The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Structure of Organizational Incentives
Abstract
0 The financial support of Peat Marwick Main & Co., Ernst & Young, David Hauck, and the Reginald H. Jones Center for Management Policy, Strategy, and Organization is gratefully acknowledged. We would like to thank Sherwin Rosen, Stanley Baiman, Marshall Meyer, three anonymous reviewers, and the workshop participants at the Wharton School, Harvard Business School, Washington University, Northwestern University, Odense University, Uppsala University, and the Shore Conference on Strategic Models for their helpful comments. To improve understanding and design of organizational incentives, we used confidential compensation data obtained for four distinct organizational levels (ranging from plant manager to corporate chief executive officer) to evaluate the ability of tournament, managerial power, and agency theories to explain these observed compensation data. Our results suggest that organizational incentives are most appropriately characterized by a combination of these models, rather than being completely described by a single theoretical description.'
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroskedasticity
White, H. (1980) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912934 · Cited by 25,861
Applied Linear Statistical Models
Ziegel, E. R., Neter, J., Wasserman, W., & Kutner, M. (1992) · Technometrics · doi:10.2307/1269588 · Cited by 9,907
Multitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24 · Cited by 6,046
Economics, Organization and Management.
Bhattacharya, S., Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1993) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2328903 · Cited by 4,644
(1981) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 3,559
Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
Lazear, E., & Rosen, S. (1979) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w0401 · Cited by 3,033
Power in Top Management Teams: Dimensions, Measurement, and Validation
Finkelstein, S. (1992) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/256485 · Cited by 2,389
Corporate Forecasts of Earnings Per Share and Stock Price Behavior: Empirical Test
Patell, J. M. (1976) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2490543 · Cited by 1,746
Mace, M. L. (1971) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 1,481
Lambert, R. A., & Larcker, D. F. (1987) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2491081 · Cited by 1,046
Self-citation
Cited by
Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance
Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W., & Larcker, D. F. (1999) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(98)00058-0 · Cited by 4,335
Self-citationThe Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
Financial accounting information and corporate governance
Bushman, R. M., & Smith, A. J. (2001) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00027-1 · Cited by 2,283
Pay without performance: the unfulfilled promise of executive compensation
(2005) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.42-4735 · Cited by 1,936
Diversification Decisions in Family‐Controlled Firms
Gomez‐Mejia, L. R., Makri, M., & Kintana, M. L. (2010) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2009.00889.x · Cited by 1,236
Environmental Performance and Executive Compensation: An Integrated Agency-Institutional Perspective
Berrone, P., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (2009) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2009.36461950 · Cited by 1,234
COLLABORATION IN THE BOARDROOM: BEHAVIORAL AND PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES OF CEO-BOARD SOCIAL TIES.
Westphal, J. D. (1999) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/256871 · Cited by 1,208
Annual bonus schemes and the manipulation of earnings
Holthausen, R. W., Larcker, D. F., & Sloan, R. G. (1995) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(94)00376-g · Cited by 1,137
Self-citationExecutive overconfidence and the slippery slope to financial misreporting
Schrand, C. M., & Zechman, S. L. C. (2012) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2011.09.001 · Cited by 1,035
How Much Does Performance Matter? A Meta-Analysis of CEO Pay Studies
Tosi, H. L., Werner, S., Katz, J. P., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (2000) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/014920630002600207 · Cited by 979
Financial Accounting Information and Corporate Governance
Bushman, R. M., & Smith, A. J. (2002) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.253302 · Cited by 849
The costs of intense board monitoring
Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 · Cited by 814
HOW MUCH DOES THE CEO MATTER? THE ROLE OF MANAGERIAL DISCRETION IN THE SETTING OF CEO COMPENSATION.
Finkelstein, S., & Boyd, B. K. (1998) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/257101 · Cited by 799
Organizational Learning from Performance Feedback: A Behavioral Perspective on Innovation and Change
Greve, H. R. (2003) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511615139 · Cited by 771
BOARD CONTROL, REMUNERATION COMMITTEES, AND TOP MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION.
Conyon, M. J., & Peck, S. I. (1998) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/257099 · Cited by 734
SOCIAL CAPITAL AT THE TOP: EFFECTS OF SOCIAL SIMILARITY AND STATUS ON CEO COMPENSATION.
BELLIVEAU, M. A., O'REILLY, C. A., & WADE, J. B. (1996) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/257069 · Cited by 626
IS CEO PAY IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY FIRMS RELATED TO INNOVATION?
Balkin, D. B., Markman, G. D., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (2000) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/1556340 · Cited by 600
Narrative, organizations and research
Rhodes, C., & Brown, A. D. (2005) · International Journal of Management Reviews · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2370.2005.00112.x · Cited by 581
Jia, N., Huang, K. G., & Man Zhang, C. (2019) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2016.0543 · Cited by 532
Looking Inside the Black Box: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Corporate Social Responsibility
Jain, T., & Jamali, D. (2016) · Corporate Governance: An International Review · doi:10.1111/corg.12154 · Cited by 530
The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance
Bhagat, S., & Black, B. S. (1997) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.11417 · Cited by 510
RELATIONSHIPS AMONG RISK, INCENTIVE PAY, AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE.
Bloom, M., & Milkovich, G. T. (1998) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/256908 · Cited by 506
Rank‐Order Tournaments and Incentive Alignment: The Effect on Firm Performance
KALE, J. R., REIS, E., & VENKATESWARAN, A. (2009) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01470.x · Cited by 505
Executive Compensation and Tournament Theory: Empirical Tests on Danish Data
Eriksson, T. (1999) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/209920 · Cited by 497
The Flattening Firm: Evidence from Panel Data on the Changing Nature of Corporate Hierarchies
Rajan, R. G., & Wulf, J. (2006) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest.88.4.759 · Cited by 482
CEO compensation: The role of individual performance evaluation
Bushman, R. M., Indjejikian, R. J., & Smith, A. (1996) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(95)00416-5 · Cited by 482
Siegel, P. A., & Hambrick, D. C. (2005) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.1050.0128 · Cited by 465
Overpaid CEOs and Underpaid Managers: Fairness and Executive Compensation
Wade, J. B., O'Reilly, C. A., & Pollock, T. G. (2006) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.1060.0204 · Cited by 441
Corporate Governance, Takeovers, and Top-Management Compensation: Theory and Evidence
Cyert, R. M., Kang, S.-H., & Kumar, P. (2002) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.48.4.453.205 · Cited by 431
Top management team compensation: the missing link between CEO pay and firm performance?
Carpenter, M. A., & Sanders, W. G. (2002) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.228 · Cited by 416
Stewards, Agents, and the Founder Discount: Executive Compensation in New Ventures
Wasserman, N. (2006) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2006.22798177 · Cited by 404
THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT, PAY DISPERSION, AND AMONG MANAGERIAL TURNOVER.
Bloom, M., & Michel, J. G. (2002) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/3069283 · Cited by 400
The functions and dysfunctions of hierarchy
Anderson, C., & Brown, C. E. (2010) · Research in Organizational Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.riob.2010.08.002 · Cited by 395
Corporate Governance and the Environment: What Type of Governance Creates Greener Companies?
Kock, C. J., Santaló, J., & Diestre, L. (2012) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2010.00993.x · Cited by 384
Henderson, A. D., & Fredrickson, J. W. (2001) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/3069339 · Cited by 382
CEO Tenure And Company Invention Under Differing Levels of Technological Dynamism
Wu, S., Levitas, E., & Priem, R. L. (2005) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2005.18803927 · Cited by 380
van Essen, M., Otten, J., & Carberry, E. J. (2015) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206311429378 · Cited by 372
Allee, K. D., & Yohn, T. L. (2009) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2009.84.1.1 · Cited by 364
The Professional Partnership: Relic or Exemplary Form of Governance?
Greenwood, R., & Empson, L. (2003) · Organization Studies · doi:10.1177/0170840603024006005 · Cited by 350
INFORMATION-PROCESSING DEMANDS AS A DETERMINANT OF CEO COMPENSATION.
Henderson, A. D., & Fredrickson, J. W. (1996) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/256656 · Cited by 343
Tournament Theory: Thirty Years of Contests and Competitions
Connelly, B. L., Tihanyi, L., Crook, T. R., & Gangloff, K. A. (2014) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206313498902 · Cited by 338
Hannan, R. L., Krishnan, R., & Newman, A. H. (2008) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2008.83.4.893 · Cited by 295
Jones, C. D., Makri, M., & Gomez–Mejia, L. R. (2008) · Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6520.2008.00269.x · Cited by 293
On the Corporate Demand for Directors' and Officers' Insurance
Core, J. E. (1997) · The Journal of Risk and Insurance · doi:10.2307/253912 · Cited by 278
The Effects of Top Management Team Pay and Firm Internationalization on MNC Performance
Carpenter, M. A., & Sanders, W. G. (2004) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1016/j.jm.2004.02.001 · Cited by 274
CEO Power and Risk Taking: Evidence from the Subprime Lending Industry
Lewellyn, K. B., & Muller‐Kahle, M. I. (2012) · Corporate Governance: An International Review · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2011.00903.x · Cited by 273
Compensation Committee Composition as a Determinant of Ceo Compensation
Daily, C. M., Johnson, J. L., Ellstrand, A. E., & Dalton, D. R. (1998) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/257103 · Cited by 267
Sharing the wealth: social comparisons and pay dispersion in the CEO's top team
Fredrickson, J. W., Davis‐Blake, A., & Sanders, W. G. (2010) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.848 · Cited by 256
Gallo, K. P., & Barlow, D. H. (2012) · Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2850.2012.01276.x · Cited by 88
Metadata
- Authors
- Lambert, R. A., Larcker, D. F., & Weigelt, K.
- Venue
- Administrative Science Quarterly
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1993-09
- Volume
- 38
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 438
- ISSN
- 0001-8392 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2007087334
- Cited by
- 609
- References
- 28
- FWCI
- 11.11
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.