The free-energy self: a predictive coding account of self-recognition
Open accessAbstract
Recognising and representing one’s self as distinct from others is a fundamental component of self-awareness. However, current theories of self-recognition are not embedded within global theories of cortical function and therefore fail to provide a compelling explanation of how the self is processed. We present a theoretical account of the neural and computational basis of self-recognition that is embedded within the free-energy account of cortical function. In this account one’s body is processed in a Bayesian manner as the most likely to be “me”. Such probabilistic representation arises through the integration of information from hierarchically organised unimodal systems in higher-level multimodal areas. This information takes the form of bottom-up “surprise” signals from unimodal sensory systems that are explained away by top-down processes that minimise the level of surprise across the brain. We present evidence that this theoretical perspective may account for the findings of psychological and neuroimaging investigations into self-recognition and particularly evidence that representations of the self are malleable, rather than fixed as previous accounts of self-recognition might suggest.
AI snapshot
Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
The paper proposes that self-recognition can be explained within the free-energy principle and predictive coding: one’s body is represented probabilistically as the most likely cause of congruent multisensory input, and self-representations are updated when prediction errors occur. It reviews psychological and neuroimaging evidence, especially multisensory illusions, to argue that self-recognition is malleable and not tied to a dedicated self-specific circuit.
Key findings
- Self-recognition is framed as Bayesian inference: one’s own body, face, and voice are processed as probabilistically the most likely to be “me” because they best explain congruent multisensory signals; high-level multimodal empirical priors explain away unimodal prediction errors.
- Three multisensory illusions—the rubber hand illusion, the enfacement illusion, and the rubber voice illusion—are used to show that self-representations are plastic: synchronous stimulation can increase the probability that another’s hand, face, or voice is “me” and decrease the probability that one’s actual body part is “self.”
- Contextual and cultural priors modulate self-other recognition: self-related primes, masked primes, culture (Western vs. East Asian), social hierarchy, and religious/atheist differences can alter self-bias.
- Anatomical predictions include: no unimodal area is exclusively engaged by self-stimuli; self-recognition engages multimodal regions such as TPJ, AI, IPS, and IFG; and predictable self-stimuli suppress activity (e.g., self-touch reduces SI activity; viewing one’s own face during touch reduces somatosensory cortex and IFG activity).
Methods
- Theoretical/conceptual review, not an empirical study; no participants, sample, or new data are reported.
- Integrates the free-energy principle and predictive coding with prior psychological and neuroimaging findings on self-recognition, including self-face, self-voice, self-body, and multisensory illusion studies.
- Main analysis is narrative synthesis and generation of testable predictions; no formal meta-analysis or statistical modeling is reported.
Limitations
- The paper states there is little direct evidence that predictions and prediction errors related to self-stimuli are processed anywhere in the brain, and that to the authors’ knowledge no paper has tested whether self-stimuli conform to predictive coding.
- The paper states the theory is hard to falsify with standard neuroscientific methods because 3T fMRI BOLD signal likely reflects both prediction and prediction-error neurons, which are found in separate cortical layers but cannot be resolved; it also notes no direct test of whether the self is probabilistic and little functional evidence for multimodal integration.
- Evident from the text: as a theoretical review, it relies on existing evidence and does not provide new empirical tests; some supporting evidence is described as consistent with, rather than direct tests of, the account.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
0 of 82 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged
- Premisecitation
Multisensory stimulation can modulate how one's own body, face and voice are recognised.
“A number of studies have highlighted the plasticity of the bodily self by showing how multisensory stimulation can modulate how one’s own body, face and voice are recognised”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Premisecitation
Synchronous but not asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation induced a shift in the first-person perspective such that participants experienced being located behind the visual image of their own body.
“Synchronous but not asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation induced a shift in the 1st person perspective such that participants experienced being located at some distance behind the visual image of their own body as if they were looking at someone else.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ehrsson, 2007 source
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- Interpretationreasoning
Self-recognition arises as a result of the brain's attempts to minimize free-energy (or 'surprise') in sensory systems.
“Within this framework we argue that self-recognition arises as a result of the brain’s attempts to minimize the amount of free-energy (or ‘surprise’) in sensory systems in order to be in states where the environment is highly predictable.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The free-energy principle and predictive coding are valid overarching theories of cortical function.
- Interpretationreasoning
Self-recognition should be plastic, such that surprising sensory events may be explained away by changes in how sensory inputs that are "self" or "other" are processed.
“Self-recognition should therefore also be plastic, such that surprising sensory events may be explained away by changes in how sensory inputs that are “self” or “other” are processed.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The free-energy principle and predictive coding are valid overarching theories of cortical function.
- Interpretationreasoning
The process of self-identification allows successful performance in the classic 'rouge' task of mirror self-recognition.
“This process of self-identification allows successful performance in the classic ‘rouge’ task of mirror self-recognition, in which infants are exposed to their mirror reflection and their response to a spot of rouge covertly applied to their nose is registered”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The infant cannot have a priori knowledge of their appearance.
- Interpretationreasoning
Self-recognition is more complex, with information from each and every sensory system potentially able to modulate self-recognition.
“Our suggestion is that self-recognition is more complex, with information from each and every sensory system potentially able to modulate self-recognition.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The free-energy principle and predictive coding are valid overarching theories of cortical function.
- Interpretationreasoning
Most self-recognition studies are unable to examine the multisensory nature of self-processing.
“This has rendered most self-recognition studies unable to examine the multisensory nature of self-processing.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Cortical signals that drive movement are descending predictions about the proprioceptive consequences of movement and are therefore better considered as corollary discharge as opposed to efference copy.
“In other words, cortical signals that drive movement are descending predictions about the proprioceptive consequences of movement and are therefore better considered as corollary discharge (the predictions of the sensory consequences of movement) as opposed to efference copy (copies of the motor commands used to form corollary discharge).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Friston and Ao, 2012
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- cites Friston et al., 2011 source
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- The authors state this as an assumption: The free-energy principle and predictive coding are valid overarching theories of cortical function.
- Interpretationreasoning
One's body is processed in a Bayesian manner as the most likely to be "me".
“In this account one’s body is processed in a Bayesian manner as the most likely to be “me”.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The free-energy principle and predictive coding are valid overarching theories of cortical function.
- Interpretationreasoning
Probabilistic representation of self arises through the integration of information from hierarchically organised unimodal systems in higher-level multimodal areas.
“Such probabilistic representation arises through the integration of information from hierarchically organised unimodal systems in higher-level multimodal areas.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The free-energy principle and predictive coding are valid overarching theories of cortical function.
- Premisecitation
In the rubber hand illusion, synchronous tactile stimulation on the hidden real hand and the visible rubber hand leads participants to experience a sense of ownership over the rubber hand.
“When the tactile stimulation is delivered in temporal synchronicity, on congruent specular locations on the two hands, participants come to experience a sense of ownership over the rubber hand”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005
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- Interpretationreasoning
The free-energy account is distinct from other accounts in highlighting how information from any system can be used to explain away information in any other system.
“The free-energy account discussed here is therefore distinct from others in highlighting how information from any system can be used to explain away information in any other system (Mitchell, 1993).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Mitchell, 1993 source
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- The authors state this as an assumption: The free-energy principle and predictive coding are valid overarching theories of cortical function.
- Premisecitation
In the Leggenhanger et al. (2007) study, only after synchronous stimulation did participants feel as if the virtual body was their body.
“Questionnaire and behavioural measures showed that only after synchronous stimulation, participants felt as if the virtual body was their body.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Leggenhanger et al, 2007
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- Interpretationreasoning
To produce parallel multimodal predictions, there must be a high level representation of self that elaborates descending predictions to multiple unimodal systems.
“However, to produce these parallel (multimodal) predictions, there must be a high level representation (of self) that elaborates descending predictions to multiple unimodal systems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The free-energy principle and predictive coding are valid overarching theories of cortical function.
- Premisecitation
In the enfacement illusion, synchronous stimulation causes participants to respond on self-other recognition tasks as if the other's face was more like their own face.
“The result of synchronous stimulation is that participants begin to respond on self-other recognition tasks as if the others face was more like their own face”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Sforza et al., 2010 source
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- cites Tsakiris, 2008
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- Interpretationreasoning
The self-face will only be recognised as "self" when a visual stimulus has been processed hierarchically for its low level visual properties, its configural features and then its identity.
“The self-face will only be recognised as “self” when a visual stimulus has been processed hierarchically for its low level visual properties, its configural features and then it’s identity.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The free-energy principle and predictive coding are valid overarching theories of cortical function.
- Interpretationreasoning
Matching between felt and observed sensorimotor signals will lead to the formation of a mental representation of visual appearance.
“This matching between felt and observed sensorimotor signals will lead to the formation of a mental representation of visual appearance (i.e., “that is my body reflected in the mirror; therefore that is what I look like”).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The infant cannot have a priori knowledge of their appearance.
- Premisecitation
Biological agents resist a natural tendency towards disorder in a constantly changing environment.
“The free-energy principle states that biological agents resist a natural tendency towards disorder in a constantly changing environment (Friston, 2005).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Friston, 2005 source
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- Premisecitation
Predictive coding argues that information is processed by two separate classes of neurons: representational units, which process probabilistic representations about upcoming sensory input, and error units, which code prediction errors.
“Predictive coding also argues that such information will be processed by two separate classes of neurons; representational units, which process probabilistic representations (or predictions) about upcoming sensory input and error units, which code prediction errors when there is a divergence between expected and actual sensory events”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Clark, in press
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- cites Friston, 2005 source
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- Interpretationreasoning
These self-recognition methodologies are inherently examining unimodal representations of self-stimuli and therefore may violate the normal conditions in which one's body is experienced.
“However, these methodologies are inherently examining unimodal representations of self-stimuli and therefore may violate the normal conditions in which one’s body is experienced.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
In the rubber hand illusion, participants' perception of the location of their own hand shifts closer to the rubber hand than its actual location.
“participants’ perception of the location of their own hand shifts to a spatial location closer to the rubber hand than its actual location”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Tsakiris et al., 2006 source
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- Interpretationreasoning
The mental representation of the physical properties of one's self is probabilistic.
“It follows that the mental representation of the physical properties of one’s self are therefore also probabilistic.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The free-energy principle and predictive coding are valid overarching theories of cortical function.
- Interpretationreasoning
Prior beliefs modulate how self-stimuli are recognised.
“Prior beliefs will therefore modulate how self-stimuli are recognised.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The free-energy principle and predictive coding are valid overarching theories of cortical function.
- Interpretationreasoning
The notion that there is a "self" is the most parsimonious and accurate explanation for sensory inputs.
“In short, the notion that there is a “self” is the most parsimonious and accurate explanation for sensory inputs.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The free-energy principle and predictive coding are valid overarching theories of cortical function.
- Interpretationreasoning
Recognition of one's self arises through the integration of sensory information creating multimodal representations of the self.
“Recognition of one’s self will therefore arise through the integration of sensory information creating multimodal representations of the self.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The free-energy principle and predictive coding are valid overarching theories of cortical function.
- Interpretationreasoning
Representations of the self are malleable, rather than fixed as previous accounts of self-recognition might suggest.
“We present evidence that this theoretical perspective may account for the findings of psychological and neuroimaging investigations into self-recognition and particularly evidence that representations of the self are malleable, rather than fixed as previous accounts of self-recognition might suggest.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The free-energy framework provides flexibility, with fewer constraints on what types of information can drive self-recognition, unlike previous accounts.
“However, unlike previous accounts, the free-energy framework provides flexibility, with fewer constraints on what types of information can drive self-recognition.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The free-energy principle and predictive coding are valid overarching theories of cortical function.
- Premisecitation
The brain can minimise surprise by updating probabilistic representations.
“As stated above, an important aspect of the free-energy principle is that the brain can minimise surprise by updating probabilistic representations (Friston, 2005).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Friston, 2005 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationcitation
A simultaneous multisensory experience can update the representation of the rubber hand as "not me" such that the probability that the rubber hand is "me" increases.
“Thus, a simultaneous multisensory experience can update the representation of the rubber hand as “not me”, such that the probability that the rubber hand is “me” increases.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Surprise in any system could be explained away by probabilistic representations derived from information in any other system, if this is the optimal manner in which free-energy can be minimised.
“This suggests that surprise in any system could be explained away by probabilistic representations which are derived from information in any other system, if this is the optimal manner in which free-energy can be minimised.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The free-energy principle and predictive coding are valid overarching theories of cortical function.
- Premisereasoning
Probabilistic representations are plastic and updated when new information reveals a discrepancy between a predicted sensory state and the actual sensory state.
“Therefore, at the core of this theory is the notion that probabilistic representations are plastic and updated when new information reveals a discrepancy between a predicted sensory state and the actual sensory state.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Perceptual learning within the free-energy and predictive coding frameworks leads to generative models where aspects of one's body are processed as probabilistically the most likely object that when touched, moved, threatened, or acted upon evokes events in other sensory systems that detect the state of the body.
“Thus, perceptual learning within the free-energy and predictive coding frameworks leads to generative models where aspects of one’s body are processed as probabilistically the most likely object (or collection of objects) that when touched, moved, threatened, or acted upon in any way, evokes events in the other sensory systems that detect the state of the body.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The free-energy principle and predictive coding are valid overarching theories of cortical function.
- Interpretationreasoning
In each of the three illusions there is considerable bottom-up sensory surprise evoked in one system.
“In each of these three illusions there is considerable bottom up sensory surprise evoked in one system.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Surprising events in one sensory system can be explained away by more parsimonious information in another via convergence at multimodal nodes in the cortex.
- Interpretationreasoning
The context within which stimuli are perceived modulates multisensory expectations about stimuli, leading to variability in the likelihood that another body will be processed as "me".
“So it is clear that the context within which stimuli are perceived modulates multisensory expectations about stimuli, leading to variability in the likelihood that another body will be processed as “me”.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The competition between alternative generative models of a stimulus as "self" offers an explanation of the processes of self-plasticity that occur in the multisensory illusions.
“The competition between alternative generative models of a stimulus as “self” offers an explanation of the processes of self-plasticity that occur in the multisensory illusion outlined above”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
Priming with a self-stimulus can influence phasic expectations about the prior probability of further self-stimuli.
“Priming with a self-stimulus can therefore influence phasic expectations about the prior probability of further self-stimuli.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Such an effect is driven by changes in the high-level prior probability that another or a different body is "me".
“Such an effect is driven by changes in the high level prior probability that another or a different body is “me”.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Perceptual learning processes will update representations of one's appearance or voice, such that the probabilistic representation of one's body and voice is different after synchronous multisensory stimulation.
“In turn, perceptual learning processes will update representations of one’s appearance or voice, such that the probabilistic representation of one’s body and voice is different after synchronous multisensory stimulation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Chinese individuals show a reversal of the self-bias in the presence of a supervisor, with reaction times becoming faster for the face of the social superior than the self-face.
“a recent study has suggested that Chinese individuals show a reversal of the self-bias in the presence of a supervisor, with reaction times becoming faster for the face of the social superior than the self-face (Liew et al., 2011).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Liew et al., 2011 source
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- Interpretationreasoning
The high-level empirical prior probability that one's actual face, voice or body are one's own is decreased during the illusion.
“In turn, the high level empirical prior probability that one’s actual face, voice or body are one’s own is decreased.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Each of the multisensory illusions illustrates how multisensory stimulation can lead to changes in how one's face, voice and body are processed, leading to an update of what is recognized as "me".
“Each of these illusions illustrates how multisensory stimulation can lead to changes in how one’s face, voice and body are processed, leading to an update of what is recognized as “me”.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Most of our sensations are caused by ourselves.
- Interpretationreasoning
When an object violates contexts necessary for objects to be processed as "me" (e.g., hand spatially incongruent to body), this results in a low probability that the object will be labelled as "self" even with congruent synchronous tactile stimulation.
“When the object violates contexts that are a necessity for objects to be processed as “me” e.g. when the hand is spatially incongruent to the body, this results in a low probability that the objects will be labelled as “self” even when there is congruent synchronous tactile stimulation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
In the enfacement illusion, self-report measures indicate that the face is experienced as more like "me" than before.
“self-report measures indicate changes in the phenomenological experience of one’s own and the other’s face, such that the face is experienced as more like “me” than before”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Tajadura-Jimenez et al., 2012 source
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- Premisecitation
In the rubber voice illusion, the manipulation modulated the pitch of participants' own speech.
“and also modulated the pitch of their own speech”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Zheng et al., 2011
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- Interpretationreasoning
A change in the likelihood that a stimulus is represented as "me" is reflected by an updating of the high-level empirical prior probability distribution representing a face, voice, or body being one's own.
“a change in the likelihood that a stimulus is represented as “me” is reflected by an updating of the high level empirical prior probability distribution representing a face, voice, or body being one’s own that is updated.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Self-other face recognition has been shown to be different across cultures.
“self-other face recognition has been shown to be different across cultures (Liew et al., 2011; Sui et al., 2009).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked - Premisecitation
Westerners show a greater self-bias on self-other face recognition tasks than East Asian individuals.
“Indeed, Westerners show a greater self-bias on such tasks than East Asian individuals.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked - Premisecitation
Western individuals maintain a self-bias in identical circumstances.
“Western individuals, however, maintain a self-bias in identical circumstances.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Liew et al., 2011 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
One's own body, face and voice are probabilistically represented as "me".
“one’s own body, face and voice are probabilistically represented as “me”.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The driving effect for each illusion is an increase in the probability that the other object (a face, voice or body part) will be represented as part of the body.
“we argue that the driving effect for each illusion is an increase in the probability that the other object (a face, voice or body part) will be represented as part of the body”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
In the rubber voice illusion, the stranger's voice is reported as a distorted version of one's voice, not as the voice of another.
“The result was that the stranger’s voice is reported as a distorted version of one’s voice, not as the voice of another”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Zheng et al., 2011
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- Interpretationreasoning
Behaviour on self-recognition tasks is dependent on the relative fit of the two generative models which code the probability of the other being me and the probability my own body being me.
“Behaviour on self-recognition tasks will also be dependent on the relative fit of the two generative models which code the probability of the other being me and the probability my own body being me.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Contextual priors significantly influence whether a novel stimulus, such as a rubber hand or another's face, will be adopted into the model of the body.
“This is consistent with the view that contextual priors significantly influence whether a novel stimulus, such as a rubber hand or another’s face, whether an object will be adopted into the model of the body.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Only subjectively perceived physical similarity between the participant's hand and the rubber hand is influenced by the experience of the rubber hand illusion.
“it has been shown that only subjectively perceived physical similarity between the participant’s hand and the rubber hand is influenced by the experience of the illusion (Longo et al., 2009).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Longo et al., 2009 source
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- Premisecitation
Self-related primes in one domain can decrease reaction times in self-other recognition tasks in another.
“self-related primes in one domain can decrease reaction times in self-other recognition tasks in another (Pannese and Hirsch, 2010; Platek et al., 2004).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Pannese and Hirsch, 2010
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- cites Platek et al., 2004 source
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- Interpretationcitation
Changes in ownership lead to changes in more abstract body image representations of one's appearance.
“suggesting that changes in ownership leads to changes in more abstract body image representations of one’s appearance.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
These physiological findings are consistent with the notion that the real limb is being partially rejected and therefore there is a decreased likelihood that it is "self".
“These findings are consistent with the notion that the real limb is being partially rejected and therefore there is a decreased likelihood that it is “self”.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
The flip between the two percepts in binocular rivalry is a function of the balance between the two generative models of the visual input.
“As such, the flip between the two percepts is a function of the balance between the two generative models of the visual input (Hohwy et al., 2008).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Hohwy et al., 2008 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Rests on an assumption: Pools of neurons that process evidence in favour of a particular model suppress the activity of neurons that process alternative models.
- Interpretationreasoning
Cultural and societal norms can create differences in prior beliefs.
“Cultural and societal norms can therefore create differences in prior beliefs.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
The effect of self-related primes on reaction times is still apparent when the priming stimuli are masked and not consciously perceived.
“This effect is still apparent when the self-related priming stimuli are masked and therefore not consciously perceived (Pannese and Hirsch, 2011).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Pannese and Hirsch, 2011
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationnone given
All three illusions can be explained through the principles of free-energy and predictive coding.
“In our account we argue that all three illusions can be explained through the principles of free-energy and predictive coding.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Surprising events in one sensory system can be explained away by more parsimonious information in another via convergence at multimodal nodes in the cortex.
- Premisecitation
Participants who experienced the rubber hand illusion perceived their hand and the rubber hand as significantly more similar than participants who did not experience the illusion.
“Participants who experienced the RHI perceived their hand and the rubber hand as significantly more similar, than participants who did not experience the illusion”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Longo et al., 2009 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Changes in the probability that another's face is "mine" can lead to changes in the likelihood that one's own actual face is "me".
“the predictive coding account illustrates how changes in the probability that another’s face is “mine” can lead to changes in the likelihood that one’s own actual face is “me”.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The context within which sensory stimulation is perceived influences priors and high-level priors, resulting in self-other distinctions being dependent on expectations prior to the presentation of a self or other stimulus.
“The context within which sensory stimulation is perceived will therefore influence priors and high level priors, resulting in self-other distinctions being dependent on expectations prior to the presentation of a self or other stimulus.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
These illusions tap into the mechanisms that operate to create a sense that one's body is one's own and that my body, face and voice are "mine".
“these illusions tap into the mechanisms that operate to create a sense that one’s body is one’s own and that my body, face and voice are “mine”.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
This surprise will be explained away by top-down effects from multisensory areas.
“This surprise will be explained away by top-down effects from multisensory areas.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Surprising events in one sensory system can be explained away by more parsimonious information in another via convergence at multimodal nodes in the cortex.
- Premisereasoning
Top-down probabilistic representations can influence information processing prior to incoming sensory input and thereby influence the likelihood that an object will be recognised as "me".
“top-down probabilistic representations can influence information processing prior to incoming sensory input and as a result influence the likelihood that an object will be recognised as “me”.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Surprising events in one sensory system can be explained away by more parsimonious information in another via convergence at multimodal nodes in the cortex.
- Interpretationcitation
Self-face recognition is manipulated by cultural effects.
“Thus, self-face recognition is manipulated by cultural effects.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Objects or faces placed within peripersonal space that are congruent in physical properties with the learned probabilistic representation of bodies or faces are more likely to be recognised and processed as self.
“objects or faces that are placed within peripersonal space that are congruent in terms of their physical properties with the learned probabilistic representation of bodies or faces, are more likely to be recognised and processed as self.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisenone given
There has not previously been a theoretical perspective that can account for all three multisensory illusions.
“However, there has not previously been a theoretical perspective which can account for all three illusions, which are clearly driven by similar multisensory processes.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
When one's own face is presented in a mirror, the likelihood that it will be processed as "me" is a function of comparisons between two generative models of which face is "me".
“when one’s own face is presented in a mirror, the likelihood that this will be processed as “me” will be a function of the comparisons between two generative models of which face is “me”.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Self-stimuli are recognised as "me" when surprise in one sensory system is explained away at a multimodal node which processes information from a system in which there is minimal surprise.
“self-stimuli are recognised as “me” when surprise in one sensory system is explained away at a multimodal node which processes information from a system in which there is minimal surprise.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Surprising events in one sensory system can be explained away by more parsimonious information in another via convergence at multimodal nodes in the cortex.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Self-stimuli in any one domain activate portions of a sensory system which are also engaged when processing non-self stimuli.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Self-stimuli presented in one modality engage multisensory areas involved in processing high-level empirical prior information about the stimulus being “self”.
- The authors state this as an assumption: When a self-stimulus leads to predictable sensory input, activity in response to the predicted stimulus is suppressed due to absence of prediction error.
- Interpretationreasoning
The driving effect for each illusion is a decrease in the probability that one's actual body will be represented as "self".
“and a decrease in the probability that one’s actual body will be represented as “self”.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
These regions are not processing anything specific to the self.
“This is consistent with the view that these regions are not processing anything that is specific to the self.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
There is a core set of regions that are crucial for recognising different aspects of one's self.
“This evidence would seem to suggest that there is a core set of regions that are crucial for recognising different aspects of one’s self.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The BOLD signal measured using 3T fMRI scanners is likely a function of both prediction and prediction error neurons.
“the BOLD signal measured using 3Tesla fMRI scanners, which are those most commonly employed in research, is likely to be a function of both prediction and prediction error neurons”
- Also stated in: § 7. Future Directions and Caveats · hedged
“the BOLD signal measured in these commonly used MRI scanners will likely be a function of both sets of neuronal types”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § 7. Future Directions and Caveats · hedged
- Premisecitation
Unimodal self face, voice and body recognition activates a broad range of multimodal areas.
“Neuroimaging studies suggest that unimodal self face, voice and body recognition activates a broad range of multimodal areas.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Apps et al., 2012b
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Devue and Bredart, 2011
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Devue et al., 2007 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Self-generated actions result in attenuation in sensory systems, as compared to exogenously cued events that result in identical sensory events to the body.
“Other studies have also shown that self-generated actions result in attenuation in sensory systems, as compared to exogenously cued events that result in identical sensory events to the body.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Prediction and prediction error neurons are found in separate cortical layers.
“Whilst each type of neuron is, according to the theory (Friston and Kiebel, 2009b) and also recent evidence examining connectivity in cortical microcircuits (Bastos et al., 2012), found in separate cortical layers”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Friston and Kiebel, 2009b
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Bastos et al., 2012
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Increased activity in unimodal areas when processing self-stimuli may reflect surprise evoked by self-stimuli that is passed up sensory hierarchies to multisensory areas.
“The increased activity in unimodal areas when processing self-stimuli may therefore reflect the surprise evoked by self-stimuli that is passed up sensory hierarchies to multisensory areas”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
A broad range of unimodal areas are engaged during self-recognition.
“Such studies suggest that a broad range of unimodal areas are engaged during self-recognition.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Premisecitation
Looking at one's own face whilst experiencing touch reduces activity in the somatosensory cortex and the multisensory Inferior Frontal Gyrus (IFG), as compared to looking at another's face and experiencing touch.
“Similarly it has been shown that looking at one’s own face whilst experiencing touch reduces activity in the (unimodal) somtosensory cortex and the multisensory Inferior Frontal Gyrus (IFG), as compared to the activity evoked by looking at another’s face and experiencing touch (Cardini et al., 2011).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Cardini et al., 2011 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Portions of AI and IFG are connected.
“There are also known to be connections between portions of the AI and the IFG (Mesulam and Mufson, 1982; Mufson and Mesulam, 1982; Petrides and Pandya, 2006)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Interpretationcitation
A self-stimulus can act as a prediction of another sensory event in another modality.
“This is consistent with the view that a self-stimulus can act as a prediction of another sensory event in another modality.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Several regions, including TPJ, IPS, AI and IFG, are also activated when participants experience the rubber-hand illusion and similar multisensory illusions where perceived spatial location of the whole body is manipulated.
“Interestingly, several of these regions, including the TPJ, IPS, AI and the IFG are also activated when participants experience the rubber-hand illusion (Ehrsson et al., 2005; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Tsakiris et al., 2008; Tsakiris et al., 2007; Tsakiris et al., 2010b), and when participants experience similar multisensory illusions where the perceived spatial location of the whole body is”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Interpretationreasoning
Self-stimuli may evoke more surprise than non-self-stimuli that needs to be explained away by multimodal top-down effects.
“i.e. self-stimuli may evoke more surprise than non-self-stimuli that needs to be explained away by multimodal top-down effects”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationcitation
The connectional fingerprints and neuroimaging research suggest that these regions are not specialised for processing self-stimuli.
“However, the connectional fingerprints of these regions and also the neuroimaging research examining their functional properties, suggest that these regions are not specialised for processing self-stimuli.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
No unimodal system is exclusively engaged by self-made stimuli.
“This precludes the possibility that a unimodal system will be exclusively engaged by self made stimuli.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Self-stimuli in any one domain activate portions of a sensory system which are also engaged when processing non-self stimuli.
- Interpretationreasoning
If the emergence of self depends upon amodal high-level empirical priors that send descending, parallel, and divergent predictions down the hierarchy, then the representation of self must be hierarchically distributed and recruit all unimodal systems that register the consequences of self-made acts.
“if the emergence of self depends upon amodal high level empirical priors that send descending, parallel, and divergent predictions down the hierarchy, then the representation of self must be hierarchically distributed and recruit in all unimodal systems that register the consequences of self made acts.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
These unimodal areas process information about all faces, bodies or voices, even if their response profile differs between self and other.
“However, it is well established that these areas process information about all faces, bodies or voices, even if the profile of their response is different between self and other”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Barraclough and Perrett, 2011
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Belin and Zatorre, 2003
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Formisano et al., 2008 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Activity in unimodal and multisensory areas can become suppressed when a self-related stimulus results in a predictable sensory input.
“These studies point to how activity in unimodal and multisensory areas can become suppressed when a self-related stimulus results in a predictable sensory input”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
A highly surprising event and a highly predicted event may both evoke large responses in populations of neurons that typically cannot be resolved using a 3T fMRI scanner.
“a highly surprising event and a highly predicted event may, although not necessarily (Alink et al., 2010), both evoke large responses in populations of neurons that typically cannot be resolved, using a 3T fMRI scanner”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Alink et al., 2010 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Typical fMRI scanning may suffer from an inability to detect self-recognition related free-energy responses.
“Typical fMRI scanning may therefore suffer from an inability to detect self-recognition related free-energy responses.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Posterior portions of STS and adjacent supramarginal gyrus around TPJ have strong connections to IFG, IPS and AI.
“There is also evidence that posterior portions of the STS and adjacent portions of the supramarginal gyrus around the TPJ, both have strong connections to the IFG, IPS and to the AI (Mars et al., 2012; Petrides and Pandya, 2009; Seltzer and Pandya, 1989).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Premisecitation
Studies using orthogonal designs or multivoxel pattern analysis have been able to identify activity related to error-related and probabilistic processes.
“studies using carefully considered designs in which error-related and probabilistic information are orthogonal (Egner et al., 2010), or using advanced analysis techniques such as multivoxel pattern analysis, have been able to identify activity related to these two distinct processes (de Gardelle et al., in press)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Egner et al., 2010 source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites de Gardelle et al., in press
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
One's own face, voice and body are probabilistically the most likely to be recognised as one's own.
“one’s own face voice and body are probabilistically the most likely to be recognised as one’s own”
- Also stated in: § 8. Summary · hedged
“Such associations will be probabilistic such that one’s own body is the most likely to be one’s own.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Information is processed in the form of probability distributions which form the basis of prior beliefs before a sensory event and on which perceptual inferences are made after sensory stimulation.
- Also stated in: § 8. Summary · hedged
- Interpretationreasoning
Within the free-energy framework, such processing is not tied specifically to any particular circuit of brain.
“within the free-energy framework that such processing will not be tied specifically to any particular circuit of brain”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Information is processed in the form of probability distributions which form the basis of prior beliefs before a sensory event and on which perceptual inferences are made after sensory stimulation.
- Interpretationreasoning
Depending on context and task, any processing in any sensory system may ultimately be able to modulate how one's face is perceptually experienced.
“depending on the context and task within which the body is processed, any processing in any sensory system may ultimately be able to modulate how one’s face is perceptually experienced”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Information is processed in the form of probability distributions which form the basis of prior beliefs before a sensory event and on which perceptual inferences are made after sensory stimulation.
- Interpretationnone given
Other features can be recognised as one's own.
“but also that other features can be recognised as one’s own”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Information is processed in the form of probability distributions which form the basis of prior beliefs before a sensory event and on which perceptual inferences are made after sensory stimulation.
- Interpretationreasoning
Recognising one's self is a process of associating the unimodal properties of the body with other information about the body from any sensory system.
“recognising one’s self is a process of associating the unimodal properties of the body (i.e., the visual properties of one’s hand), with other information about the body from any sensory system”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Information is processed in the form of probability distributions which form the basis of prior beliefs before a sensory event and on which perceptual inferences are made after sensory stimulation.
- Interpretationreasoning
Whether an object will be processed as self is based on contextual information that modulates prior beliefs about the likelihood that an object could be "me".
“Whether an object will be processed as self will also be based on contextual information that modulates prior beliefs about the likelihood that an object could be “me”.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Information is processed in the form of probability distributions which form the basis of prior beliefs before a sensory event and on which perceptual inferences are made after sensory stimulation.
- Interpretationreasoning
Representations of one's body are plastic, such that other objects can become, probabilistically, more likely to be a part of one's self.
“Representations of one’s body are also plastic, such that other objects can become, probabilistically, more likely to be a part of one’s self.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Information is processed in the form of probability distributions which form the basis of prior beliefs before a sensory event and on which perceptual inferences are made after sensory stimulation.
- May combine two claims. 25
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 11
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningOne's own body is the one which has the highest probability of being "me" as other objects are probabilistically less likely to evoke the same sensory inputs.
“That is, one’s own body is the one which has the highest probability of being “me” as other objects are probabilistically less likely to evoke the same sensory inputs.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The free-energy principle and predictive coding are valid overarching theories of cortical function.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationMinimal first-person perspective, self-location and self-identification are three conditions critical for the experience of selfhood.
“three conditions that are critical for the experience of selfhood (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Blanke and Metzinger, 2009 source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationPredictive coding argues for complementary hierarchical top-down and bottom-up processes, with bottom-up information reflecting prediction errors and top-down information being predictions about sensory consequences.
“Predictive coding argues for complimentary hierarchical top-down and bottom-up processes, which are distinguished by the nature of the information that they process. Bottom-up information flowing through the hierarchy reflects the impact of a sensory event, i.e. prediction errors. Top-down information flowing through the hierarchy is in the in the form of predictions about the sensory consequences”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationThese multisensory manipulations demonstrate the efficiency of current multisensory input in determining the experience of a minimal first-person perspective, self-location and self-identification.
“These manipulations demonstrate the efficiency of current multisensory input in determining the experience of a minimal 1st person-perspective (Ehrsson, 2007), self-location (Leggenhanger et al,(2007) and self-identification (Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationAll self-recognition methods (self-other detection, morphing, masked priming) converge on the notion of a self-bias, with self-stimuli being more salient and processed faster.
“All of these methods converge on the notion of a self-bias, with self-stimuli being more salient and processed faster.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Bredart, 2004
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Devue and Bredart, 2008
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Devue et al., 2009
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
PremisereasoningRepresentational units dynamically update prior predictions and project these down the hierarchy, explaining away error in the immediately preceding level.
“However, representational units dynamically update prior predictions and project these down the hierarchy. As such, representational units “explain away” error in the immediately preceding level of the hierarchy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Premisenone givenCurrent theories of self-recognition are not embedded within global theories of cortical function and therefore fail to provide a compelling explanation of how the self is processed.
“However, current theories of self-recognition are not embedded within global theories of cortical function and therefore fail to provide a compelling explanation of how the self is processed.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationIn predictive coding, more than one model of an event is processed at a time, with models with less evidence not being selected for and inferences based on the information they code not being made.
“In predictive coding, more than one model of an event is processed at a time, with models with less evidence not being selected for and inferences based on the information they code are not made (Clark, in press).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Clark, in press
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationIn the rubber hand illusion, if the object placed in front of the participant is non-corporeal, is a rubber hand of a different skin tone, or is placed in a spatially incongruent location, the sense of ownership over the object is modulated or not present at all.
“In the rubber hand illusion, if the object placed in front of the participant is non-corporeal (Tsakiris et al., 2010a), is a rubber hand of a different skin tone (Farmer et al., 2012) or is placed in a spatially incongruent location (Bekrater-Bodmann et al., 2012; Cadieux et al., 2011; Costantini and Haggard, 2007; Folegatti et al., 2012; Hohwy and Paton, 2010; Holle et al., 2011; Makin et al., 2”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Tsakiris et al., 2010a
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Farmer et al., 2012 source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Bekrater-Bodmann et al., 2012
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationRecent studies have reported physiological changes to the real hand, including a reduction in temperature and an increase in histamine level, during the illusory experience.
“recent studies have reported physiological changes to the real hand, including a reduction in temperature (Hohwy and Paton, 2010; Moseley et al., 2008) and also an increase in histamine level (Barnsley et al., 2011) during the illusory experience.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checkedProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationReligious individuals do not have as strong a self-other bias as atheists.
“religious individuals do not have as strong a self-other bias as atheists (Ma and Han, 2012).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ma and Han, 2012
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningDuring the rubber hand illusion, the likelihood that one's own body is "me" decreases, but the likelihood that a rubber hand is "me" increases.
“Thus, the likelihood that one’s own body is “me” decreases, but the likelihood that a rubber hand is “me” increases during the illusion.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationThis is not the first discussion of free-energy in the context of self-other information processing.
“It should be noted that this is not the first discussion of Free-energy in the context of self-other information processing.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Friston et al., 2010
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Kilner, 2011
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Kilner et al., 2007a
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningIn the enfacement illusion, the difference in the likelihood that the self-face and the other face are actually one's own is reduced, leading to changes in the degree to which one's own face is recognised as "self".
“The difference in the likelihood that the self-face and the other face are actually one’s own is reduced, leading to changes in the degree to which one’s own face is recognised as “self”.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningInformation prior to an event nuances predictions about likely sensory input, and when sensory input is received, the prior information biases the probabilistic inferences that are made about causes of an event.
“the free-energy account argues that information prior to an event will nuance predictions about the likely sensory input, and when sensory input is received, the prior information biases the probabilistic inferences that are made causes of an event.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningInformation processed at multimodal nodes is highly abstract, processing high-level prior information about self-stimuli and explaining away surprise in unimodal sensory systems by labelling a stimulus as "me".
“The information processed at multimodal nodes will therefore be highly abstract, i.e., they will process high level prior information about self-stimuli and explain away surprise in unimodal sensory systems by labelling a stimulus as “me”.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningContextual effects can modulate the processing of stimuli by influencing expectations before a sensory event is perceived and by modulating inferences made following perception of a self-stimulus.
“contextual effects can modulate the processing of stimuli, by influencing expectations before a sensory event is perceived and also modulate the inferences that are made following the perception of a self-stimulus.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe probability that another's body part is "me" increases and as a result the ability to distinguish between self and other is diminished.
“As a result, the probability that another’s body part is “me” increases and as a result the ability to distinguish between self and other is diminished.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
PremisereasoningThere is, as yet, little direct evidence that predictions and prediction errors related to self-stimuli are processed anywhere in the brain.
“Perhaps the most important caveat is that there is, as yet, little direct evidence that predictions and prediction errors related to self-stimuli are processed anywhere in the brain.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe lack of evidence is in part due to the novelty of this theory, but also due to the fact that the theory is hard to falsify using standard neuroscientific methods.
“The lack of evidence is in part due to the novelty of this theory, but also due to the fact that the theory is hard to falsify using standard neuroscientific methods.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationThis self-touch effect is purportedly driven by reduced activity in primary somatosensory cortex (SI) when receiving self-delivered tactile stimulation.
“Functional imaging research has highlighted that this effect is purportedly driven by reduced activity in primary somatosensory cortex (SI), a unimodal area, when receiving self-delivered tactile stimulation (Blakemore et al., 1999a; Blakemore et al., 2000; Blakemore et al., 1999b).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Blakemore et al., 1999a
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Blakemore et al., 2000 source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Blakemore et al., 1999b
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThese connectional fingerprints are indicative of distinct functional properties: TPJ processes confluence of visual and bodily related information, AI processes emotional, interoceptive and motor information about the body, IPS processes visuo-spatial information about somatosensory input to the body, and IFG processes mappings between abstract rules and the body.
“These connectional fingerprints are indicative of distinct functional properties, with the TPJ processing the confluence of visual information and bodily related information, the AI processing the confluence of emotional, interoceptive and motor information about the body, the IPS processing visuo-spatial information about somatosensory input to the body and the IFG processing the mappings between”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationThere is little evidence that these multimodal regions are engaged exclusively by self-recognition processes; each is not found to be activated exclusively during processing of self-stimuli.
“However, there is little evidence that these regions are engaged exclusively by self-recognition processes and indeed, each of these regions is not found to be activated exclusively during the processing of self-stimuli (Legrand and Ruby, 2009)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Legrand and Ruby, 2009 source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenA multisensory node, in this case the IFG, instantiates a prediction of the upcoming stimulus, reducing activation when that stimulus is presented.
“A multisensory node, in this case the IFG, instantiates a prediction of the upcoming stimulus reducing activation when that stimulus is presented.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Premisenone givenThere has not been a paper that has tested whether the brain processes information about self-stimuli in a manner that conforms to the principles of predictive coding.
“At this point, to the best of our knowledge, there has not been a paper that has tested whether the brain processes information about self-stimuli in a manner that conforms to the principles of predictive coding.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisereasoningThere is no evidence that refutes the claim that predictions and prediction errors related to self-stimuli are processed in the brain.
“However, whilst there is little direct evidence that supports the claims, there is also none that refute it.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningProcessing in these areas is not specific to the self; rather self-stimuli evoke surprise that must be explained away by processing in these regions.
“However, processing in these areas is not specific to the self, rather self-stimuli evoke surprise that must be explained away by processing in these regions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationParticipants cannot experience a tickling sensation when they apply tactile stimulation to their own skin, only when tactile stimulation is externally delivered.
“found that participants cannot experience a tickling sensation when they apply tactile stimulation to their own skin, only when tactile stimulation is externally delivered.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThese regions are important for recognising a stimulus as self and integrating multisensory information, in the form of abstract empirical priors, in order to explain away unimodal sensory surprise as "me".
“We therefore argue that these regions are important for the process of recognising a stimulus as self and integrating multisensory information, in the form of abstract empirical priors, in order to explain away unimodal sensory surprise as “me”.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe three regions are unified by the fact that none can be considered as processing unimodal sensory information and their functional processing extends beyond self-related stimuli.
“However, despite their functional discrepancies, the three regions are unified by the fact that none of them can be considered us processing unimodal sensory information and also, that their functional processing extends beyond the processing of self-related stimuli.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationKilner and colleagues have offered an account of how the free-energy framework can explain how the intentions and actions of others are learned within the mirror neuron system through predictive simulation of others' corollary discharge.
“Previously, Kilner and colleagues (Friston et al., 2010; Kilner, 2011; Kilner et al., 2007a, b) have offered a thorough account of how the free-energy framework can provide a compelling explanation of how the intentions and actions of others are learned within the mirror neuron system, through the predictive simulation of the others’ corollary discharge”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Friston et al., 2010
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Kilner, 2011
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Kilner et al., 2007a
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThese three regions may comprise a core circuit which is engaged when recognising one's self and creates a sense of ownership over one's body.
“suggesting that these three regions may comprise a core circuit which is engaged when recognising one’s self and creates a sense of ownership over one’s body.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningSuch processing is hierarchical with multimodal areas processing the confluence of self information from different sensory systems and explaining away surprising incoming sensory information from unimodal areas.
“Such processing will be processed hierarchically with multimodal areas processing the confluence of “self” information from different sensory systems and explaining away the surprising incoming sensory information from unimodal areas.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: There is anatomical evidence that multimodal areas play an important role in integrating information across systems to explain away bottom-up unimodal surprise.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationnone givenTo date, empirical data neither largely supports nor refutes the predictive coding account of self-recognition.
“we note that to date, empirical data neither largely supports nor refutes our account of self-recognition”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenSelf-recognition may be accounted for by the interaction between bottom-up and top-down processes interacting in a predictive coding framework.
“we have suggested that self-recognition may be accounted for by the interaction between bottom-up and top-down processes interacting in a predictive coding framework”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: There is anatomical evidence that multimodal areas play an important role in integrating information across systems to explain away bottom-up unimodal surprise.
- Rests on an assumption: There is little functional evidence for the role of multimodal areas in integrating information across systems.
- Rests on an assumption: There has not yet been a direct test of whether the likelihood of stimuli being accepted as part of one’s body is probabilistic, whether one’s own body is represented probabilistically as self and not deterministically, and whether recognition and ownership of others’ body parts are acquired during illusions in a manner that conforms to the predictive coding account.
The authors state this as an assumption.
The free-energy principle and predictive coding are valid overarching theories of cortical function.
“At this point it should be explicitly stated that the aim of this paper is not to discuss the validity or evidence supporting the free-energy principle and predictive coding as overarching, unifying theories of the brain.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The infant cannot have a priori knowledge of their appearance.
“Given that the infant cannot have a priori knowledge of their appearance, the infant encountering a mirror for the first time must succeed in matching their sensorimotor experience with the observed sensorimotor behavior of the object seen inside the mirror.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Surprising events in one sensory system can be explained away by more parsimonious information in another via convergence at multimodal nodes in the cortex.
“The free-energy principle highlights how surprising events in one sensory system can be explained away by more parsimonious information in another by the convergence of information at multimodal nodes in the cortex.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Pools of neurons that process evidence in favour of a particular model suppress the activity of neurons that process alternative models.
“Pools of neurons that process evidence in favour of a particular model suppress the activity of neurons that process alternative models.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Self-stimuli in any one domain activate portions of a sensory system which are also engaged when processing non-self stimuli.
“First, self-stimuli in any one domain will activate portions of a sensory system which are also engaged when processing non-self stimuli.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Self-stimuli presented in one modality engage multisensory areas involved in processing high-level empirical prior information about the stimulus being “self”.
“Second, self-stimuli presented in one modality will engage multisensory areas that are involved in processing high-level empirical prior information about the stimulus being “self” i.e. multisensory areas will be activated during self-recognition.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
When a self-stimulus leads to predictable sensory input, activity in response to the predicted stimulus is suppressed due to absence of prediction error.
“Third, when a self-stimulus leads to predictable sensory input, activity in response to the predicted stimulus will be suppressed due to the absence of prediction error.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Most of our sensations are caused by ourselves.
“In our examples, these prior beliefs reflect the fact that most of our sensations are caused by ourselves.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Illusory phenomena are a result of Bayes optimal inference.
“This treatment of illusions - in the context of self recognition - is entirely consistent with current understanding that illusory phenomena are a result of Bayes optimal inference.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Information is processed in the form of probability distributions which form the basis of prior beliefs before a sensory event and on which perceptual inferences are made after sensory stimulation.
“At the core of the free-energy is the concept that information is processed in the form of probability distributions which form the basis of prior beliefs before a sensory event and on which perceptual inferences are made after sensory stimulation.”
The paper relies on this without support.
There is anatomical evidence that multimodal areas play an important role in integrating information across systems to explain away bottom-up unimodal surprise.
“Whilst there is anatomical evidence to support the notion that multimodal areas may play an important role in integrating information across systems to explain away bottom-up unimodal surprise”
The paper relies on this without support.
There is little functional evidence for the role of multimodal areas in integrating information across systems.
“there is little functional evidence”
The paper relies on this without support.
There has not yet been a direct test of whether the likelihood of stimuli being accepted as part of one’s body is probabilistic, whether one’s own body is represented probabilistically as self and not deterministically, and whether recognition and ownership of others’ body parts are acquired during illusions in a manner that conforms to the predictive coding account.
“there has yet not been a direct test of whether the likelihood of stimuli being accepted as a part of one’s body is probabilistic in nature, whether one’s own body is represented probabilistically as “self” and not deterministically, and whether recognition and ownership of others’ body parts are acquired during illusions in a manner that conforms to our predictive coding account of plasticity in”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Minimization of prediction errors, such as those induced by multisensory conflicts during the RHI, will update posterior probabilities and, over time, can induce changes in self-related priors.
“This is compatible with PC inasmuch as minimization of prediction errors -such as those induced by multisensory conflicts during the RHI -will update the posterior probabilities and, over time, can induce changes in self-related priors [22].”
From Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self (2013) · cites this paper as [22]
Predictive Coding as a unifying theory of brain function provides a plausible framework for understanding the cognitive basis of self-recognition.
“However, a recent interest in Predictive Coding as a unifying theory of brain function has provided a plausible framework for understanding the cognitive basis of self-recognition [55].”
From Changing bodies changes minds: Owning another body affects social cognition (2015) · cites this paper as [55]
The self is a multimodal, hierarchical construct containing both low-level, bodily representations as well as higher level attitudes and beliefs.
“The self is a multimodal, hierarchical construct containing both low-level, bodily representations as well as higher level attitudes and beliefs.”
From Changing bodies changes minds: Owning another body affects social cognition (2015) · cites this paper as [55]
On the predictive coding account, one's body is processed in a probabilistic manner as the most likely to be 'me', given prior knowledge about our bodies and incoming sensory information.
“On this account, one's body is processed in a probabilistic manner as the most likely to be”
From Changing bodies changes minds: Owning another body affects social cognition (2015) · cites this paper as [55]
On a predictive coding account, these different levels of representation continuously interact, as prediction errors, when left unexplained at one level, need to be processed and eliminated at a higher level of the hierarchy.
“On a predictive coding account, these different levels of representation continuously interact [55,56], as prediction errors, when left unexplained at one level ,need to be processed and eliminated at a higher level of the hierarchy.”
From Changing bodies changes minds: Owning another body affects social cognition (2015) · cites this paper as [55]
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Four brain regions described as three
MinorThe functional-anatomy discussion names the TPJ, AI, IPS and IFG-four regions-but immediately refers to them as "the three regions."
“However, despite their functional discrepancies, the three regions are unified by the fact that none of them can be considered us processing unimodal sensory information”
“with the TPJ processing the confluence of visual information and bodily related information, the AI processing the confluence of emotional, interoceptive and motor information about the body, the IPS processing visuo-spatial information about somatosensory input to the body and the IFG processing the mappings between abstract rules and the body.”
Face explanation both declines and increases in likelihood
MinorIn the binocular-rivalry example, the paper says prediction errors reduce the likelihood that the input is a face, then says they update the alternative face model so that its likelihood increases. Both statements concern the face explanation for the same sensory input.
“The probability that the cause of the sensory input is an image of a face therefore declines as a result of the prediction error signals.”
“The alternative generative model (“face”) is updated and the likelihood that the cause of the sensory input is “face” increases.”
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“In the last couple of years, several proposals of ‘minimal’ selfmodel implementations under a predictive coding scheme have been advanced (Seth, 2013; Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2013; Limanowski, 2014; Apps and Tsakiris, 2014; Ishida et al., 2015; Allen and Friston, 2016).”
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Heartfelt imitation: high interoceptive awareness is linked to greater automatic imitation
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Self-citationLosing Ourselves: Active Inference, Depersonalization, and Meditation
Deane, G., Miller, M., & Wilkinson, S. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.539726 · Cited by 87 · see citing works
Why should any body have a self?
Hohwy, J., & Michael, J. (2017) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/fm4cr · Cited by 54 · see citing works
Predictive processing in cognitive robotics: A review
Ciria, A., Schillaci, G., Pezzulo, G., Hafner, V. V., & Lara, B. (2021) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/neco_a_01383 · Cited by 51 · see citing works
Expecting some action: predictive processing and the construction of conscious experience
Nave, K., Deane, G., Miller, M., & Clark, A. (2022) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-022-00644-y · Cited by 50 · see citing works
Marshall, A. C., Gentsch-Ebrahimzadeh, A., & Schütz-Bosbach, S. (2022) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2022.119011 · Cited by 36 · see citing works
Predictive codes of interoception, emotion, and the self.
Sel, A. (2014) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00189 · Cited by 26 · see citing works
What can body ownership illusions tell us about minimal phenomenal selfhood?
Limanowski, J. (2014) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2014.00946 · Cited by 25 · see citing works
Interpersonal Motor Interactions Shape Multisensory Representations of the Peripersonal Space
Fanghella, M., Era, V., & Candidi, M. (2021) · Brain Sciences · doi:10.3390/brainsci11020255 · Cited by 22 · see citing works
- Authors
- Apps, M. A. J., & Tsakiris, M.
- Affiliations
- University of London (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Apps, Matthew A.J.
- ORCID
- Apps, Matthew A.J.
- Venue
- Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2014-04
- Volume
- 41
- Pages
- 85-97
- ISSN
- 0149-7634 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC3848896
- OpenAlex
- W1994259251
- Semantic Scholar
- a2132d080b2aaa971f8d93388c10e056f3d9147c
- Cited by
- 514
- References
- 173
- Citations by year
- 2026: 28 · 2025: 43 · 2024: 42 · 2023: 71 · 2022: 28 · 2021: 60 · 2020: 43 · 2019: 47 · 2018: 44 · 2017: 29 · 2016: 24 · 2015: 30 · 2014: 15 · 2013: 10
- FWCI
- 2.24
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Locations
- Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (acceptedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- University of Birmingham Research Portal (University of Birmingham) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- European Research Council (ERC-2010-StG-262853)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Face Recognition and Perception
- Keywords
- self-recognition, self-awareness, free energy principle, predictive coding, Bayesian brain, representation of the body, top-down processing, hierarchical integration, multimodal integration, cortical function
- MeSH terms
- Animals, Bayes Theorem, Brain, Humans, Illusions, Models, Neurological, Perception, Self Concept, Recognition, Psychology
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-09.
Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-09.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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