The Problem with Phi: A Critique of Integrated Information Theory
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 59 of the 73 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 21 of the 110 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
In the last decade, Guilio Tononi has developed the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of consciousness.IIT postulates that consciousness is equal to integrated information (F).The goal of this paper is to show that IIT fails in its stated goal of quantifying consciousness.The paper will challenge the theoretical and empirical arguments in support of IIT.The main theoretical argument for the relevance of integrated information to consciousness is the principle of information exclusion.Yet, no justification is given to support this principle.Tononi claims there is significant empirical support for IIT, but this is called into question by the creation of a trivial theory of consciousness with equal explanatory power.After examining the theoretical and empirical evidence for IIT, arguments from philosophy of mind and epistemology will be examined.Since IIT is not a form of computational functionalism, it is vulnerable to fading/ dancing qualia arguments.Finally, the limitations of the phenomenological approach to studying consciousness are examined, and it will be shown that IIT is a theory of protoconsciousness rather than a theory of consciousness.
Overview
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TL;DR
Cerullo argues that Integrated Information Theory (IIT) fails in its stated goal of quantifying consciousness because its foundational principle of information exclusion rests only on Tononi's intuition, and because a deliberately trivial rival theory (Circular Coordinated Message Theory, CCMT) can reproduce IIT's key empirical predictions. The paper concludes that IIT is best understood as a theory of proto- or noncognitive consciousness (partial-panexperientialism) addressing the "Pretty Hard Problem" rather than consciousness as studied by most neuroscientists.
Key findings
- The principle of information exclusion — that consciousness is generated by ruling out alternatives — is the sole theoretical foundation of IIT, yet "no valid arguments outside of Tononi's intuition are advanced to support" it; at most, granting it would make integrated information necessary but not sufficient for consciousness.
- CCMT, built on an equally "self-evident" principle of information circulation (Omicron, O), makes the same predictions as IIT for split-brain syndrome and the cerebellum, which the author argues undercuts IIT's claimed explanatory power.
- Because IIT rejects computational functionalism (Tononi: "whether a system is conscious or not cannot be decided based on its input-output behavior only"), it is vulnerable to fading/dancing qualia arguments, and is "especially vulnerable" given its axiom of the unity of conscious experience.
- Aaronson and Tononi agreed that an n × n grid of XOR gates can generate √n Φ, so arbitrarily large Φ can arise in systems performing no complex information processing — suggesting IIT measures protoconsciousness, not cognitive consciousness.
Methods
- Conceptual/philosophical critique, not an empirical study: the paper analyzes IIT's theoretical foundations (information exclusion, the axioms of IIT 3.0), its claimed empirical support (split-brain, cerebellum, EEG correlates, effective connectivity), and its relationship to functionalism and panpsychism.
- Constructs a counter-theory, CCMT, as a demonstration that IIT's predictions are trivially reproducible, and draws on philosophy of mind arguments (fading/dancing qualia, Chalmers' hard vs. easy problem, Block's A/P consciousness distinction) plus the published Aaronson–Tononi exchange.
- No sample, dataset, or statistical analysis is reported.
Limitations
- The paper states no formal limitations section; it acknowledges that neither computational functionalism nor identity theory solves the hard problem of consciousness, and that the debate over panpsychism/panexperientialism is unresolved ("we do not need to resolve the debate... to understand some differences").
- Evident from the text: the central argument against information exclusion rests on the author's own contrary intuition rather than new empirical data, and CCMT is offered as a rhetorical counterexample rather than a developed theory.
- Evident from the text: the taxonomy of four consciousness types (Chalmers' primitive protoconsciousness, Rosenberg's noncognitive-consciousness, Block's access- and phenomenal-cognitive-consciousness) is the author's synthesis, and the claim that IIT is "irrelevant" to cognitive consciousness depends on that framing.
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Claims the paper makes
9 Valid · 0 Not valid · 29 Not checked · 35 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“In either case, IIT appears to be identifying consciousness with a specific measure of information.”
§ The Problem with Phi: A Critique of Integrated Information Theory > IIT and Functionalism
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [1] G. Tononi, 2003, Measuring integrated information, BMC Neuroscience sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Background defines Φ as a specific measure of information integration, and the Discussion links high Φ to the generation of consciousness. But the Discussion presents that link conditionally; it does not identify consciousness itself with Φ. (LLM, conf=0.82)
- Supportedcites [2] G. Tononi, 2004, An informational integration theory of consciousness, BMC Neuroscience source
In the Presentation of the hypothesis, the paper says consciousness corresponds to the capacity to integrate information and that its quantity is given by a complex’s Φ value. This supports the citing sentence’s hedged characterization; the paper separately describes informational relationships as determining the quality of consciousness. (LLM, conf=0.92)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [3] G. Tononi, 2008, Consciousness as integrated information: A provisional manifesto, Biol. Bull source
- Supportedcites [4] G. Tononi, 2008, The neural correlates of consciousness An Update, Ann N.Y. Acad. Sci source
In “Consciousness as Integrated Information,” the paper says that a system is conscious in proportion to its integrated information and introduces a specific measure to quantify it. This supports the citing sentence’s hedged characterization of IIT. (LLM, conf=0.92)
- Partly supportedcites [5] D. Balduzzi, 2009, Qualia: The geometry of integrated information, Computational Biology sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Introduction says IIT identifies the quantity of consciousness with the amount of integrated information and describes Φ as a measure of it. But it says the quality of consciousness is specified by informational relationships, not by that single measure, so the claim is too broad if it refers to consciousness as a whole. (LLM, conf=0.84)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [6] C. Koch, 2011, A Test for Consciousness, Scientific American source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [7] G. Tononi, 2012, Integrated information theory of consciousness: an updated account, Arch Ital Biol doi:10.4449/aib.v149i5.1388
- Partly supportedcites [8] M. Oizumi, 2014, From the phenomenology to the mechanisms of consciousness: Integrated information theory 3.0, Computational Biology sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Introduction and Abstract say IIT uses a value of integrated information to specify the quantity of an experience. They also say its quality is specified by a maximally irreducible conceptual structure (MICS). Thus, the paper does not identify consciousness in its entirety with a single measure of information. (LLM, conf=0.86)
hedgedstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Fading and dancing qualia thought experiments show that identity and non-computational functionalist theories allow the unity of consciousness to be interrupted at any arbitrary point [22].”
§ The Problem with Phi: A Critique of Integrated Information Theory > IIT and Functionalism
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [22] M. Cerullo, 2015, Uploading and Branching Identity, Minds and Machines sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
In “Machine Consciousness” (page unavailable), the paper says these qualia thought experiments could interrupt the unity of conscious experience at any point under identity theory. It does not extend that conclusion to non-computational functionalist theories; instead, it says the experiments support functionalism and present no obstacles to it. (LLM, conf=0.89)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“The principal theoretical justification for IIT is the conjecture that, in perception, what is absent may be more significant to consciousness than what is present [2,3].”
§ The Problem with Phi: A Critique of Integrated Information Theory > The Theoretical Foundation of IIT
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [2] G. Tononi, 2004, An informational integration theory of consciousness, BMC Neuroscience sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
In “Presentation of the hypothesis” (page unavailable), the seeing-light example says a conscious percept rules out an extraordinarily large number of alternatives, supporting the point about what is absent. But the paper presents both information and its integration as central to the theory; it does not identify exclusion of absent possibilities as IIT’s principal theoretical justification or say they are more significant than what is present. (LLM, conf=0.84)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [3] G. Tononi, 2008, Consciousness as integrated information: A provisional manifesto, Biol. Bull source
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
The sources with a verdict support this claim; the rest weren’t checked yet, have no full text we could read, or their verdicts aren’t rated yet.
In the paper
“However, this research is merely consistent with IIT rather than evidence in support of the theory.”
§ The Problem with Phi: A Critique of Integrated Information Theory > The Explanatory Power of IIT
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [17] J. King, 2013, Information Sharing in the Brain Indexes Consciousness in Noncommunicative Patients, Current Biology source
The Results report an EEG study testing whether brain-scale information sharing distinguishes patients with and without clinical signs of consciousness. The Discussion reports that information sharing increased with consciousness state. The judgment that this is merely consistent with IIT, rather than evidence for it, is the citing authors’ own assessment, not a finding attributed to this paper. (LLM, conf=0.90)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [18] M Massimini, 2005, Breakdown of Cortical Effective Connectivity During Sleep, Science source
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The sources with a verdict support this claim; the rest weren’t checked yet, have no full text we could read, or their verdicts aren’t rated yet.
In the paper
“Tononi’s response is not surprising given that IIT implies a form of panpsychism [1–8].”
§ The Problem with Phi: A Critique of Integrated Information Theory > The Epistemology of IIT
What the sources say
- Could not verifycites [1] G. Tononi, 2003, Measuring integrated information, BMC Neuroscience sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Discussion section, “Information integration and basic neuroanatomy” (page unavailable), proposes high information integration as a requirement for consciousness and discusses the thalamocortical system. It does not say that consciousness is widespread or that the theory implies panpsychism. Searches for panpsychism and consciousness in non-neural systems found no passage establishing that implication. (LLM, conf=0.72)
- Supportedcites [2] G. Tononi, 2004, An informational integration theory of consciousness, BMC Neuroscience source
In “Implications of the hypothesis,” Tononi says experience is a fundamental quantity and that any physical system has subjective experience to the extent that it integrates information. The section also says consciousness is graded and should exist to varying degrees in most natural and artificial systems. This supports the characterization as a form of panpsychism, with information integration as the condition. (LLM, conf=0.92)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [3] G. Tononi, 2008, Consciousness as integrated information: A provisional manifesto, Biol. Bull source
- Supportedcites [4] G. Tononi, 2008, The neural correlates of consciousness An Update, Ann N.Y. Acad. Sci source
In “Some Implications” (page not supplied), Tononi says that any physical system with some capacity for integrated information would have some degree of experience, regardless of what it is made of. This supports describing IIT as implying a form of panpsychism, with the qualification that the system must have capacity for integrated information. (LLM, conf=0.92)
- Supportedcites [5] D. Balduzzi, 2009, Qualia: The geometry of integrated information, Computational Biology source
The Introduction says IIT ties the quantity of consciousness to integrated information generated by a physical system, rather than restricting consciousness to humans or biological organisms. The Model section says a system of elements with Φ>0 can form a complex; this supports the claim that IIT implies a form of panpsychism, though the paper does not use that term or say every physical object is conscious. (LLM, conf=0.85)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [6] C. Koch, 2011, A Test for Consciousness, Scientific American source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [7] G. Tononi, 2012, Integrated information theory of consciousness: an updated account, Arch Ital Biol doi:10.4449/aib.v149i5.1388
- Supportedcites [8] M. Oizumi, 2014, From the phenomenology to the mechanisms of consciousness: Integrated information theory 3.0, Computational Biology source
In “Simple systems can be conscious: A ‘minimally conscious’ photodiode,” the paper concludes that a two-element photodiode is conscious, albeit minimally, and says a thermistor could have the same minimal experience. This supports the broad characterization that IIT implies a form of panpsychism, though the passage does not use that term or say that every physical object is conscious. (LLM, conf=0.85)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Could not verify
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Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“both theories seem to implicate the corico-thalamic connections as necessary neural structures of consciousness (Tononi et al., 2016, p.452;Cerullo, 2015, p.5)”
From The Ergonomics of Learning: A Proposed Update to Bloom’s Taxonomy (2025) · cites this paper as Cerullo, 2015
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredIn the citing paper
“Cerullo (2015) posits a more dynamic explanatory framework because it defines consciousness as information circulation in feedback loops.”
From The Ergonomics of Learning: A Proposed Update to Bloom’s Taxonomy (2025) · cites this paper as Cerullo (2015)
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Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ The Problem with Phi: A Critique of Integrated Information Theory > The Epistemology of IIT
“Dehaene and Naccache’s [30] workspace framework of consciousness”
§ The Problem with Phi: A Critique of Integrated Information Theory > References
“29. Dehaene S, & Naccache L. (2001). Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework In Dahaene (Ed.), The Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness (pp. 1– 37). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 11164022 30. Gazzaniga M., Ivry R., & Mangun G. (2002). Cognitive Neuroscience: The Biology of the Mind 2nd edition New York: W. W. Norton & Company.”
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Cited by
Northoff, G., & Huang, Z. (2017) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2017.07.013 · Cited by 229
The integrated information theory of consciousness: A case of mistaken identity
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Measuring integrated information: comparison of \ncandidate measures in theory and simulation
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Integrated information as a common signature of dynamical and information-processing complexity
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Conscious agent networks: Formal analysis and application to cognition
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“With this assumption, proper components of the human neurocognitive system cannot themselves be experiencers; that this is the case is treated as axiomatic, for example, in Integrated Information Theory (Tononi & Koch, 2015; see Cerullo, 2015 for a critique of this assumption in the IIT context).”
Is the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness Compatible with Russellian Panpsychism?
Mørch, H. H. (2018) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-018-9995-6 · Cited by 85
Psychedelics and Consciousness: Distinctions, Demarcations, and Opportunities
Yaden, D. B., Johnson, M. W., Griffiths, R. R., Doss, M. K., Garcia‐Romeu, A., Nayak, S. M., Gukasyan, N., Mathur, B. N., & Barrett, F. S. (2021) · The International Journal of Neuropsychopharmacology · doi:10.1093/ijnp/pyab026 · Cited by 76
“For example, relatively simple digital logic gates (e.g., XOR gate), which intuitively seem non-conscious, can generate large amounts of Φ (Cerullo, 2015).”
BackgroundConsciousness: New Concepts and Neural Networks
Zhao, T., Zhu, Y., Tang, H., Xie, R., Zhu, J., & Zhang, J. H. (2019) · Frontiers in Cellular Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fncel.2019.00302 · Cited by 67
“The neural mechanism that produces the least consciousness is called the related neuron of consciousness (NCC) (Crick and Koch, 2005; Cerullo, 2015; Tononi and Koch, 2015; Reddy and Pereira, 2017; Xie et al., 2017), which was first proposed by Crick and Koch (1990).”
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Consciousness in a Rotor? Science and Ethics of Potentially Conscious Human Cerebral Organoids
Zilio, F., & Lavazza, A. (2023) · AJOB Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/21507740.2023.2173329 · Cited by 54
“IIT is the most liberal theory among those analyzed, even resembling some form of proto-, quasipanpsychism or partial pan-experientialism (Cerullo 2015; Zilio 2019).”
MethodOn the dangers of conflating strong and weak versions of a theory of consciousness
Lau, H., & Michel, M. (2019) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/hjp3s · Cited by 52
“”4 On the other hand, arguments and criticisms against the theory abound (Barrett & Mediano, 2019; Bayne, 2018; Cerullo, 2015; Doerig et al., 2019; Pautz, 2019).”
BackgroundFalsification and consciousness
Kleiner, J., & Hoel, E. (2021) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niab001 · Cited by 46
“Due to IIT’s level of formalization as a theory, it has triggered the most in-depth responses, expansions, and criticisms (Cerullo 2015; Bayne 2018; Mediano et al. 2019; Kleiner and Tull 2020) since well-formalized theories are much easier to criticize than nonformalized theories.”
BackgroundSynthetic consciousness: the distributed adaptive control perspective
Verschure, P. F. M. J. (2016) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2015.0448 · Cited by 64
The Mathematical Structure of Integrated Information Theory
Kleiner, J., & Tull, S. (2021) · Frontiers in Applied Mathematics and Statistics · doi:10.3389/fams.2020.602973 · Cited by 46
“It also provides a simplification and mathematical clarification of the IIT algorithm which extends the technical analysis of the theory [1, 41, 42] and may contribute to its ongoing critical discussion [2, 4, 8, 23, 27, 28, 33].”
BackgroundFalsification and consciousness
Kleiner, J., & Hoel, E. (2020) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2004.03541 · Cited by 46
Consciousness: a unique way of processing information
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“Despite its advantages, IIT has raised several concerns (Cerullo 2015; Jonkisz 2015; Searle 2013).”
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Thagard, P. R. (2019) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190678739.001.0001 · Cited by 81
Is Consciousness Intrinsic?: A Problem for the Integrated Information Theory
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“Overdetermination also undermines IIT when, for example, it postulates the emergence of consciousness out of a particular information flow in the neuronal circuitry inspired by thalamo-cortical circuits and their difference from cerebellar neuronal patterns (Tononi, 2003); as these two anatomical systems differ signif…”
Self-organized criticality as a framework for consciousness: A review study
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“Therefore, it has been revised continuously over the years (Oizumi et al., 2014; Cerullo, 2015; Barrett and Mediano, 2019; Kleiner and Hoel, 2021; Kleiner and Tull, 2021).”
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Computing integrated information
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“While this approach is not undisputed (e.g., Aaronson, 2014; Cerullo, 2015), IIT has both explanatory and predictive power and thus the idea of measuring integrated information has by now gained widespread popularity in the cognitive neuroscience literature and beyond (e.g., Balduzzi and Tononi,…”
What Does ‘Information’ Mean in Integrated Information Theory?
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“From this perspective he stresses, for instance, that a part of IIT’s axiom of information “is not a part of phenomenology”, where “we take phenomenology to include both its use in analytical philosophy and the continental school of phenomenology” [66] (p.”
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“However, authors have become more cautious when applying IIT as a general theory of consciousness (Cerullo 2015; Gaillard 2024; Goddard et al. 2023; Searle 2013; Zilio 2019).”
Prefrontal neural dynamics in consciousness
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“One major criticism is the difficulty of measuring Φ in complex systems [47].”
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“In any case, IIT has and will continue to face criticism (Cerullo 2015).”
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Анохин, К. В. (2021) · Neuroscience and Behavioral Physiology · doi:10.1007/s11055-021-01149-4 · Cited by 22
“Overall, the theory explains something, but not what other researchers mean by the term consciousness or what corresponds to the general human understanding of this phenomenon [Searle, 2013; Cerullo, 2015].”
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Integrated information theory of consciousness is a functionalist emergentism
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Scaling Behaviour and Critical Phase Transitions in Integrated Information Theory
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“, see [3,4]) and the mathematical definitions therein.”
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Nemirovsky, I. E., Popiel, N. J. M., Rudas, J., Caius, M., Naci, L., Schiff, N. D., Owen, A. M., & Soddu, A. (2023) · Communications Biology · doi:10.1038/s42003-023-05063-y · Cited by 15
“51,52 Another widely discussed framework is global workspace theory (GWT), which attributes conscious percepts to spotlights of attention that are mediated by executive control functions.”
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Goddard, E., Tomaskovic‐Crook, E., Crook, J. M., & Dodds, S. (2023) · Organoids · doi:10.3390/organoids2010004 · Cited by 19
“IIT unpacks subjective awareness as kind of proto-consciousness—defined as experience separated from cognition or mind, it is not the kind of consciousness described earlier as sentience or self-awareness [67].”
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Hanson, J. R., & Walker, S. I. (2023) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niad014 · Cited by 19
Exclusion and Underdetermined Qualia
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A Traditional Scientific Perspective on the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness
Mallatt, J. M. (2021) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e23060650 · Cited by 20
“Aaronson [62] and Cerullo [36] said IIT’s claim redefines consciousness as too simple, in a way that does not match commonsense intuition or the original neuroscientific and psychological definition of “consciousness.”
BackgroundMcFadden, J. (2021) · NeuroSci · doi:10.3390/neurosci2030021 · Cited by 13
“The theory has gathered a lot of support but has also been subject to subject to several criticisms [38,39] which I will not reiterate here but instead compare IIT to cemi field theory.”
ResultFirst-person experience cannot rescue causal structure theories from the unfolding argument
Herzog, M. H., Schurger, A., & Doerig, A. (2022) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2021.103261 · Cited by 14
“Despite these qualities, IIT has been strongly criticized in recent years (Aaronson, 2014b, 2014a; Cerullo, 2015; Doerig et al., 2019, Doerig, Schurger, et al., 2020; Hanson, 2021; Hanson & Walker, 2020; Hanson & Walker, 2021; Lau & Michel, 2019; Merker et al., 2021).”
Miyahara, K., & Witkowski, O. (2018) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-018-9608-5 · Cited by 13
A First Principles Approach to Subjective Experience
Key, B., Zalucki, O. H., & Brown, D. J. (2022) · Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnsys.2022.756224 · Cited by 15
“For more detailed critiques of the integrated information theory the reader is referred elsewhere (Cerullo, 2015; Pautz, 2019; Michel and Lau, 2020; Cooke, 2021; Mallatt, 2021).”
BackgroundMarchetti, G. (2022) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2022.913309 · Cited by 14
“Taken to extremes, this identification leads one to maintain that any system that has integrated states of information is conscious (Cerullo, 2015; Jonkisz, 2015), which implies some counterintuitive consequences, such as the attribution of consciousness to simple artifacts, such as photodiodes.”
BackgroundGranato, G., & Baldassarre, G. (2024) · Neural Networks · doi:10.1016/j.neunet.2024.106292 · Cited by 12
Integrated information and dimensionality in continuous attractor dynamics
Tajima, S., & Kanai, R. (2017) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/nix011 · Cited by 10
“Currently, the value of IIT is still a subject of debate, with both enthusiasm and criticism [27].”
BackgroundMcFadden, J. (2023) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e25121635 · Cited by 11
“…should similarly be possible to find a maximally high value of Φ for any information processing system, including all living organisms from bacteria to plants and animals, as well as inanimate devices, including, not only computers, but even photodiodes or large-scale electrical power grids [53,86].”
BackgroundIntervening on the Causal Exclusion Problem for Integrated Information Theory
Baxendale, M., & Mindt, G. (2018) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-018-9456-7 · Cited by 9
“IIT’s notion of information has already been flagged as problematic (Cerullo 2011, 2015; Mindt 2017).”
BackgroundSeiler, J. G., Hammond, K. E., Payne, S. H., & Ivy, R. (2011) · PubMed · Cited by 8
We need to explain subjective experience, but its explanation may not be mechanistic
Signorelli, C. M., Cea, I., & Prentner, R. (2026) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niaf034 · Cited by 11
Noise, Information and Fitness in Changing Environments
Pedraza, J. M., Garcia, D. A., & Pérez-Ortiz, M. F. (2018) · Frontiers in Physics · doi:10.3389/fphy.2018.00083 · Cited by 5
Panpsychism and dualism in the science of consciousness
Yurchenko, S. B. (2024) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2024.105845 · Cited by 13
Can Biological Quantum Networks Solve NP‐Hard Problems?
Wendin, G. P. (2019) · Advanced Quantum Technologies · doi:10.1002/qute.201800081 · Cited by 5
Illusionist Integrated Information Theory
McQueen, K. J. (2019) · Chapman University Digital Commons (Chapman University) · Cited by 19
Toy Models of Top Down Causation
Kent, A. (2020) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e22111224 · Cited by 7
“[19–21], gives a mathematical framework to explore and generalise as well as a connection to empirical data.”
BackgroundThe exclusionary approach to consciousness
Paßler, M. (2023) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niad022 · Cited by 7
“However, this theory has been criticized for its lack of empirical support (Cerullo Michael 2015), for being difficult to operationalize in practice (Barrett Adam and Seth 2011), and for its seemingly absurd consequences, such as DVD players being more conscious than humans (see Aaronson’s (2014)…”
The difficult legacy of Turing’s wager
Thwaites, A., Soltan, A. A. S., Wieser, E., & Nimmo‐Smith, I. (2017) · Journal of Computational Neuroscience · doi:10.1007/s10827-017-0651-y · Cited by 4
What does it mean for consciousness to be multidimensional? A narrative review
Páleník, J. (2024) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1430262 · Cited by 4
“IIT’s concept of Φ has been criticized from various perspectives (Cerullo, 2015; Barrett and Mediano, 2019; Pautz, 2019), as has been the theory itself (e.g., Bayne, 2018; Doerig et al., 2019; Michel and Lau, 2020; Herzog et al., 2022; Fleming et al., 2023).”
BackgroundCollapse and Measures of Consciousness
Kent, A. (2021) · Foundations of Physics · doi:10.1007/s10701-021-00467-4 · Cited by 11
“[14–17]).”
Gaillard, M. (2024) · Neuroethics · doi:10.1007/s12152-024-09544-7 · Cited by 3
“It should also be said that, even if the PCI has made some steps towards clinical validation, IIT does not propose today an empirically validated and uncon-tested methodology for the measurement of consciousness in human beings, let alone in other, less familiar systems [40].”
BackgroundConsciousness and Energy Processing in Neural Systems
Pepperell, R. (2024) · Brain Sciences · doi:10.3390/brainsci14111112 · Cited by 6
Moral Status and Consciousness
Niikawa, T. (2018) · The Annals of the University of Bucharest Philosophy Series · Cited by 15
Toy Models of Top Down Causation
Kent, A. (2020) · Apollo (University of Cambridge) · doi:10.17863/cam.58956 · Cited by 3
Li, J. (2025) · Natural Language Processing Journal · doi:10.1016/j.nlp.2025.100163 · Cited by 3
“IIT remains contentiously debated, with scholars critically challenging the validity of its axioms regarding consciousness phenomenology (Cerullo, 2015; Doerig et al., 2019).”
A methodological guideline for consciousness assessment via neural electrophysiological activity
Ping, A., Guan, L.-Z., Wang, Y., Yang, S., Yang, C., Hu, X., Tu, Y., Chen, H., Li, W., & Li, X. (2025) · Military Medical Research · doi:10.1186/s40779-025-00682-4 · Cited by 3
“Furthermore, it facilitates the selection and propagation of local networks by global ignition according to the GNWT [5, 29] and aligns with neural integration and differentiation in the integrated information theory [27].”
Dendritic Integration Theory as a Cellular Bridge for the Current Major Consciousness Theories
Čorlukić, M., Krpan, J., & Stojanović, M. (2023) · Psihologijske teme · doi:10.31820/pt.32.3.7 · Cited by 2
Getting It Together: Psychological Unity and Deflationary Accounts of Animal Metacognition
Comstock, G., & Bauer, W. A. (2018) · Acta Analytica · doi:10.1007/s12136-018-0340-0 · Cited by 3
“Although IIT is controversial (for example, see Cerullo 2015), it does retain attractive features: in quantifying consciousness, it makes it more measurable and objective.”
BackgroundLegostaeva, L. A., Zmeykina, E. A., Poydasheva, A. G., Sergeev, D. V., Sinitsyn, D. O., Kremneva, E. I., Chervyakov, A. V., Ryabinkina, Y. V., Suponeva, N. A., & Пирадов, М. А. (2016) · Современные технологии в медицине · doi:10.17691/stm2016.8.4.30 · Cited by 2
“However, apart from the conceptual counterarguments [73] facing the theory of integrated information, there is the”
BackgroundOf integrated information theory: a philosophical evaluation
Liu, H. (2019) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2019.1695044 · Cited by 3
“challenge that IIT fails to capture the subjective aspect of consciousness (Peressini, 2013), or that IIT fails to capture consciousness at all (Cerullo, 2015; Mindt, 2017).”
BackgroundCollapse and Measures of Consciousness
Kent, A. (2021) · Apollo (University of Cambridge) · doi:10.17863/cam.70419 · Cited by 1
What is a Theory of Consciousness for?
Fields, C. (2021) · Journal of Consciousness Studies · doi:10.53765/20512201.28.9.104 · Cited by 2
Introduction: Reality as One Sees It
Lau, H. C. (2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198856771.003.0001 · Cited by 2
Reducing uncertainty : understanding the information-theoretic origins of consciousness
Mindt, G. (2019) · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · doi:10.60644/2996 · Cited by 2
Beyond IIT: (how) can we model the evolution of consciousness?Preprint
Kent, A. (2021) · PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/kar4c · Cited by 2
Value saturation: Architecture of subjective necessity
Trukovich, J. J. (2025) · Biosystems · doi:10.1016/j.biosystems.2025.105642 · Cited by 1
Ghosh, S., & Raj, R. (2026) · Advances in computational intelligence and robotics book series · doi:10.4018/979-8-3373-5530-6.ch005 · Cited by 1
Time is a river which sweeps consciousness along, but consciousness is the river
Tagliazucchi, E. (2019) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2019.09.010 · Cited by 1
Meng, J. (2023) · Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science · doi:10.1007/s12124-023-09775-y · Cited by 1
“In turn, it is difficult to prove any of these theories unequivocally, thereby giving rise to some controversies (Michael, 2015; Koch & Hepp, 2006).”
BackgroundThagard, P. R. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190678739.003.0010 · Cited by 1
Christensen, B. (2024) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-024-00845-0 · Cited by 1
“…science (Mediano et al., 2022) and biology (Niizato et al., 2020), to social science (Engel & Malone, 2018) have utilized its formal tools for problem-solving within their respective domains irrespective of its success or failure as a neuroscientific theory (Cerullo, 2015; Albantakis et al. 2023b).”
Gorman, K. R., Wrightson-Hester, A., Landman, M., & Mansell, W. (2024) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2024.103792 · Cited by 1
Does integrated information lack subjectivity?
Nešić, J. (2018) · Theoria Beograd · doi:10.2298/theo1802131n · Cited by 2
The extended dual-aspect monism framework: an attempt to solve the hard problem
Vimal, R. L. P. (2018) · Trans/Form/Ação · doi:10.1590/0101-3173.2018.v41esp.09.p153 · Cited by 1
“Chalmers (1995) categorized the problems into tractable problems of science as ‘easy problems’ [“how the brain generates the behavior associated with consciousness” (CERULLO, 2015)] and non-tractable problems of consciousness as ‘hard problem’ [how to explain the experiential aspect of consciousness or “why any physic…”
BackgroundInfluentialThagard, P. R. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190678739.003.0006 · Cited by 1
Prescott, T. J. (2021) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-41610-1_205-1 · Cited by 5
Thagard, P. R. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190678739.003.0002 · Cited by 1
Mechanisms of Safety Risk Consciousness as Reflected in Brain and Eye Activities: A Conceptual Study
Li, R. Y. M. (2019) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-981-13-5761-9_3
Thagard, P. R. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190678739.003.0009
Jenkins, D. (2019) · Open Access Victoria University of Wellington | Te Herenga Waka (Figshare) · doi:10.26686/wgtn.17136149.v1
Robot Consciousness: Physics and Metaphysics Here and AbroadPreprint
Ripley, S. B. (2020) · doi:10.36227/techrxiv.12902687.v1
“articles of Tononi and Koch [5], [103]–[109] and their collegial counterparts [83], [85-109], [110], which are supported by detailed analyses such as Tegmark’s [111]– [113] generalization of Tononi’s [2] hypothesis.”
BackgroundA Non-equilibrium Thermodynamic Framework of ConsciousnessPreprint
Ganesh, N. (2020) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2005.02801 · Cited by 3
“As in the case of functionalism, there have been many arguments both for and against this framework [12], [13], [14], [15], [16].”
BackgroundResultHosaka, T. (2021) · Research Square · doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-385815/v1
“evidence supported by experiments [26, 27, 28].”
Bringing Philosophy into Scientific Research
Ottoman, M. (2021) · Berkeley Scientific Journal · doi:10.5070/bs325254492
Niizato, T., Nishiyama, Y., Sakamoto, K., Kazama, T., Okabayashi, T., & Yamaguchi, T. (2021) · bioRxiv (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory) · doi:10.1101/2021.11.29.470324
“One of the main criticisms stems from the statement that Φ can measure raw conscious-ness [Cerullo, 2015, Lombardi and López, 2018].”
BackgroundRobot Consciousness: Physics and Metaphysics Here and AbroadPreprint
Ripley, S. B. (2020) · doi:10.36227/techrxiv.12902687
Thagard, P. R. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190678739.003.0007
Thagard, P. R. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190678739.003.0008
Robot ConsciousnessPreprint
Ripley, S. B. (2020) · PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/q7jrb
Thagard, P. R. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190678739.003.0004
Thagard, P. R. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190678739.003.0005
Thagard, P. R. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190678739.003.0003
Thagard, P. R. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190678739.003.0001
Metadata
- Authors
- Cerullo, M. A.
- Corresponding author
- Cerullo, Michael A.
- Venue
- PLOS Computational Biology
- Publisher
- Public Library of Science (PLoS)
- Published
- 2015-09-17
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 9
- Pages
- e1004286
- ISSN
- 1553-734X (ISSN-L)
- 1553-7358
- PMC
- PMC4574706
- OpenAlex
- W2193208712
- Cited by
- 114
- References
- 73
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 10 · 2023: 10 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 15 · 2020: 8 · 2019: 31 · 2018: 12 · 2017: 5 · 2016: 2
- FWCI
- 9.55
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- PLoS Computational Biology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Keywords
- integrated information theory, consciousness, integrated information, qualia, computational functionalism, phenomenology, proto-consciousness, philosophy of mind, epistemology of consciousness
- MeSH terms
- Algorithms, Consciousness, Humans, Information Theory, Models, Neurological, Biomedical Research, Split-Brain Procedure
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