Cited by 1,281Digital Platforms and EconomicsMerger and Competition AnalysisConsumer Market Behavior and Pricing

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 242 of the 242 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 2 of the 18 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

The Economics of Two-Sided Markets

Open access
Rysman, Marc·2009·Journal of Economic Perspectives

Abstract

Broadly speaking, a two-sided market is one in which 1) two sets of agents interact through an intermediary or platform, and 2) the decisions of each set of agents affects the outcomes of the other set of agents, typically through an externality. In the case of a video game system, the intermediary is the console producer—Sony in the scenario above—while the two sets of agents are consumers and video game developers. Neither consumers nor game developers will be interested in the PlayStation if the other party is not. Similarly, a successful payment card requires both consumer usage and merchant acceptance, where both consumers and merchants value each others' participation. Many more products fit into this paradigm, such as search engines, newspapers, and almost any advertiser-supported media (examples in which consumers typically negatively value, rather than positively value, the participation of the other side), as well as most software or title-based operating systems and consumer electronics. This paper seeks to explain what two-sided markets are and why they interest economists. I discuss the strategies that firms typically consider, and I highlight a number of puzzling outcomes from the perspective of the economics of two-sided markets. Finally, I consider the implications for public policy, particularly antitrust and regulatory policy, where there have been a number of recent issues involving media, computer operating systems, and payment cards.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1257/jep.23.3.125

Cites

242 of 242 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

2 of 18 cited sources checked · 1 supported · 0 flagged · accuracy not yet measured

Show all 46 claims

  • Probably not a substantial claim. 34
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 39
56 of 56
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Two-sidedness may exist in practically all markets.

    “That is, although two-sidedness may exist in practically all markets, it is not always quantitatively important.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The difference in industries between the two-sided markets literature and the network effects literature is not crucial.

    “However, the difference in industries is not crucial, and there are exceptions on both sides.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The two-sided markets literature and the network effects literature have a lot in common.

    “Many papers that study operating systems identify themselves with network effects rather than two-sided markets so perhaps this example is less canonical, but as I have argued, the two literatures have a lot in common.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Antitrust authorities typically use the size of cross-price elasticities to determine what products should be included in a relevant market.

    “Antitrust authorities typically use the size of cross-price elasticities to determine what products should be included in a relevant market.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Inefficient pricing is not an antitrust violation by itself.

    “Although inefficient pricing is the hallmark of the economic criticism of monopoly power, inefficient pricing is not an antitrust violation by itself.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Monopolization and vertical contracting cases typically hinge on whether a firm has excluded competitors from the market in a way that did not benefit consumers or reduce costs.

    “Monopolization and vertical contracting cases typically hinge on whether a firm has excluded competitors from the market in a way that did not benefit consumers or reduce costs.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    In December 2007, the European Commission ruled that the interchange fee at MasterCard for cross-border transactions is collusive and illegal.

    “In December 2007, the European Commission ruled that the interchange fee at MasterCard (for crossborder transaction) is collusive and illegal.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    MasterCard can exist with a zero-interchange fee.

    “Since MasterCard can exist with a zero-interchange fee, the exemption to the joint behavior was eliminated.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Increased prices led to more consumer usage rather than less because ATMs were much more conveniently located.

    “Furthermore, increased prices led to more consumer usage rather than less because ATMs were much more conveniently located.”
9 of 9

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

  • Conflicting RAND journal volumes for the same 2006 issue

    Minor

    The references assign volume 37, issue 3 and volume 35, issue 3 of The RAND Journal of Economics to 2006. Both cannot identify that journal's third issue in the same year.

1 of 1

Citations

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Show all 71 references

Research works printed but not linked: 5

  1. Boudreau Kevin, 2007, MIT Sloan Research Paper, 4611
  2. Brodley Joseph F, 2000, Georgetown Law Journal, 88, 2239
  3. Ellison Glenn, 2009, Econometrica, 77, 427
  4. Evans David S, 2003, Yale Journal on Regulation, 20, 325
  5. Rysman Marc, 2007, Competition Policy International, 3, 197

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Items 1,001–1,100 of 1,281

Metadata

Authors
Rysman, M.
Affiliations
Boston University (US)
Corresponding author
Rysman, Marc
Venue
Journal of Economic Perspectives
Published
2009-08-01
Volume
23
Issue
3
Pages
125-143
ISSN
0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1982461819
Cited by
1,261
References
71
Citations by year
2026: 68 · 2025: 74 · 2024: 77 · 2023: 93 · 2022: 85 · 2021: 95 · 2020: 124 · 2019: 92 · 2018: 87 · 2017: 70 · 2016: 81 · 2015: 57 · 2014: 72 · 2013: 76 · 2012: 47
FWCI
103.49
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
other-oa
Locations
  • The Journal of Economic Perspectives (publishedVersion, other-oa)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
Keywords
two-sided markets, platform intermediaries, network effects, externalities, payment cards, video game consoles, operating systems, competition policy, regulation, public policy, consumer electronics, search engines

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