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The Problem with Phi: A Critique of Integrated Information Theory

Open access
Cerullo, Michael A. · 2015 · PLOS Computational Biology

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 59 of the 73 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 21 of the 110 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Abstract

In the last decade, Guilio Tononi has developed the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of consciousness.IIT postulates that consciousness is equal to integrated information (F).The goal of this paper is to show that IIT fails in its stated goal of quantifying consciousness.The paper will challenge the theoretical and empirical arguments in support of IIT.The main theoretical argument for the relevance of integrated information to consciousness is the principle of information exclusion.Yet, no justification is given to support this principle.Tononi claims there is significant empirical support for IIT, but this is called into question by the creation of a trivial theory of consciousness with equal explanatory power.After examining the theoretical and empirical evidence for IIT, arguments from philosophy of mind and epistemology will be examined.Since IIT is not a form of computational functionalism, it is vulnerable to fading/ dancing qualia arguments.Finally, the limitations of the phenomenological approach to studying consciousness are examined, and it will be shown that IIT is a theory of protoconsciousness rather than a theory of consciousness.

Overview

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TL;DR

Cerullo argues that Integrated Information Theory (IIT) fails in its stated goal of quantifying consciousness because its foundational principle of information exclusion rests only on Tononi's intuition, and because a deliberately trivial rival theory (Circular Coordinated Message Theory, CCMT) can reproduce IIT's key empirical predictions. The paper concludes that IIT is best understood as a theory of proto- or noncognitive consciousness (partial-panexperientialism) addressing the "Pretty Hard Problem" rather than consciousness as studied by most neuroscientists.

Key findings

  • The principle of information exclusion — that consciousness is generated by ruling out alternatives — is the sole theoretical foundation of IIT, yet "no valid arguments outside of Tononi's intuition are advanced to support" it; at most, granting it would make integrated information necessary but not sufficient for consciousness.
  • CCMT, built on an equally "self-evident" principle of information circulation (Omicron, O), makes the same predictions as IIT for split-brain syndrome and the cerebellum, which the author argues undercuts IIT's claimed explanatory power.
  • Because IIT rejects computational functionalism (Tononi: "whether a system is conscious or not cannot be decided based on its input-output behavior only"), it is vulnerable to fading/dancing qualia arguments, and is "especially vulnerable" given its axiom of the unity of conscious experience.
  • Aaronson and Tononi agreed that an n × n grid of XOR gates can generate √n Φ, so arbitrarily large Φ can arise in systems performing no complex information processing — suggesting IIT measures protoconsciousness, not cognitive consciousness.

Methods

  • Conceptual/philosophical critique, not an empirical study: the paper analyzes IIT's theoretical foundations (information exclusion, the axioms of IIT 3.0), its claimed empirical support (split-brain, cerebellum, EEG correlates, effective connectivity), and its relationship to functionalism and panpsychism.
  • Constructs a counter-theory, CCMT, as a demonstration that IIT's predictions are trivially reproducible, and draws on philosophy of mind arguments (fading/dancing qualia, Chalmers' hard vs. easy problem, Block's A/P consciousness distinction) plus the published Aaronson–Tononi exchange.
  • No sample, dataset, or statistical analysis is reported.

Limitations

  • The paper states no formal limitations section; it acknowledges that neither computational functionalism nor identity theory solves the hard problem of consciousness, and that the debate over panpsychism/panexperientialism is unresolved ("we do not need to resolve the debate... to understand some differences").
  • Evident from the text: the central argument against information exclusion rests on the author's own contrary intuition rather than new empirical data, and CCMT is offered as a rhetorical counterexample rather than a developed theory.
  • Evident from the text: the taxonomy of four consciousness types (Chalmers' primitive protoconsciousness, Rosenberg's noncognitive-consciousness, Block's access- and phenomenal-cognitive-consciousness) is the author's synthesis, and the claim that IIT is "irrelevant" to cognitive consciousness depends on that framing.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004286

Cites

59 of 59 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

Cites

Show all 59 references

Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. G. Tononi, 2003, Measuring integrated information, BMC Neuroscience, 4
  2. D. Griffen, 1997, Panexperientialist physicalism and the mind-body problem, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 4, 248
  3. G. Strawson, 2006, Realistic monism–why physicalism entails panpsychism, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13, 3

Cited by

Items 101–117 of 117

Metadata

Authors
Cerullo, M. A.
Corresponding author
Cerullo, Michael A.
Venue
PLOS Computational Biology
Published
2015-09-17
Volume
11
Issue
9
Pages
e1004286
ISSN
  • 1553-734X (ISSN-L)
  • 1553-7358
OpenAlex
W2193208712
Cited by
114
References
73
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 10 · 2023: 10 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 15 · 2020: 8 · 2019: 31 · 2018: 12 · 2017: 5 · 2016: 2
FWCI
9.55
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • PLoS Computational Biology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
Keywords
integrated information theory, consciousness, integrated information, qualia, computational functionalism, phenomenology, proto-consciousness, philosophy of mind, epistemology of consciousness
MeSH terms
Algorithms, Consciousness, Humans, Information Theory, Models, Neurological, Biomedical Research, Split-Brain Procedure

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