The DOI matches its Crossref record; 242 of the 242 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 2 of the 18 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
The Economics of Two-Sided Markets
Open accessAbstract
Broadly speaking, a two-sided market is one in which 1) two sets of agents interact through an intermediary or platform, and 2) the decisions of each set of agents affects the outcomes of the other set of agents, typically through an externality. In the case of a video game system, the intermediary is the console producer—Sony in the scenario above—while the two sets of agents are consumers and video game developers. Neither consumers nor game developers will be interested in the PlayStation if the other party is not. Similarly, a successful payment card requires both consumer usage and merchant acceptance, where both consumers and merchants value each others' participation. Many more products fit into this paradigm, such as search engines, newspapers, and almost any advertiser-supported media (examples in which consumers typically negatively value, rather than positively value, the participation of the other side), as well as most software or title-based operating systems and consumer electronics. This paper seeks to explain what two-sided markets are and why they interest economists. I discuss the strategies that firms typically consider, and I highlight a number of puzzling outcomes from the perspective of the economics of two-sided markets. Finally, I consider the implications for public policy, particularly antitrust and regulatory policy, where there have been a number of recent issues involving media, computer operating systems, and payment cards.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
2 of 18 cited sources checked · 1 supported · 0 flagged · accuracy not yet measured
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“In fact, two-sided markets often seem to evolve toward to a situation where members of one side use a single platform and the other side uses multiple platforms; Armstrong (2006, Section 5) makes this point and provides formal analysis.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Pricing
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Armstrong (2006, Section 5) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 5, “Competitive bottlenecks” (page unavailable), formally analyzes a market in which one group uses a single platform and the other uses multiple platforms. The discussion preceding Section 5 says several important markets resemble this configuration. The paper does not establish that markets evolve toward it over time. (LLM, conf=0.83)
Strength:hedged· not yet calibratedCausal:correlational· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passes- Partly supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Hence, firms compete aggressively on the side that uses a single network in order to charge monopoly prices to the other side that is trying to reach them (Armstrong, 2006).”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Pricing
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Armstrong, 2006 source
In “Fixed fees or per-transaction charges” (page unavailable), Armstrong says platforms compete for single-homing agents but have monopoly power over access to them, leading to high prices for the multi-homing side. Section 5, “Competitive bottlenecks” (page unavailable), describes each platform as holding a local monopoly over that access. The claim is a fair paraphrase of this competitive-bottleneck result. (LLM, conf=0.91)
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passes- Supported
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In addition, two-sided markets allow for a new form of price discrimination: discrimination based on heterogeneity in the attractiveness of an agent to the other side.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Pricing
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesA conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“These markets seem much less flexible in terms of the choice of two-sidedness.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Openness
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesThe paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Advertising prices depend on consumer demand for advertising as well, with relatively low prices for advertisements that consumers more highly value (such as classified advertisements and some local advertisements).”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Abstract
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:direct· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesA conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Hence, the “twosidedness” of pricing can be more pronounced in competitive markets.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Pricing
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesA conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“If there are multiple competing market intermediaries, the effect of participation of one side on the other has even more bite.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Pricing
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesThe paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The main result is that pricing to one side of the market depends not only on the demand and costs that those consumers bring but also on how their participation affects participation on the other side and the profit that is extracted from that participation.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Pricing
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesA conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In this sense, Microsoft is more open than Apple.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Openness
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesA conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In this scenario, the interchange fee primarily affects the terms that merchants and consumers face and the total volume of transactions.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Abstract
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passes
- Probably not a substantial claim. 34
- It may state two separate claims as one. 39
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Of great controversy is that the merchant's bank must pay the consumer's bank an “interchange fee,” a percent of each transaction.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Abstract
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Providers of platforms often prefer incompatibility on the grounds that it locks in current customers and locks out competitors.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Openness
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The interchange fee presumably explains why banks can offer generous rewards programs to consumers for using their credit cards.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Abstract
Strength:hedged· not yet calibratedCausal:conditional· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“This result might explain why payment card pricing has increasingly favored consumers over time rather than merchants (for instance, with the rise of rewards programs), since consumers and not merchants typically use a single network and competition among card networks has become more important relative to competition between card networks and cash.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Pricing
Strength:hedged· not yet calibratedCausal:conditional· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Hence, payment associations offered supermarkets relatively low interchange fees, which led to low bank fees and ultimately to the adoption of payment card usage by supermarkets.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Pricing
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:direct· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“These changes do not appear to have led to a strategic change with respect to interchange policy.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Abstract
Strength:hedged· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
In the paper
“However, as Rochet and Tirole (2002) point out, if serving consumers and merchants is perfectly competitive, then the interchange fee does not affect the profits of the member banks.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Abstract
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Rochet and Tirole (2002) source
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Thus, it may be better to discuss two-sided “strategies” rather than two-sided “markets,” because two-sidedness is an endogenous choice in some markets, not a technologically determined outcome.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Openness
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✗ Checkable: fails✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The interchange fee is set by the card association, and in this sense is set cooperatively by the member banks.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Abstract
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:direct· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Merchants typically accept payment on multiple networks-for example, Visa, Mastercard, American Express, and Discover-as well as via alternatives such as on-line debit cards and personal checks.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Pricing
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Newspapers are a canonical two-sided market, where the newspaper provides a platform for communication from advertisers to consumers.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Abstract
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“For instance, in any market, prices typically fall as the price elasticity of demand increases, but in a two-sided market the effect can be even larger: The low price on one side not only attracts elastic consumers on that side but also, as a result, leads to higher prices or more participation on the other side.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Pricing
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“But now, lowering the consumer price attracts consumers from the competing platform, which degrades the value of the competitor to buyers, and hence leads to a larger increase in buyer interest in the original platform.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Pricing
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The merchant's fee is set to reflect this cost and is usually only slightly higher than the interchange fee.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Abstract
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:direct· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“A successful operating system requires consumer adoption as well as software development by software vendors.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Abstract
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:direct· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“Thus, discrimination increases the value extracted on one side, which leads to lower prices on the other side which has now become more valuable (Weyl, 2009).”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Pricing
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Weyl, 2009 source
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“That is, we can characterize Microsoft as managing a three-sided market between consumers, software providers, and hardware providers, whereas Apple manages only a two-sided market between consumers and software providers.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Openness
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Note that Mastercard and Visa incorporated in 2006 and 2007 and so are organized as for-profit corporations rather than as associations or cooperatives.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Abstract
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:direct· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Payment cards like Visa, MasterCard, and American Express are two-sided in the sense that they require consumer usage and merchant acceptance to be successful.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Abstract
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Similarly, it is common to establish a technological standard through free distribution of a basic product (for instance, Adobe's free distribution of Reader popularizes the PDF standard) and then profit on peripheral products (such as Adobe Acrobat).”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Pricing
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:direct· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Similarly, a successful payment card requires both consumer usage and merchant acceptance, where both consumers and merchants value each others' participation.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Abstract
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In markets with multiple newspapers, consumers typically read only one newspaper whereas advertisers appear in all of them.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Pricing
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In addition, there is a more subtle effect through mark-ups: advertising to one side that raises the mark-up on that side leads to lower prices on the other side, and vice versa.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Other Strategies
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:direct· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“If there is no antitrust violation in setting interchange fees but the equilibrium outcome diverges from the social optimum (as in Rochet and Tirole, 2002), then price regulation may be a reasonable solution.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Regulation
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Rochet and Tirole, 2002 source
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✗ Checkable: fails✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“As such, it is unlikely that the theory of two-sided markets will have much effect here, although there is some movement to make predatory pricing easier to prosecute(Brodley, Bolton, and Riordan, 2000).”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > y I thank Mark Armstrong, David Evans, Marshall Van Alstyne, Pai Ying Li, and Glen
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Brodley, Bolton, and Riordan, 2000
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Strength:hedged· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- Not matched
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“If the sellers cannot differentiate aside from adopting a standard, they must differentiate by choosing separate standards, which leads to the adoption of multiple standards (Ellison and Fudenberg, 2003) or even adoption failure (Augereau, Greenstein, and Rysman, 2006;Kretschmer, 2008).”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Openness
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Ellison and Fudenberg, 2003 source
- Not matchedcites Augereau, Greenstein, and Rysman, 2006;Kretschmer, 2008
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“For instance, cash is more costly to process than credit card payments, whereas electronic debit is cheaper (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2007).”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Regulation
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Reserve Bank of Australia, 2007
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
- Not matched
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The economics of two-sided markets can play an important role in guiding the determination of the optimal fee, although it does not appear to have done so to date.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Regulation
Strength:hedged· not yet calibratedCausal:conditional· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“Knittel and Stango (2008) argue that deregulating surcharges for ATMs had a major role in causing the expansion.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Regulation
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Knittel and Stango (2008) source
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:direct· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Two-sided markets typically have network effects and as such are likely to tip toward a single dominant platform.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Antitrust
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Hence, fees were deregulated in this market, in contrast with the current trend toward regulation in payment cards.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Regulation
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- Rests on an assumption: Increased prices led to more consumer usage rather than less because ATMs were much more conveniently located.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Thus, persuasive advertising on one side can lead to lower prices on the other side, whereas informative advertising on one side leads to higher prices on the other.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Other Strategies
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:direct· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Video games compete with a host of leisure activities for consumer attention, but not for game developer attention.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Antitrust
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“It seems clear that the economics of two-sided markets is highly relevant for pricing analysis in antitrust.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Antitrust
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✗ Checkable: fails✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The literature has important policy implications for pricing analysis, an important feature of regulation and a large part of antitrust analysis.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Conclusion
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✗ Checkable: fails✓ Load-bearing: passes✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In general, my prediction is that two-sided analysis will grow in importance in areas where pricing analysis is important, whereas the effect will be more limited in exclusionary conduct cases such as monopolization and conditional sales.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Antitrust
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“However, the technical legal question was about cooperation and the nature of the Visa association, not about two-sided markets.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Antitrust
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“For example, newspapers compete with billboards for advertising, but not for consumer readership.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Antitrust
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The interchange fees imposed in Australia may or may not raise social welfare, but the process for determining the fee surely diverges from the prescription of the economics of two-sided markets.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Regulation
Load-bearingStrength:hedged· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Here, pricing issues were crucial and two-sided market concerns were relatively important.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Antitrust
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Economic theory suggests that any determination of the optimal interchange fee should consider the marginal costs of serving both consumers and merchants as well as price elasticities of demand and interaction elasticities of demand to usage on the other side of the market.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Regulation
Load-bearingStrength:hedged· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“From different perspectives, the same business may have different numbers of sides.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > y I thank Mark Armstrong, David Evans, Marshall Van Alstyne, Pai Ying Li, and Glen
Strength:hedged· not yet calibratedCausal:conditional· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Certain more subtle strategies are more common in two-sided than in onesided markets.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Other Strategies
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:correlational· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✗ Checkable: fails✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Advertising on one side raises participation and usage on that side, which raises demand on the other side, and so advertising on one side can lead to higher prices on the other.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Other Strategies
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“That is, determining the difference between optimal and equilibrium prices has little role in establishing the legality of an action in a monopolization case (although it may have an important role in determining the requisite question of whether a firm has market power).”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Antitrust
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- Rests on an assumption: Inefficient pricing is not an antitrust violation by itself.
- Rests on an assumption: Monopolization and vertical contracting cases typically hinge on whether a firm has excluded competitors from the market in a way that did not benefit consumers or reduce costs.
In the paper
“The court deemed that system unworkable, and hence the collectively set interchange fee was legal as it was necessary to provide the Visa card.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Antitrust
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites National Bancard Corp.(Nabanco) v. Visa U.S.A., Inc. (779 F.2d 592 [11 th Cir.1986])
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- Not matched
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The Internet service providers can be seen as platforms matching Internet users to content providers and hence, the concept of net neutrality is often evaluated from the perspective of two-sided markets.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > y I thank Mark Armstrong, David Evans, Marshall Van Alstyne, Pai Ying Li, and Glen
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:direct· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The economics of two-sided markets provides insights primarily into pricing and so is likely to be particularly important for the parts of antitrust enforcement that focus on pricing issues.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Antitrust
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In a two-sided market, we should consider multiple prices and, potentially, different measures of competition for each side.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Antitrust
Load-bearingStrength:hedged· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✗ Checkable: fails✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The economics of two-sided markets are important for a wide variety of public policy issues.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Public Policy
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✗ Checkable: fails✗ Load-bearing: fails✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Pricing issues are the main thrust of a great deal of economic regulation, and as such, the economics of two-sided markets can make a large contribution.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Regulation
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:conditional· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✗ Checkable: fails✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Also, a platform firm must be concerned not only with its own quality and advertising, but also that of the vendors who operate over its network.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Other Strategies
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Similarly, the effects of quality investment will depend on whether it generates relatively price-elastic or -inelastic consumers on the margin, and on whether it attracts consumers that are more or less responsive to participation on the other side.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Other Strategies
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:conditional· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Pricing was not a primary issue in this calculation, and it is unclear that two-sided market economics offers much guidance.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Antitrust
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedSingle caseTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“A network of ATMs is two-sided in the sense that it is more valuable to consumers if it can reach more banks and more valuable to banks if more consumers use it, which is often a function of how many locations a network reaches.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Regulation
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Common strategies in one-sided markets like innovation, advertising, and quality investment can take on added dimensions in a two-sided market.”
§ The Economics of Two-Sided Markets > Other Strategies
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:correlational· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
The paper relies on this without support.
Two-sidedness may exist in practically all markets.
“That is, although two-sidedness may exist in practically all markets, it is not always quantitatively important.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The difference in industries between the two-sided markets literature and the network effects literature is not crucial.
“However, the difference in industries is not crucial, and there are exceptions on both sides.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The two-sided markets literature and the network effects literature have a lot in common.
“Many papers that study operating systems identify themselves with network effects rather than two-sided markets so perhaps this example is less canonical, but as I have argued, the two literatures have a lot in common.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Antitrust authorities typically use the size of cross-price elasticities to determine what products should be included in a relevant market.
“Antitrust authorities typically use the size of cross-price elasticities to determine what products should be included in a relevant market.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Inefficient pricing is not an antitrust violation by itself.
“Although inefficient pricing is the hallmark of the economic criticism of monopoly power, inefficient pricing is not an antitrust violation by itself.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Monopolization and vertical contracting cases typically hinge on whether a firm has excluded competitors from the market in a way that did not benefit consumers or reduce costs.
“Monopolization and vertical contracting cases typically hinge on whether a firm has excluded competitors from the market in a way that did not benefit consumers or reduce costs.”
The paper relies on this without support.
In December 2007, the European Commission ruled that the interchange fee at MasterCard for cross-border transactions is collusive and illegal.
“In December 2007, the European Commission ruled that the interchange fee at MasterCard (for crossborder transaction) is collusive and illegal.”
The paper relies on this without support.
MasterCard can exist with a zero-interchange fee.
“Since MasterCard can exist with a zero-interchange fee, the exemption to the joint behavior was eliminated.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Increased prices led to more consumer usage rather than less because ATMs were much more conveniently located.
“Furthermore, increased prices led to more consumer usage rather than less because ATMs were much more conveniently located.”
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Conflicting RAND journal volumes for the same 2006 issue
MinorThe references assign volume 37, issue 3 and volume 35, issue 3 of The RAND Journal of Economics to 2006. Both cannot identify that journal's third issue in the same year.
“Armstrong, Mark. 2006. "Competition in Two- Sided Markets." The RAND Journal of Economics, 37(3): 668 -91.”
“Rochet, Jean-Charles, and Jean Tirole. 2006. "Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report." The RAND Journal of Economics, 35(3): 645-67.”
Citations
Cites
Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets
Rochet, J.-C., & Tirole, J. (2003) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/154247603322493212 · Cited by 5,642
Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship*
Aghion, P., Bloom, N., Blundell, R. W., Griffith, R., & Howitt, P. W. (2005) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/120.2.701 · Cited by 3,769
Competition in two-sided markets
Armstrong, M. (2006) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00037.x · Cited by 3,315
Two-sided markets: A progress report
Rochet, J.-C., & Tirole, J. (2006) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00036.x · Cited by 2,994
Competition and innovation: an inverted U relationship
Aghion, P., Bloom, N., Blundell, R. W., Griffith, R., & Howitt, P. W. (2017) · doi:10.1920/wp.ifs.2002.0204 · Cited by 2,113
Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers
Caillaud, B., & Jullien, B. (2003) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1593720 · Cited by 1,799
Two-Sided Network Effects: A Theory of Information Product Design
PARKER, G. G., & Alstyne, M. V. (2005) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1050.0400 · Cited by 1,684
Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship*
Aghion, P., Bloom, N., Blundell, R., Griffith, R., & Howitt, P. (2005) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/0033553053970214 · Cited by 995
Open Platform Strategies and Innovation: Granting Access vs. Devolving Control
Boudreau, K. J. (2010) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1100.1215 · Cited by 984
Journal of the European Economic Association
European Economic Association (2017) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/(issn)1542-4774 · Cited by 859
Flagged first, then by citations
Research works printed but not linked: 5
- Boudreau Kevin, 2007, MIT Sloan Research Paper, 4611
- Brodley Joseph F, 2000, Georgetown Law Journal, 88, 2239
- Ellison Glenn, 2009, Econometrica, 77, 427
- Evans David S, 2003, Yale Journal on Regulation, 20, 325
- Rysman Marc, 2007, Competition Policy International, 3, 197
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Items 1,101–1,200 of 1,281
Impact of Protection Level on Vertically-Differentiated Two-Sided Software Platforms
Hamedani, M. F., & Dehghan, A. (2021) · International Journal of Information Security and Privacy · doi:10.4018/ijisp.2022010109
Why Platform Businesses Are Unlike Product or Service Businesses
Tiwana, A. (2013) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-408066-9.00003-5
Ducci, F. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108867528.007
Baudry, M., & Dumont, B. (2017) · doi:10.1002/9781119452911.biblio
Ducci, F. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108867528.001
Ducci, F. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108867528.003
Algorithm-driven economy, oligopolio e collusionePreprint
Basini, G. (2021) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3810149
Ducci, F. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108867528.008
Essays on the Theory of Two-Sided Markets
Horvath, D. M. (2022) · doi:10.14267/phd.2022013
Backhaus, K., König, U., & Bieling, M. (2019) · Springer Reference Wirtschaft · doi:10.1007/978-3-658-13342-9_25
Ducci, F. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108867528.009
Intelligent Mechanisms for Platforms in Modern MarketsPreprint
Hajaj, C. (2019) · doi:10.31237/osf.io/n5vbs
The Baidu Music Settlement: A Turning Point for Copyright Reform In China?
Dong, X. “., & Jayakar, K. (2013) · Journal of Information Policy · doi:10.5325/jinfopoli.3.1.77
The Rise of MP3 as the Market Standard
den Uijl, S., de Vries, H. J., & Bayramoglu, D. (2014) · Advances in IT standards and standardization research (AISSR) book series/Advances in IT standards and standardization research series · doi:10.4018/978-1-4666-6332-9.ch009
New Models and Conflicts in the Interconnection and Delivery of Internet-Mediated ContentPreprint
Frieden, R. (2014) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2411674
Platform Competition Under the Ambiguous Two-Sided Market TheoryPreprint
Rauch, G. (2021) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3938915
Maggiore, M. (2019) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3381740
Price competition strategy of internet platforms
Zhuang, L. (2015) · International Journal of Design & Nature and Ecodynamics · doi:10.2495/dne-v10-n4-319-326
AN APPROACH TO SELECT PARTNERSIN OVER-THE-TOP INITIATIVES
(2018) · Asia Pacific Journal of Advanced Business and Social Studies · doi:10.25275/apjabssv4i1bus24
“In an effort to compete with Over-The-Top (OTT) services, Communication Service Providers (CSPs) havebeen providing their own OTT services using various business model such as two-sided markets model (Zhao, 2011; Armstrong, 2006; Rysman, 2009), freemium (Martin, 2012; Needleman and Loten 2012) or market capitalization…”
BackgroundMethodJudging a book by its cover?: analysing the Indian approach to defining platform markets
Bhattacharya, S., & Khandelwal, P. (2022) · International Review of Law Computers & Technology · doi:10.1080/13600869.2022.2030032
“Tipping is a ‘winner-take-all’market situation (Rysman 2009).”
Backhaus, K., König, U., & Bieling, M. (2016) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-658-13361-0_25-1
Buxmann, P., & Hinz, O. F. (2013) · WIRTSCHAFTSINFORMATIK · doi:10.1007/s11576-013-0377-z
Malardé, V., & Pénard, T. (2022) · Revue économique · doi:10.3917/reco.pr2.0181
Microgiving with Digital PlatformsPreprint
Jiang, X., Xing, J., Xu, J., & Zou, E. (2022) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4140867
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF INTERACTION IN TWO-SIDED MARKET OF LOCAL CURRENCY
YOSHIOKA, T., Chikaraishi, M., & Fujiwara, A. (2022) · Journal of Japan Society of Civil Engineers Ser D3 (Infrastructure Planning and Management) · doi:10.2208/jscejipm.77.5_i_83
Lindenmayr, M., Kircher, T., Stolte, A., et al. (2022) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4112215
Designfaktoren zur Wertmaximierung von B2B Datenaustausch in datengetriebenen Plattform Ökosystemen
Tingelhoff, F., Elshan, E., & Ebel, P. (2022) · HMD Praxis der Wirtschaftsinformatik · doi:10.1365/s40702-022-00895-4
“In einem folgenden Perspektivenwandel, vor allem bedingt durch das rasch-wachsende Interesse des E-Commerce, wurden Plattformen als Teil eines zweiseitigen Marktes und somit Teil eines Ökosystems verstanden (Rysman 2009).”
BackgroundKünstliche Intelligenz für die Geschäftsmodellinnovation
Winter, J. (2022) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-658-37903-2_3
Prominent Employee Sociopolitical Activism: Construct and Study of Cable News Media PersonalitiesPreprint
Suhag, R., Grewal, R., & Germann, F. (2022) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4291508
Consumer preferences for network liquidity and opponent quality in online poker
Wimmer, B. S., & Philander, K. S. (2023) · International Gambling Studies · doi:10.1080/14459795.2022.2160000
“…multi-homing on market outcomes and business strategies, as well as the conditions under which network effects lead to winner-take-all outcomes (Armstrong & Wright, 2007; Armstrong, 2006; Caillaud & Jullien, 2003; Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005; Rochet & Tirole, 2003, 2006; Rysman, 2009; Weyl, 2010).”
BackgroundDampak Inovasi Sistem Pembayaran Terhadap Nilai Pemegang Saham Bank Dan Pengecer
Muditomo, A., Syaukat, Y., Andati, T., & Hasanah, N. N. (2022) · Jurnal Reviu Akuntansi dan Keuangan · doi:10.22219/jrak.v12i2.18304
Gambaro, M. (2017) · Journal of Creative Industries and Cultural Studies · doi:10.56140/jocis-v9-5
Matteucci, N. (2023) · PRISMA Economia - Società – Lavoro · doi:10.3280/pri2021-001009
Platforms and Public Administration
Zarpelon, F., Nardi, V. A. M., & Verschoore, J. R. (2022) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-66252-3_3627
Platform break-even market share
Arce, D. G. (2023) · Marketing Letters · doi:10.1007/s11002-023-09674-7
“Indeed, traditional price–cost margins can be misleading in platform markets since the price on one side of the market is a function of demand and cost conditions on both sides of the market, including indirect network effects (Rysman, 2009).”
BackgroundRevisiting Mobile Effects: Interdependent Decisions in High-Stakes PlatformsPreprint
Fang, S., Kwon, H. E., Lu, T., & Zhang, Y. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4413640
Regulaciones antitrust para Silicon Valley
Komissarov, S. (2022) · doi:10.35537/10915/152006
Rating Visibility and Pricing in Airbnb MarketsPreprint
Applin, R. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4409993
Lee, Y. H., & Lee, S. B. (2023) · Asia-pacific Journal of Convergent Research Interchange · doi:10.47116/apjcri.2023.04.13
Antitrust Economics of Cryptocurrency Mining
Deuflhard, F., & Heller, C.-P. (2021) · Journal of Competition Law & Economics · doi:10.1093/joclec/nhad006
Hsu, J. H., Shin, H. G., Park, N., et al. (2023) · doi:10.1145/3593743.3593758
“Both event organizers and participants can benefit from EBSN platforms by lowering the coordination cost while interacting with each other, comprising two-sided cultural niches [25, 26].”
BackgroundWhy Self-Preferencing and Why Preferences for Ex-Ante RegulationsPreprint
Ireland, D. J. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4511807 · Cited by 1
A Generic Parametric Framework for Peer-to-Peer Electricity Market Design
Saghiri, A. M., & Moazeni, S. (2023) · IEEE International Conference on Environment and Electrical Engineering and IEEE Industrial and Commercial Power Systems Europe (EEEIC / I&CPS Europe) · doi:10.1109/eeeic/icpseurope57605.2023.10194773
“Regulation : A P2P electricity market design should be able to adapt to new regulations and policies to promote energy efficiency practices and fairness [29].”
BackgroundVersioning strategies for online dating platforms
Sun, Y. (2023) · Electronic Commerce Research · doi:10.1007/s10660-023-09756-8
“Several studies have investigated dating agencies as MSPs [2, 7, 16, 26, 28, 32–35, 43 ].”
Do Lower Search Costs Benefit Intermediaries?
Li, M. (2023) · Review of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1007/s11151-023-09921-1
“Consequently, it is also naturally related to the literature on the economics of inter-mediation (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977; Li, 1998; Biglaiser and Friedman, 1994; Chu and Chu, 1994; Kirmani and Rao, 2000; Rysman, 2009).”
Beyond just politics and space: A literature review
Amoah, M., Wireko-Gyebi, R. S., Takyi, S. A., et al. (2023) · Social Sciences & Humanities Open · doi:10.1016/j.ssaho.2023.100677
A research on regulatory framework and tax for digital platform business
Ghosh, S. S. P. A. K., Bobek, V., Rojs, M. K., et al. (2023) · International Journal of Electronic Trade · doi:10.1504/ijetrade.2023.133314
A study on the regulation of digital platforms and the need or excess in the employment relationship
de Araújo, A. C. M., Santos, F. A. V. G., & de Almeida, H. J. R. (2023) · Concilium · doi:10.53660/clm-2043-23p13
“Cumpre salientar que, tal decisão do Tribunal do Reino Unido, segundo Fernandez (2022, p. 91) diverge da corrente mundial que designa as plataformas digitais como um modelo de negócio, alinhando decisões sobre alocação de oferta (Rysman, 2009, p. 127).”
BackgroundAre On-Demand Platforms Winner-Take-All Markets?Preprint
Keith, D. R., & Rahmandad, H. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4600417
Ridesharing Platforms with Reference-Dependent Gig WorkersPreprint
Zhang, N., Paul, A., & Qiu, L. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4557358 · Cited by 1
Anatomy of the ‘Data Business’
Oberson, X., & Yazıcıoğlu, A. E. (2023) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-43372-6_3
Multisided Platforms in Antitrust PracticePreprint
Evans, D. S. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4606511
Understanding the Need for Regulatory Intervention: The EU Data-Driven MarketPreprint
Coca-Constantinescu, M. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4621227
Leiponen, A. E. (2023) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009209038.015
Leiponen, A. E. (2023) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009209038.012
Consumer adoption and use of financial technology: "Tap and Go" paymentsPreprint
Brown, M., Felber, L., & Meyer, C. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4678367
Competition in Multisided Markets
Hayashi, S., & Arai, K. (2024) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-981-99-5310-3_8
Stock Exchanges as Platforms for Data and TradingPreprint
Schwabe, R., Hendershott, T. J., & Rysman, M. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4773382
Self-citationBuilding national autonomy in a platform-dominated world: Russia state policy towards platformsPreprint
Kontareva, A., & Kenney, M. F. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4776251
Wang, Y., Zheng, C., Li, Y., & Dao, C. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4783418
Yang, B., Han, K., Tu, W., et al. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4797322
Współczesne Problemy Gospodarowania
Kopycińska, D., & Korpysa, J. (2023) · doi:10.14254/978-83-968258-0-3/2023
Muditomo, A., Syaukat, Y., Andati, T., et al. (2024) · Asian Journal of Research in Business and Management · doi:10.55057/ajrbm.2024.6.1.3
Ito, Y., & Nakamura, D. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4864604
Aktaş, M. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4876701
30 Years of Platform Economy Operation Management Analysis and Forecasting: A Bibliometric ReviewPreprint
Li, Y., Wu, D., Zhang, J., et al. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4886812
Palm as Decentralized Identifiers: Mitigate scrounging of platform economy
Wang, H., Wang, S., & Zhang, D. (2024) · International Studies of Economics · doi:10.1002/ise3.85
A theory of degrees in education
Winter, S., Kistner, M., & Maffia, D. (2024) · Heliyon · doi:10.1016/j.heliyon.2024.e36008
“[45 – 47]) or as an engineering design approach (e.g., Refs.”
BackgroundAshraf, S., & Bardhan, A. K. (2024) · Electronic Commerce Research · doi:10.1007/s10660-024-09891-w
“With the proliferation of e-commerce, novel business models in the form of digital platforms have emerged [81].”
The Rise of Digital Monopolies: A Historical-Institutionalist PerspectivePreprint
Beyer, J. (2024) · doi:10.31235/osf.io/8qpzt
Deng, G., & Zhang, X. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4944748
Nedelescu, D. M. (2024) · Networks and Spatial Economics · doi:10.1007/s11067-024-09659-7 · Cited by 1
Marketplace Platforms: Towards a New Taxonomy
Zeamari, I. (2024) · Lecture notes in business information processing · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-76368-7_7
State and Prospects for Development of the Payment Card Market in Poland
Feruś, A. (2024) · Folia Oeconomica Stetinensia · doi:10.2478/foli-2024-0018
Recognizing a good deal: Short-term subsidies and the dynamics of public service use
Deutschmann, J. W. (2025) · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2024.103114
Markets as Dualistic, Semi-Decentralized OrganizationsPreprint
Jackson, W. A. (2025) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.5018190
Beyer, J. (2024) · Wirtschaft + Gesellschaft · doi:10.1007/978-3-658-46565-0_7
Value allocation in two-sided markets
Cho, W. J., & Moreno‐Ternero, J. D. (2026) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103292
Employee Spin-outs of Platform Firms: Positioning and PerformancePreprint
Kang, Z., Rong, K., & Zhu, F. (2025) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.5155726
Hybrid Governance for Diverse and Inclusive Digital Platforms
Brødreskift, M. K., & Pershina, R. (2025) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-981-96-2516-1_11
Hansmeier, P. (2025) · Lecture notes in information systems and organisation · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-80125-9_4
Does Digital Infrastructure Amplify the Internet Usage Wage Premium? Empirical Evidence from ChinaPreprint
Shi, T., Wang, H., & Deng, Y. (2025) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.5207047
Research on E-Commerce Platform Logistics Integration Strategy Considering Service Levels
江, 春. (2025) · E-Commerce Letters · doi:10.12677/ecl.2025.144940
Airports as Platforms: An Analysis of Flight and Retail Concession OperationsPreprint
Wang, L., Zhou, Z., & Rabinovich, E. (2025) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.5225196
Hey Robot, Here’s My Data: The Impact of AI on Joining Digital B2B Platforms
Harasser, J., Wecklein, V., Kellerer, F., & Mang, S. (2025) · Smart innovation, systems and technologies · doi:10.1007/978-981-96-3077-6_8
Dong, Y., Gao, Z., Han, X., et al. (2025) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1017/eec.2024.2
“Examples of two-sided markets are commonplace, including traditional ones, such as newspapers, credit card services, and operating systems (Rysman, 2009), as well as spring-up ones, with the rapid development of new technologies, especially smartphones, such as Uber, Lift, Didi, eBay, and Airbnb…”
Gándelman, N., Roldán, F., & Viera, S. (2025) · Journal of Regulatory Economics · doi:10.1007/s11149-025-09494-9
“As more consumers use cards, merchants face increased pressure to accept them to remain competitive, reinforcing the network effect and further expanding the platform’s reach (Rysman, 2009; Wright, 2012 ).”
When Cost Subadditivity Is Not Enough: Market Size, Fixed Costs, and MonopoliesPreprint
Kan, K., & Wang, Y. (2025) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.5336719
Personalised Incentives: Segregation in a Platform with NetworksPreprint
Chaudhury, R. D., & Nandy, A. (2025) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.5350517
Digital lead generation platforms: Rightsizing the seller base
Vaid, S., & Feinberg, F. M. (2025) · Journal of Retailing · doi:10.1016/j.jretai.2025.06.007 · Cited by 1
Food Waste in Online Grocery Platforms: Operational Drivers and Evidence from IndonesiaPreprint
Wang, L., Syalianda, S., Lim, M. K., et al. (2025) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.5374999
Validating Generative Agent-Based Models for Logistics and Supply Chain Management ResearchPreprint
Castillo, V. E. (2025) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.5407742
The Evaluative, Economic, and Organizational Dimensions of Personalized Medicine
Trieste, L., & Turchetti, G. (2025) · Data science, machine intelligence, and law · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-99709-9_9
Corporate Incubation am Beispiel des Logistik Spin-offs Cargoboard
Brühn, T., & Kleeschulte, R. (2025) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-658-47912-1_15
Lin, Y.-W., & Lin, W.-H. (2025) · Communications in computer and information science · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-99353-4_22
Nishimura, Y. (2025) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.5417699
Deep Multi-Objective Multi-Stakeholder Recommendations in the Media IndustryPreprint
Unger, M., Li, P., Cohen, M. C., et al. (2025) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.5410302
Design Options to Shape Platform Success in B2B Markets Throughout the Platform Lifecycle
Özcan, L., Petzke, L., Dumitrescu, R., & Koldewey, C. (2025) · IEEE Engineering Management Review · doi:10.1109/emr.2025.3608788
“Second, the decision of one market side affects the other market side [28].”
Metadata
- Authors
- Rysman, M.
- Affiliations
- Boston University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Rysman, Marc
- ORCID
- Rysman, Marc
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2009-08-01
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 125-143
- ISSN
- 0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1982461819
- Semantic Scholar
- 1c0c366611a5049d783edb97c8fce22b666c4622
- Cited by
- 1,261
- References
- 71
- Citations by year
- 2026: 68 · 2025: 74 · 2024: 77 · 2023: 93 · 2022: 85 · 2021: 95 · 2020: 124 · 2019: 92 · 2018: 87 · 2017: 70 · 2016: 81 · 2015: 57 · 2014: 72 · 2013: 76 · 2012: 47
- FWCI
- 103.49
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- other-oa
- Locations
- The Journal of Economic Perspectives (publishedVersion, other-oa)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
- Keywords
- two-sided markets, platform intermediaries, network effects, externalities, payment cards, video game consoles, operating systems, competition policy, regulation, public policy, consumer electronics, search engines
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-11, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-11 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (gpt-6-sol).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
