The DOI matches its Crossref record; 70 of the 70 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Do Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peace?
Abstract
A basic debate in world politics involves the impact of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) on international conflict. Liberals, functionalists, and others see IGOs as capable of transforming global anarchy, while realists emphasize the essential irrelevance of IGOs in managing such fundamental processes as war and peace. Recent quantitative studies also yield disparate conclusions depending on particular econometric assumptions, implying variously that IGOs foster pacific relations among states, have no impact on dispute behavior, or even increase dispute propensity. At least part of the problem is a lack of theoretical and empirical specificity. The authors apply bargaining theory to develop a “middle path” between the realist and liberal perspectives. Only some IGOs, those with security mandates and the most sophisticated institutional structures, are likely to influence dispute behavior. The authors combine the theory with two improvements in research design. First, IGOs vary in capability, mandate, and cohesion. The authors construct a dataset of IGO institutional heterogeneity and member cohesiveness. Second, states join IGOs for reasons that are not unrelated to why states fight. The authors control for the level of international involvement among countries and find support for their arguments in initial tests.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7466396 · Cited by 20,065
Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War
FEARON, J. D., & LAITIN, D. D. (2003) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055403000534 · Cited by 7,366
Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data
King, G., & Zeng, L. (2001) · Political Analysis · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.pan.a004868 · Cited by 4,316
Rationalist explanations for war
Fearon, J. D. (1995) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300033324 · Cited by 3,995
Connolly, T., & Axelrod, R. (1984) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2392957 · Cited by 3,890
The False Promise of International Institutions
Mearsheimer, J. J. (1994) · International Security · doi:10.2307/2539078 · Cited by 2,680
Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable
Beck, N., Katz, J. N., & Tucker, R. (1998) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2991857 · Cited by 2,471
(2013) · International Organization · doi:10.1057/9781137356734.0006 · Cited by 2,016
Why States Act through Formal International Organizations
Abbott, K. W., & Snidal, D. (1998) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002798042001001 · Cited by 1,784
Explaining Interethnic Cooperation
Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (1996) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2945838 · Cited by 1,606
The halse Promise of International Institutions
Mearsheimer, J. J. (2017) · International Organization · doi:10.4324/9781315251981-9 · Cited by 1,579
Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics
(1992) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511521775 · Cited by 1,575
Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions
Axelrod, R., & Keohane, R. O. (1985) · World Politics · doi:10.2307/2010357 · Cited by 1,435
Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations
Ikenberry, G. J., Russett, B. M., & Oneal, J. R. (2001) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20050168 · Cited by 1,391
Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data
Jaggers, K., & Gurr, T. R. (1995) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343395032004007 · Cited by 1,317
The Promise of Institutionalist Theory
Keohane, R. O., & Martin, L. L. (1995) · International Security · doi:10.2307/2539214 · Cited by 1,202
Handbook of International Relations
Carlsnaes, W., Risse, T., & Simmons, B. (2013) · SAGE Publications Ltd eBooks · doi:10.4135/9781446247587 · Cited by 1,172
Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation
Fearon, J. D. (1998) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081898753162820 · Cited by 1,149
Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816–1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns
Jones, D. M., Bremer, S. A., & Singer, J. D. (1996) · Conflict Management and Peace Science · doi:10.1177/073889429601500203 · Cited by 1,015
Constructing International Politics
Wendt, A. (1995) · International Security · doi:10.2307/2539217 · Cited by 1,013
The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory
Freedman, L. D., & Toft, M. D. (2004) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20033926 · Cited by 793
Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions
Martin, L. L., & Simmons, B. A. (1998) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081898550734 · Cited by 793
Explaining Rare Events in International Relations
King, G., & Zeng, L. (2001) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/00208180152507597 · Cited by 774
Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis
Ruggie, J. G. (1983) · World Politics · doi:10.2307/2010273 · Cited by 770
Triangulating peace: democracy, interdependence, and international organizations
(2001) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.38-5829 · Cited by 733
Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization.
Alger, C. F., Haas, E. B., & Gardner, R. N. (1965) · Midwest Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2109137 · Cited by 716
Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory
Powell, R. (1991) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1963947 · Cited by 565
Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict
Gartzke, E., Li, Q., & Boehmer, C. (2001) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/00208180151140612 · Cited by 554
Self-citationIn the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics
Powell, R. (1999) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9780691213989 · Cited by 540
Kant We All Just get Along? Opportunity, Willingness, and the Origins of the Democratic Peace
Gartzke, E. (1998) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2991745 · Cited by 516
Self-citationWagner, R. H. (2000) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2669259 · Cited by 504
Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976: Procedures, Patterns, and Insights
Gochman, C. S., & Maoz, Z. (1984) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002784028004002 · Cited by 481
The Value of Biased Information: A Rational Choice Model of Political Advice
Calvert, R. L. (1985) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.2307/2130895 · Cited by 475
Exploring the Bargaining Model of War
Reiter, D. (2003) · Perspective on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592703000033 · Cited by 467
Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation
Snidal, D. (1991) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1963847 · Cited by 456
Oneal, J. R., & Russett, B. (1999) · World Politics · doi:10.1017/s0043887100020013 · Cited by 444
Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation
Kydd, A. (2003) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/1540-5907.00042 · Cited by 441
Voeten, E. (2000) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081800551154 · Cited by 439
Holbrooke, R. C. (1998) · Virtual Defense Library (Ministerio de Defensa) · Cited by 394
B ARGAINING T HEORY AND I NTERNATIONAL C ONFLICT
Powell, R. (2002) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.5.092601.141138 · Cited by 381
Oneal, J. R., & Russett, B. M. (2015) · SpringerBriefs on Pioneers in Science and Practice · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-13850-3_5 · Cited by 380
Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining
Morrow, J. D. (1989) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111116 · Cited by 358
In the shadow of power: states and strategies in international politics
(2000) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.37-4145 · Cited by 350
Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data
King, G., & Zeng, L. (2003) · Journal of Statistical Software · doi:10.18637/jss.v008.i02 · Cited by 349
Causes of Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992
Oneal, J. R., Russett, B., & Berbaum, M. L. (2003) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/1468-2478.4703004 · Cited by 343
Bargaining and Learning While Fighting
Powell, R. (2004) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00074.x · Cited by 333
Russett, B., Oneal, J. R., & Davis, D. R. (1998) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081898550626 · Cited by 323
Political Handbook of the World
(1944) · International Affairs · doi:10.2307/3018581 · Cited by 300
How Could Trade Affect Conflict?
Morrow, J. D. (1999) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343399036004006 · Cited by 288
Nuclear deterrence theory the search for credibility
Powell, R. (1990) · Cited by 285
The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information
POWELL, R. (2004) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s000305540400111x · Cited by 283
Conflict without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information: How the Future Matters
Garfinkel, M. R., & Skaperdas, S. (2000) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002700044006005 · Cited by 275
Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility
Powell, R. (1990) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511551598 · Cited by 275
Preferences and the Democratic Peace
Gartzke, E. (2000) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/0020-8833.00155 · Cited by 261
Self-citationA Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate
Schweller, R. L., & Priess, D. (1997) · Mershon International Studies Review · doi:10.2307/222801 · Cited by 258
(2015) · Conflict After the Cold War · doi:10.4324/9781315664484-23 · Cited by 257
The Might of the Pen: A Reputational Theory of Communication in International Disputes
Sartori, A. E. (2002) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081802753485151 · Cited by 250
Gartzke, E. (1999) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081899550995 · Cited by 239
Self-citationYearbook of International Organizations
(2004) · Reference Reviews · doi:10.1108/09504120410520809 · Cited by 227
International Regimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions
Young, O. R. (1986) · World Politics · doi:10.2307/2010300 · Cited by 216
The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States
SLANTCHEV, B. L. (2003) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s000305540300056x · Cited by 211
The Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation
Grieco, J., Powell, R., & Snidal, D. (1993) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2938747 · Cited by 194
Intergovernmental Organization in the Global System, 1815–1964:A Quantitative Description
Wallace, M., & Singer, J. D. (1970) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s002081830002590x · Cited by 190
Methods and models: a guide to the empirical analysis of formal models in political science
(2000) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.37-4150 · Cited by 180
Explaining the Intractability of Territorial Conflict1
Walter, B. F. (2003) · International Studies Review · doi:10.1111/j.1079-1760.2003.00504012.x · Cited by 176
Research Design and Estimator Choices in the Analysis of Interstate Dyads: When Decisions Matter
Bennett, D. S., & Stam, A. C. (2000) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002700044005005 · Cited by 167
War and the changing global system
(1988) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.26-0542 · Cited by 154
Rationalist explanations for war?
Kirshner, J. (2000) · Security Studies · doi:10.1080/09636410008429423 · Cited by 67
Motivations for Choice: The Salience of Relative Gains in International Politics
Rousseau, D. (2002) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002702046003004 · Cited by 49
Time Horizons and Multilateral Enforcement in International Cooperation
Barkin, J. S. (2004) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.0020-8833.2004.00305.x · Cited by 27
Cited by
Gartzke, E. (2007) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00244.x · Cited by 744
Self-citationPower Positions: International Organizations, Social Networks, and Conflict
Hafner-Burton, E. M., & Montgomery, A. H. (2006) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002705281669 · Cited by 293
The relevance of political affinity for the initial acquisition premium in cross‐border acquisitions
Bertrand, O., Betschinger, M., & Settles, A. (2016) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2438 · Cited by 191
Metadata
- Authors
- Boehmer, C., Gartzke, E., & Nordstrom, T.
- Venue
- World Politics
- Publisher
- Project MUSE
- Published
- 2004-10
- Volume
- 57
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-38
- ISSN
- 0043-8871 (ISSN-L)
- 1086-3338
- OpenAlex
- W1983881815
- Cited by
- 321
- References
- 70
- FWCI
- 51.48
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.