Cited by 627Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceNeural dynamics and brain functionVisual perception and processing mechanisms

The Neural Correlates of Consciousness: An Update

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Tononi, Giulio, Koch, Christof·2008·Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences

Abstract

This review examines recent advances in the study of brain correlates of consciousness. First, we briefly discuss some useful distinctions between consciousness and other brain functions. We then examine what has been learned by studying global changes in the level of consciousness, such as sleep, anesthesia, and seizures. Next we consider some of the most common paradigms used to study the neural correlates for specific conscious percepts and examine what recent findings say about the role of different brain regions in giving rise to consciousness for that percept. Then we discuss dynamic aspects of neural activity, such as sustained versus phasic activity, feedforward versus reentrant activity, and the role of neural synchronization. Finally, we briefly consider how a theoretical analysis of the fundamental properties of consciousness can usefully complement neurobiological studies.

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Crossref · 10.1196/annals.1440.004

Cites

173 of 173 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Integration of bottom-up input and top-down recurrent information is essential for consciousness.

    “The integration of bottom-up input and top-down recurrent information is considered essential for consciousness to occur (Tononi and Koch, 2008) and is likely to be subserved by long-distance projection neurons (Dehaene et al., 2006; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011).”

    From Anterior insular cortex and emotional awareness (2013) · cites this paper as Tononi and Koch, 2008

    In “Reentrant versus Feedforward Activity” (page unavailable), the paper describes a view in which a feedforward sweep becomes conscious when joined by a reentrant sweep. But it presents this as a possibility and questions whether backward signals are critical for consciousness, so it does not establish their integration as essential. (LLM, conf=0.88)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • IIT postulates that consciousness is equal to integrated information (Φ).

    “IIT defines a property of a system called integrated information (Φ) and postulates that this is an exact measure of the quantity of consciousness of any system.”

    From The Problem with Phi: A Critique of Integrated Information Theory (2015) · cites this paper as [4]

    In “Some Implications” (page unavailable), the paper says that the quantity of consciousness is given by the amount of integrated information generated within a complex. The “Consciousness as Integrated Information” section (page unavailable) introduces a measure of integrated information, but specifies that only a complex generates it. Thus the core claim is supported, while calling it an exact measure for any system omits the paper’s restriction to complexes. (LLM, conf=0.85)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • IIT implies a form of panpsychism.

    “Tononi’s response is not surprising given that IIT implies a form of panpsychism [1–8].”
  • IIT appears to be identifying consciousness with a specific measure of information.

    “In either case, IIT appears to be identifying consciousness with a specific measure of information.”

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Cites

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Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Abeles, M. (1991). Corticonics Neural circuits of the cerebral cortex. Cambridge, UK, New York: Cambridge University Press.
  2. Guilleminault, C. (1976). Cataplexy. In C. Guilleminault, W. Dennet, & P. Passouant, (Eds.), Narcolepsy (pp. 125-143). New York: Spectrum.

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Authors
Tononi, G., & Koch, C.
Affiliations
University of Wisconsin–Madison (US)
Venue
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2008-03
Volume
1124
Issue
1
Pages
239-261
ISSN
  • 0077-8923 (ISSN-L)
  • 1749-6632
OpenAlex
W2016702702
Cited by
627
References
173
Citations by year
2026: 12 · 2025: 16 · 2024: 37 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 15 · 2021: 17 · 2020: 25 · 2019: 77 · 2018: 55 · 2017: 48 · 2016: 34 · 2015: 43 · 2014: 47 · 2013: 34 · 2012: 53
FWCI
3.66
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural dynamics and brain function
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Visual perception and processing mechanisms
Keywords
neural correlates of consciousness, consciousness, sleep, anesthesia, seizures, brain regions, neuronal synchronization
MeSH terms
Brain, Brain Mapping, Consciousness

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