The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Incentives and Careers in Organizations
Open accessAbstract
This paper surveys two related pieces of the labor-economics literature: incentive pay and careers in organizations. In the discussion of incentives, I first summarize theory and evidence related to the classic agency model, which emphasizes the tradeoff between insurance and incentives. I then offer econometric and case-study evidence suggesting that this classic model ignores several crucial issues and sketch new models that begin to analyze these issues. In the discussion of careers in organizations, I begin by summarizing evidence on wages and positions using panel data within firms. This evidence is sparse and far-flung (drawn from industrial relations, organizational behavior and sociology, as well as from labor economics); I identify ten basic questions that merit more systematic investigation. Turning to theory, I describe building-block models that address one or a few pieces of evidence but focus on more recent models that address broad patterns of evidence.
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Citations
Cites
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Dixit, A. (2002) · The Journal of Human Resources · doi:10.2307/3069614 · Cited by 1,104
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Hauser, J., Tellis, G. J., & Griffin, A. (2006) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.1050.0144 · Cited by 1,077
Performance Pay and Wage Inequality*
Lemieux, T., MacLeod, W. B., & Parent, D. (2009) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2009.124.1.1 · Cited by 549
The Promise and Pitfalls of Using Imprecise School Accountability Measures
Kane, T. J., & Staiger, D. O. (2002) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/089533002320950993 · Cited by 503
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Bititci, U. S., Turner, U., & Begemann, C. (2000) · International Journal of Operations & Production Management · doi:10.1108/01443570010321676 · Cited by 436
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Incentives Between Firms (and Within)
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Self-citationAn Assessment of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation on Task Performance in Crowdsourcing Markets
Rogstadius, J., Kostakos, V., Kittur, A., Smus, B., Laredo, J., & Vukovic, M. (2021) · Proceedings of the International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media · doi:10.1609/icwsm.v5i1.14105 · Cited by 299
Incentives and Prosocial Behavior
Bénabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2005) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w11535 · Cited by 264
Metrics: You are what you measure!
Hauser, J., & Katz, G. (1998) · European Management Journal · doi:10.1016/s0263-2373(98)00029-2 · Cited by 228
Benabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2011) · doi:10.3386/w17579 · Cited by 227
Metadata
- Authors
- Gibbons, R.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 1996-08
- OpenAlex
- W3124160272
- Cited by
- 195
- References
- 5
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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