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Characteristics, Contracts and Actions: Evidence from Venture Capitalist Analyses
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Metadata
- Authors
- Kaplan, S. N., & Strömberg, P. J.
- Venue
- SSRN Electronic Journal
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2002
- ISSN
- 1556-5068 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2124041433
- Cited by
- 289
- References
- 50
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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