611a5049d783edb97c8fce22b666c4622
- Cited by
- 1,261
- References
- 71
- Citations by year
- 2026: 68 · 2025: 74 · 2024: 77 · 2023: 93 · 2022: 85 · 2021: 95 · 2020: 124 · 2019: 92 · 2018: 87 · 2017: 70 · 2016: 81 · 2015: 57 · 2014: 72 · 2013: 76 · 2012: 47
- FWCI
- 103.49
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- other-oa
- Locations
- The Journal of Economic Perspectives (publishedVersion, other-oa)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
- Keywords
- two-sided markets, platform intermediaries, network effects, externalities, payment cards, video game consoles, operating systems, competition policy, regulation, public policy, consumer electronics, search engines
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