A Neural Network Framework for Cognitive Bias
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 42 of the 42 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Human decision-making shows systematic simplifications and deviations from the tenets of rationality ('heuristics') that may lead to suboptimal decisional outcomes ('cognitive biases'). There are currently three prevailing theoretical perspectives on the origin of heuristics and cognitive biases: a cognitive-psychological, an ecological and an evolutionary perspective. However, these perspectives are mainly descriptive and none of them provides an overall explanatory framework for the underlying mechanisms of cognitive biases. To enhance our understanding of cognitive heuristics and biases we propose a neural network framework for cognitive biases, which explains why our brain systematically tends to default to heuristic ('Type 1') decision making. We argue that many cognitive biases arise from intrinsic brain mechanisms that are fundamental for the working of biological neural networks. To substantiate our viewpoint, we discern and explain four basic neural network principles: (1) Association, (2) Compatibility, (3) Retainment, and (4) Focus. These principles are inherent to (all) neural networks which were originally optimized to perform concrete biological, perceptual, and motor functions. They form the basis for our inclinations to associate and combine (unrelated) information, to prioritize information that is compatible with our present state (such as knowledge, opinions, and expectations), to retain given information that sometimes could better be ignored, and to focus on dominant information while ignoring relevant information that is not directly activated. The supposed mechanisms are complementary and not mutually exclusive. For different cognitive biases they may all contribute in varying degrees to distortion of information. The present viewpoint not only complements the earlier three viewpoints, but also provides a unifying and binding framework for many cognitive bias phenomena.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 · Cited by 28,810
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7455683 · Cited by 18,497 · cited 1×
“Why do we make risk-averse choices if the expected outcome is positive, but make risk-seeking choices to avoid negative outcomes, i.e., the pseudo-certainty effect (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981b; Hardman, 2009).”
BackgroundA BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF RATIONAL CHOICE
Simon, H. A. (1955) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884852 · Cited by 15,877
Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(73)90033-9 · Cited by 9,984 · cited 2×
“This is the tendency to judge the frequency, importance or likelihood of an event by the ease with which relevant instances come to mind, which is highly determined by their imaginability or retrievability (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973, 1974).”
BackgroundBaddeley, A. D., & Hitch, G. (1974) · Psychology of Learning and Motivation · doi:10.1016/s0079-7421(08)60452-1 · Cited by 9,860
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1984) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.39.4.341 · Cited by 6,544
The information capacity of the human motor system in controlling the amplitude of movement.
Fitts, P. M. (1954) · Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0055392 · Cited by 6,466 · cited 1×
“This tendency may originate from the fact that proportionality and relative differences dominate in human perception (e.g., the Weber–Fechner Law: Fechner, 1860 or Fitts’ law: Fitts, 1954).”
BackgroundOn the psychology of prediction.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1973) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0034747 · Cited by 6,202 · cited 4×
“…we tend to use simple heuristics in complex, unfamiliar, uncertain, and/or time-constrained situations because we can only process a limited amount of the available information (‘limited-’ or ‘bounded rationality’: Simon, 1955; Kahneman, 1973; Norman and Bobrow, 1975; Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialInsensitivity to future consequences following damage to human prefrontal cortex
Bechara, A., Damasio, A. R., Damasio, H., & Anderson, S. W. (1994) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(94)90018-3 · Cited by 6,128
A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality.
Kahneman, D. (2003) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.58.9.697 · Cited by 5,540
Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2008) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093629 · Cited by 5,137
Broadbent, D. E. (1958) · doi:10.1037/10037-000 · Cited by 4,337
Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate
Evans, J. S. B. T., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691612460685 · Cited by 4,271 · cited 2×
“The slower deliberate processes rely on time-and resource-consuming serial operations on the available data and are constrained by the limited capacity of the central working memory (Baddeley and Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, 1986; Evans and Stanovich, 2013).”
The Intuitive Psychologist And His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process
Ross, L. (1977) · Advances in Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/s0065-2601(08)60357-3 · Cited by 4,170
Gigerenzer, G., & Gaissmaier, W. (2011) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145346 · Cited by 4,037
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.90.4.293 · Cited by 3,991
Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261737 · Cited by 3,194
Bargh, J. A., Chen, M., & Burrows, L. (1996) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.71.2.230 · Cited by 2,736
Conditions for intuitive expertise: A failure to disagree.
Kahneman, D., & Klein, G. (2009) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/a0016755 · Cited by 2,443 · cited 2×
“The cognitive-psychological (or heuristics and biases) perspective (Evans, 2008; Kahneman and Klein, 2009) attributes cognitive biases to limitations in the available data and in the human information processing capacity (Simon, 1955; Broadbent, 1958; Kahneman, 1973, 2003; Norman and Bobrow, 1975).”
BackgroundOn data-limited and resource-limited processes
Norman, D. A., & Bobrow, D. G. (1975) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(75)90004-3 · Cited by 2,403 · cited 2×
“…we tend to use simple heuristics in complex, unfamiliar, uncertain, and/or time-constrained situations because we can only process a limited amount of the available information (‘limited-’ or ‘bounded rationality’: Simon, 1955; Kahneman, 1973; Norman and Bobrow, 1975; Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002).”
BackgroundMethodWhy do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory
Mercier, H., & Sperber, D. (2011) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x10000968 · Cited by 2,254
Network hubs in the human brain
van den Heuvel, M. P., & Sporns, O. (2013) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.09.012 · Cited by 2,123
Abbott, L. F., & Regehr, W. G. (2004) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature03010 · Cited by 1,684
Skinner, B. F. (1948) · Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0055873 · Cited by 1,456 · cited 3×
“…are the control illusion (people tend to overestimate the degree to which they are in control (Langer, 1975; Matute et al., 2015), superstition (Skinner, 1948; Risen, 2015), spurious causality (seeing causality in unconnected correlations), the conjunction fallacy (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983),…”
BackgroundModels of ecological rationality: The recognition heuristic.
Goldstein, D. G., & Gigerenzer, G. (2002) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.109.1.75 · Cited by 1,352 · cited 1×
“The ecological perspective points out that heuristics can be quite effective in practical and natural situations (Gigerenzer, 2000; Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2010).”
BackgroundThe proactive brain: using analogies and associations to generate predictions
Bar, M. (2007) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2007.05.005 · Cited by 1,144
Survivorship Bias in Performance Studies
Brown, S. J., Goetzmann, W., Ibbotson, R. G., & Ross, S. A. (1992) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/5.4.553 · Cited by 1,121
Familiarity and Its Impact on Consumer Decision Biases and Heuristics
Park, C. W., & Lessig, V. P. (1981) · Journal of Consumer Research · doi:10.1086/208859 · Cited by 962
Yang, Y., & Raine, A. (2009) · Psychiatry Research: Neuroimaging · doi:10.1016/j.pscychresns.2009.03.012 · Cited by 888
Outcome Bias in Decision Evaluation
Baron, J., & Hershey, J. C. (1988) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.54.4.569 · Cited by 873 · cited 1×
“…perceive events as inevitable or more likely once they have occurred: Hoffrage et al., 2000; Roese and Vohs, 2012), and the outcome bias (the perceived quality of a decision is based on its outcome rather than on the – mostly less obvious – factors that led to the decision: Baron and Hershey, 1988).”
BackgroundEvidential impact of base rates
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1982) · Judgment under Uncertainty · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511809477.011 · Cited by 591 · cited 3×
“Why do we make risk-averse choices if the expected outcome is positive, but make risk-seeking choices to avoid negative outcomes, i.e., the pseudo-certainty effect (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981b; Hardman, 2009).”
BackgroundThe sunk cost and Concorde effects: Are humans less rational than lower animals?
Arkes, H. R., & Ayton, P. (1999) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.125.5.591 · Cited by 554 · cited 1×
“…perspective of lesser-informed people: Kennedy, 1995), the familiarity heuristic (familiar items are favored over unfamiliar ones: Park and Lessig, 1981) and the sunk-cost fallacy (tendency to consistently continue a chosen course with negative outcomes rather than alter it: Arkes and Ayton, 1999).”
BackgroundHow Basic Are Behavioral Biases? Evidence from Capuchin Monkey Trading Behavior
Chen, M. K., Lakshminarayanan, V., & Santos, L. R. (2006) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/503550 · Cited by 472 · cited 2×
“When heuristics and biases emerge from the basic characteristics of biological neural networks, it is not very surprising that comparable cognitive phenomena are observed in animal behavior (e.g., Dawkins and Brockmann, 1980; Chen et al., 2006; Lakshminaryanan et al., 2008).”
BackgroundRoese, N. J., & Vohs, K. D. (2012) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691612454303 · Cited by 457 · cited 1×
“…effect, the hindsight bias (the tendency to erroneously perceive events as inevitable or more likely once they have occurred: Hoffrage et al., 2000; Roese and Vohs, 2012), and the outcome bias (the perceived quality of a decision is based on its outcome rather than on the – mostly less obvious –…”
BackgroundFellows, L. K., & Farah, M. J. (2007) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/bhl176 · Cited by 337
Shafir, E., & LeBoeuf, R. A. (2002) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.53.100901.135213 · Cited by 317
Fundamental contribution by the basolateral amygdala to different forms of decision making
Ghods-Sharifi, S., St. Onge, J. R., & Floresco, S. B. (2009) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.0315-09.2009 · Cited by 257
Mapping mental function to brain structure: how can cognitive neuroimaging succeed?
Poldrack, R. A. (2010) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691610388777 · Cited by 238
The anchoring bias reflects rational use of cognitive resources
Lieder, F., Griffiths, T. L., M. Huys, Q. J., & Goodman, N. D. (2018) · Psychonomic Bulletin & Review · doi:10.3758/s13423-017-1286-8 · Cited by 230 · cited 1×
“If alternative normative systems are not available or arbitrary (Cohen, 1981; Dennett, 1989) there is little ground for deriving unifying laws of cognition from a set of basic axioms (Lieder et al., 2017).”
BackgroundAdaptive rationality: an evolutionary perspective on cognitive bias
Haselton, M. G., Bryant, G. A., Wilke, A., Frederick, D. A., Galperin, A., Frankenhuis, W. E., & Moore, T. (2009) · Social Cognition · doi:10.1521/soco.2009.27.5.733 · Cited by 222 · cited 1×
“The evolutionary perspective attributes cognitive biases to a mismatch between evolutionarily developed heuristics (‘evolutionary rationality’: Haselton et al., 2009) and the current context or environment (Tooby and Cosmides, 2005).”
BackgroundRisen, J. L. (2016) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/rev0000017 · Cited by 221 · cited 5×
“…illusion (people tend to overestimate the degree to which they are in control (Langer, 1975; Matute et al., 2015), superstition (Skinner, 1948; Risen, 2015), spurious causality (seeing causality in unconnected correlations), the conjunction fallacy (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983), the…”
BackgroundInfluentialBrains seek patterns in coincidences
Beitman, B. D. (2009) · Psychiatric Annals · doi:10.3928/00485713-20090421-02 · Cited by 27
Cited by
Human- versus Artificial Intelligence
Korteling, J. E. (., van de Boer-Visschedijk, G. C., Blankendaal, R. A. M., Boonekamp, R. C., & Eikelboom, A. R. (2021) · Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.3389/frai.2021.622364 · Cited by 619
“…they are equipped with a completely different operating system (digital vs biological) and with correspondingly different cognitive qualities and abilities than biological creatures, like humans and other animals (Moravec, 1988; Klein et al., 2004; Korteling et al., 2018a; Shneiderman, 2020a).”
BackgroundSelf-citationCognitive bias and how to improve sustainable decision making
Korteling, J. E. (., Paradies, G. L., & Sassen-van Meer, J. P. (2023) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1129835 · Cited by 143
“Our cognitive capacities to pick up and understand all this technical, statistical, and scientific information are inherently limited (e.g., Engler et al., 2018; Korteling et al., 2018).”
InfluentialSelf-citation(Hans) Korteling, J. E., & Toet, A. (2022) · Encyclopedia of Behavioral Neuroscience, 2nd edition · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-809324-5.24105-9 · Cited by 65
Self-citation(2020) · doi:10.18653/v1/2020.findings-emnlp.112 · Cited by 32
Why we need biased AI: How including cognitive biases can enhance AI systems
Hagendorff, T., & Fabi, S. (2024) · Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1080/0952813x.2023.2178517 · Cited by 20
“Heuristics are acquired through evolution and experience and are based on the environmental regularities in which humans routinely interact (Korteling et al., 2018).”
Metadata
- Authors
- Korteling, J. E., Brouwer, A.-M., & Toet, A.
- Venue
- Frontiers in Psychology
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2018-09-03
- Volume
- 9
- Pages
- 1561-1561
- ISSN
- 1664-1078 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2890555866
- Cited by
- 127
- References
- 42
- FWCI
- 6.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.