The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented
Abstract
This paper derives a supply price for public policy using a constrained maximization model. In the model, three sets of agents each have preferences over outcomes: organized interest groups offer campaign contributions to improve their own wealth, voters offer votes to obtain outcomes closer to their most preferred outcomes, and legislators seek both campaign contributions and votes to obtain reelection. A given legislator's supply price for policy is shown to depend on the productivity of his effort, as determined by committee assignments, priority and ability, and by the preferences of his unorganized constituency in the home district. Two extreme assumptions about the effectiveness of campaign spending in eliciting votes are used to illustrate the comparative statics properties of the model. The prediction of the model is that interest groups will, in general, seek out legislators whose voters are indifferent to the policy the interest group seeks. Thus, voters who do have preferences over policy are in effect represented, even though they are not organized.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.
Sufrin, S. C., & Olson, M. (1966) · Industrial and Labor Relations Review · doi:10.2307/2521228 · Cited by 11,518
The Theory of Economic Regulation
Stigler, G. J. (1971) · The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science · doi:10.2307/3003160 · Cited by 8,098
The Theory of Economic Regulation
Stigler, G. J. (2021) · The Political Economy · doi:10.4324/9781315495811-8 · Cited by 5,483
Bureaucracy and Representative Government
Niskanen, W. A. (1971) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 5,203
The Economic Approach to Human Behavior
Becker, G. S. (1976) · University of Chicago Press eBooks · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226217062.001.0001 · Cited by 5,027
Congress, The Electoral Connection
Ross, M. J., & Mayhew, D. R. (1975) · The Western Political Quarterly · doi:10.2307/447379 · Cited by 4,094
Congress: The Electoral Connection, by David R. Mayhew
Page, B. I. (1975) · Political Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2148248 · Cited by 3,130
American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory
Lowi, T. J. (1964) · World Politics · doi:10.2307/2009452 · Cited by 2,498
Home Style: House Members in Their Districts, by Richard F. Fenno, Jr.
Leuthold, D. A. (1979) · Political Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2150167 · Cited by 1,601
Price, D. E. (1977) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400268147 · Cited by 945
Cited by
Weingast, B. R., & Marshall, W. J. (1988) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261528 · Cited by 1,527
The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy: A Review and an Agenda
Burstein, P. (2003) · Political Research Quarterly · doi:10.1177/106591290305600103 · Cited by 1,438
Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?
Ansolabehere, S., de Figueiredo, J. M., & Snyder, J. M. (2003) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/089533003321164976 · Cited by 1,281
Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy
HALL, R. L., & DEARDORFF, A. V. (2006) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055406062010 · Cited by 1,172
Dal Bo, E. (2006) · Oxford Review of Economic Policy · doi:10.1093/oxrep/grj013 · Cited by 960
Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees
Hall, R. L., & Wayman, F. W. (1990) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1962767 · Cited by 932
Delegating powers: a transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers
(2000) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.37-6536 · Cited by 910
Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results
Wittman, D. (1989) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261660 · Cited by 804
The evolutionary theory of land rights as applied to sub-Saharan Africa: A critical assessment
Platteau, J. (1996) · Development and Change · doi:10.1111/j.1467-7660.1996.tb00578.x · Cited by 687
Mapping the Ideological Marketplace
Bonica, A. (2014) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12062 · Cited by 680
Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters
Baron, D. P. (1994) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2944880 · Cited by 641
Public policies, pressure groups, and dead weight costs
Becker, G. S. (1985) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(85)90063-5 · Cited by 640
Closeness, Expenditures, and Turnout in the 1982 U.S. House Elections
Cox, G. W., & Munger, M. C. (1989) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1956441 · Cited by 542
Self-citationThe Determinants of Industry Political Activity, 1978–1986
Grier, K. B., Munger, M. C., & Roberts, B. E. (1994) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082716 · Cited by 499
Self-citationA Dead Senator Tells No Lies: Seniority and the Distribution of Federal Benefits
Roberts, B. E. (1990) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111510 · Cited by 473
Contributions, Lobbying, and Committee Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives
Wright, J. R. (1990) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1963527 · Cited by 471
Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy
Johnston, M. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511490965 · Cited by 471
Syndromes of corruption: wealth, power, and democracy
(2006) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.44-1760 · Cited by 447
Groseclose, T., & Snyder, J. M. (1996) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082886 · Cited by 428
Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis
Levine, M. E., & Forrence, J. L. (1990) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/6.special_issue.167 · Cited by 413
Henisz, W. J., & Zelner, B. A. (2005) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2005.16387892 · Cited by 395
Ideology and Interests in the Political Marketplace
Bonica, A. (2013) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12014 · Cited by 381
Interest Group Access to the Bureaucracy, Parliament, and the Media
Binderkrantz, A. S., Christiansen, P. M., & Pedersen, H. H. (2015) · Governance · doi:10.1111/gove.12089 · Cited by 359
Estimating and Visualizing Conditional Densities
Hyndman, R. J., Bashtannyk, D. M., & Grunwald, G. K. (1996) · Journal of Computational and Graphical Statistics · doi:10.1080/10618600.1996.10474715 · Cited by 357
Long-Term Investing in Politicians; Or, Give Early, Give Often
Snyder (1992) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467243 · Cited by 356
Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress
Hojnacki, M., & Kimball, D. C. (1998) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2586303 · Cited by 353
Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote
Austen-Smith, D., & Wright, J. (1992) · Social Choice and Welfare · doi:10.1007/bf00192880 · Cited by 311
Yackee, S. W. (2006) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/mui042 · Cited by 309
Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence
Potters, J., & Sloof, R. (1996) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/s0176-2680(96)00008-0 · Cited by 298
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF U.S. FOREIGN AID: AMERICAN LEGISLATORS AND THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF AID
MILNER, H. V., & TINGLEY, D. H. (2010) · Economics & Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.2009.00356.x · Cited by 293
Interest Group Influence in the U. S. Congress
Smith, R. A. (1995) · Legislative Studies Quarterly · doi:10.2307/440151 · Cited by 284
Political Economics and Public Finance
Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (1999) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w7097 · Cited by 279
Why Do Organized Interests Lobby? A Multi-Goal, Multi-Context Theory of Lobbying
Lowery, D. (2007) · Polity · doi:10.1057/palgrave.polity.2300077 · Cited by 278
Economic Models of Interest Groups: An Introductory Survey
Mitchell, W. C., & Munger, M. C. (1991) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111373 · Cited by 266
Self-citationInterest Group Success in the European Union: When (and Why) Does Business Lose?
Dür, A., Bernhagen, P., & Marshall, D. (2015) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414014565890 · Cited by 264
Milner, H. V., & Tingley, D. H. (2011) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818310000317 · Cited by 263
Bonica, A. (2016) · Business and Politics · doi:10.1515/bap-2016-0004 · Cited by 147
Informational Lobbying and Legislative Voting
Schnakenberg, K. E. (2017) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12249 · Cited by 145
Leech, B. L. (2010) · The Oxford Handbook of American Political Parties and Interest Groups · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199542628.003.0028 · Cited by 91
Bailout for sale? The vote to save Wall Street
Dorsch, M. (2013) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-011-9888-6 · Cited by 16
“As a result, financial sector lobbying expenditures should go to representatives for whom c∗ if is the smallest (Denzau and Munger 1986; Stratmann 1992, 1996).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Denzau, A. T., & Munger, M. C.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1986-03
- Volume
- 80
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 89-106
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W1987936802
- Cited by
- 709
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 40.10
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.