Context, attention, and the switch between habit and goal-direction in behavior

May combine two claims.

Habit develops when the cue always predicts the response will be reinforced, but not when the cue is associated with a reinforcer unpredictably on a random half of the trials.

“Habit develops when the cue always predicts the response will be reinforced, but not when the cue is associated with a reinforcer unpredictably on a random half of the trials.”

• cites Thrailkill et al., 2018Not checked yet

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• cites Thrailkill et al., 2021Not checked yet

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May combine two claims.

In Trask et al. (2020), interleaved R2 training could be reinforced by a different reinforcer, and R2 was not necessary; presenting reinforcers freely during sessions in Context B was enough to convert a habitual R1 back to action.

“Additional experiments found that the interleaved training of R2 could be reinforced by a different reinforcer (sucrose when grain had been trained or grain when sucrose had been trained). And it turned out that R2 was not necessary; all we needed to do was present the reinforcers freely (not contingent on any response) during the sessions in Context B.”

• cites Trask et al., 2020 sourceNot checked yet

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May combine two claims.

In a discriminated operant procedure, habit developed when the reinforcer was predictably delivered in every S, but not when it was unpredictably delivered in only half of them.

“In a discriminated operant procedure, habit developed when the reinforcer was predictably delivered in every S, but not when it was unpredictably delivered in only half of them.”

• cites Thrailkill et al., 2018, Experiment 4Not checked yet

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May combine two claims.

Sixty-six sessions involved roughly 1,054 pairings of response and reinforcer, whereas free-operant methods can create habit in about 360.

“Sixty-six sessions was a lot of training by most standards – it involved roughly 1,054 pairings of the response and reinforcer, whereas free-operant methods can create habit in about 360”

• cites Thrailkill & Bouton, 2015Not checked yet

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May combine two claims.

In Shipman et al. (2018), inactivation of prelimbic cortex suppressed moderately trained but not extensively trained instrumental behavior, and inactivation of infralimbic cortex suppressed the extensively trained but not moderately trained response.

“We found that inactivation of the prelimbic cortex suppressed moderately trained (but not extensively trained) instrumental behavior, and that inactivation of infralimbic cortex suppressed the extensively trained (but not moderately trained) response.”

• cites Shipman et al., 2018 sourceNot checked yet

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May combine two claims.

In Trask et al. (2020), when R1 was trained without interleaved R2 training, or when R2 training began after R1 training had finished, reinforcer devaluation tests determined that R1 was a habit.

“When R1 was trained the same way but without the interleaved R2 training, or when R2 training began after R1 training had finished, reinforcer devaluation tests determined that R1 was indeed a habit.”

• cites Trask et al., 2020 sourceNot checked yet

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May combine two claims.

With a longer 8-min tone on RI-30, habit developed after extended training; rats with taste aversion continued to lever press despite aversion.

“When we trained rats with a longer 8-min, rather than a 30-s, tone stimulus setting the occasion for lever pressing on the RI-30 schedule, habit did develop after extended training; rats that subsequently acquired a taste aversion to the pellet continued to lever press during the test despite their aversion to the reinforcer”

• cites Thrailkill et al., 2018, Experiments 2 and 3Not checked yet

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May combine two claims.

Effects of reinforcer devaluation in Shipman et al. (2018) suggested that both the moderately trained R2 and extensively trained R1 were goal-directed actions.

“But there was a rub: The effects of reinforcer devaluation suggested that both the moderately trained R2 and extensively trained R1 were goal-directed actions.”

• cites Shipman et al., 2018 sourceNot checked yet

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May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.

In Thrailkill et al. (2021), the CRF procedure produced habit, whereas PRF maintained goal-direction, with a brief 6-s tone.

“As Thrailkill et al. (2018) had found with stimuli that were five times as long and a reinforcement schedule that was 1/10 as rich, the CRF procedure produced habit, whereas PRF maintained goal-direction.”

• cites Thrailkill et al., 2021Not checked yet

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May combine two claims.

With a lever-insertion stimulus, which may be more salient, habit develops even when the reinforcer is uncertain, perhaps because the stimulus and the strength of its presumed prediction of the reinforcer are less decremented by non-reinforced trials.

“With a lever-insertion stimulus, which may be more salient, habit does develop even when the reinforcer is uncertain, perhaps because the stimulus (and the strength of its presumed prediction of the reinforcer) is less decremented by the non-reinforced trials”

• cites Thrailkill et al., 2021Not checked yet

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May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.

With as many as 66 sessions of discriminated operant training, devaluing the reinforcer caused rats to lever press less in extinction tests, indicating the behavior was still a goal-directed action.

“Thus, with as many as 66 sessions, the behavior was still a goal-directed action.”

• cites Thrailkill et al., 2018Not checked yet

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May combine two claims.

With a standard tone stimulus, habit develops if the tone predicts that a reinforcer will occur whenever it is presented, but not when reinforcer delivery is uncertain.

“With a standard tone stimulus, habit develops if the tone predicts that a reinforcer will occur whenever it is presented, but not when reinforcer delivery is uncertain”

• cites Thrailkill et al., 2018Not checked yet

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• cites Thrailkill et al., 2021Not checked yet

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May combine two claims.

In Steinfeld and Bouton (2020), after extinction in Context B, responding renewed in original training Context A; the response trained as an action renewed as action and the response trained as a habit renewed as a habit.

“In either case, responding returned (was “renewed”), and by comparing the groups for which the pellets had been devalued or not, we could see that the response that had been trained as an action renewed as action and the response trained as a habit renewed as a habit.”

• cites Steinfeld & Bouton, 2020Not checked yet

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

With an equal number of response-reinforcer pairings, habit develops when the reinforcers are predictable, and not when they are not.

“it is also not clear whether existing reinforcement learning theories can accommodate the evidence that, with an equal number of response-reinforcer pairings, habit develops when the reinforcers are predictable, and not when they are not (Thrailkill et al., 2018, 2021).”

• cites Thrailkill et al., 2018, 2021Not checked yet

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Habits develop more rapidly with behaviors reinforced on interval as opposed to ratio schedules.

“habits develop more rapidly with behaviors reinforced on interval as opposed to ratio schedules”

• cites Dickinson et al., 1983 sourceNot checked yet

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May combine two claims.

Habits are not permanent; goal-direction can be restored by environmental manipulations including exposure to unexpected reinforcers or context change.

“Other results suggest that habits are not permanent, and that goal-direction can be restored by several environmental manipulations, including exposure to unexpected reinforcers or context change.”

May combine two claims.

Extinction weakens instrumental responding but does not erase the original learning; instead it involves context-specific inhibition of the response.

“We and others have shown that extinction weakens instrumental responding, but does not erase the original learning. Instead, extinction involves a form of context-specific inhibition (rather than unlearning) of the response”

• cites Bouton, 1993 sourceNot checked yet

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• cites Bouton, 2019 sourceNot checked yet

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• cites Bouton, Maren, & McNally, 2021bNot checked yet

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Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

According to the Pearce-Hall model, attention to cues that predict a reinforcer should decline as the reinforcer becomes better predicted during extended conditioning.

“according to at least one venerable theory of associative learning, the Pearce-Hall model of Pavlovian learning (Pearce & Hall, 1980), attention paid to cues that predict a reinforcer should decline as the reinforcer becomes better and better predicted during extended conditioning.”

• cites Pearce & Hall, 1980 sourceNot checked yet

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Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

The attentional perspective holds that a behavior becomes a habit once you are not attending to it, and suggests that a behavior's status as habit or action might change as attention changes.

“On the other hand, the attentional perspective, which holds that a behavior becomes a habit once you aren’t attending to it, suggests more flexibility: A behavior’s status as habit or action might in principle change as attention changes.”

May combine two claims.

When the reinforcer is imperfectly predicted by S, attention to the predictor and the behavior itself may be maintained, which may keep a discriminated operant as goal-directed action.

“Thus, when the reinforcer is imperfectly predicted by S, we might pay more attention to both the predictor and the behavior itself. That may be the reason why a discriminated operant that is reinforced during only some of the S presentations may keep the status of goal-directed action.”

May combine two claims.

A visual cue with an uncertain 50% relation to an outcome maintains orienting behavior, whereas a cue with a perfect 100% relation to an outcome does not.

“The results of experiments in rats (e.g., Kaye & Pearce, 1984; Wilson et al., 1992) and humans (Hogarth et al., 2008) suggest that a visual cue that has an uncertain (50%) relation to an outcome maintains orienting behavior, whereas a cue that has a perfect (100%) relation to an outcome does not.”

• cites Kaye & Pearce, 1984Not checked yet

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• cites Wilson et al., 1992Not checked yet

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• cites Hogarth et al., 2008 sourceNot checked yet

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May combine two claims.

The context can be the stimulus controlling habits learned with free-operant methods; testing lever pressing in a different context decreases habit strength.

“We know that the “context” (e.g., the Skinner box itself) can be the stimulus (S) that controls habits learned with free-operant methods (Thrailkill & Bouton, 2015)– when we test lever pressing in a different context, the habit decreases in strength.”

• cites Thrailkill & Bouton, 2015Not checked yet

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May combine two claims.

Although a little S-R learning may occur early during instrumental training, the action-to-habit transition seems to fit a general organizing principle of associative learning.

“Although a little S-R learning may occur early during instrumental training (e.g., Thrailkill & Bouton, 2015), the action➔habit transition seems to fit a general organizing principle of associative learning.”

• cites Thrailkill & Bouton, 2015Not checked yet

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May combine two claims.

The picture from studies of action-to-habit conversion is one of flexibility rather than rigidity; habits are not fixed or confining.

“The picture that emerges in our studies of action➔habit conversion is one of flexibility rather than rigidity. Habits are not really fixed or confining.”

May combine two claims.

After action-to-habit conversion, goal-direction transfers well across contexts (from A to C), whereas habit does not transfer as effectively from B to C.

“The simplest interpretation of these results after action➔habit conversion is that goal-direction transfers well across contexts (i.e., from A to C), whereas habit does not transfer as effectively from B to C.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The arbitrator selects between model-based and model-free systems according to criteria such as accuracy or prediction error or prevailing rate of reinforcement.

“Given the tradeoff, the arbitrator selects between the two systems according to various criteria, such as the accuracy or prediction error connected with each (Daw et al., 2005; Lee et al., 2014) or the prevailing rate of reinforcement (Dezfouli et al., 2014).”

• cites Daw et al., 2005 sourceNot checked yet

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• cites Lee et al., 2014 sourceNot checked yet

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• cites Dezfouli et al., 2014 sourceNot checked yet

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May combine two claims.

The action-to-habit conversion and context-dependent interference by habit allow the organism to switch between action and habit with changes in context.

“Although actions seem less affected by context change than habits are, the action➔habit conversion and context-dependent interference by habit allows the organism to switch between the two with changes in context (see below).”

May combine two claims.

In the authors' animals and with their methods, habit learning does not seem permanent, but like extinction, interferes with goal-direction in a context-specific way.

“In our animals and with our methods, habit learning does not seem permanent, but like extinction, interferes with goal-direction in a context-specific way.”

May combine two claims.

Habits are context-specific, but actions are not.

“Habits are context-specific, but actions are not (see also Thrailkill & Bouton, 2015).”

• cites Thrailkill & Bouton, 2015Not checked yet

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Other frameworks that emphasize multiple parallel memory systems in the brain allow behavioral flexibility.

“Other frameworks that emphasize multiple parallel memory systems in the brain (e.g., Gruber & McDonald, 2012; McDonald & White, 1993; White, 1996) also allow behavioral flexibility.”

• cites Gruber & McDonald, 2012 sourceNot checked yet

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• cites McDonald & White, 1993 sourceNot checked yet

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• cites White, 1996 sourceNot checked yet

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

When a behavior is in habit mode, it exploits the tried and true; when it is in action mode, it can explore new opportunities or connections.

“When a behavior is in habit mode, it exploits the tried and true; when it is in action mode, it can presumably explore new opportunities or connections (cf. Beeseley et al., 2015)”

• cites Beeseley et al., 2015 sourceNot checked yet

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Reinforcement learning approaches have often accepted the coexistence of action and habit systems and allowed one or the other to be selected by a hypothetical arbitrator for behavioral control.

“Approaches to action and habit in the reinforcement learning tradition (e.g., Sutton & Barto, 1998) have also often accepted the coexistence of action and habit systems and allowed one or the other to be selected by a hypothetical “arbitrator” for behavioral control (e.g.,Daw et al., 2005 ; Lee et al., 2014).”

• cites Sutton & Barto, 1998Not checked yet

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• cites Daw et al., 2005 sourceNot checked yet

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• cites Lee et al., 2014 sourceNot checked yet

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May combine two claims.

In action-to-habit conversion, like conditioning-to-extinction or conditioning-to-punishment conversion, the first thing learned (goal-directed action) remains at least partially intact after second learning and transfers relatively well across contexts, whereas the second thing learned (habit) does not.

“The parallel with habit learning is apparent: In the action➔habit conversion, like the conditioning➔extinction (or conditioning➔punishment) conversion, the first-thing learned (goal-directed action) remains at least partially intact after second learning. It also transfers relatively well across contexts. In contrast, the second-thing learned (habit) does not.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Model-based actions are considered rich but computationally expensive, while model-free habits may be efficient but inflexible.

“Actions or behaviors based on a “model-based” system (which encodes representations of all the behavior’s possible consequences) are considered rich but computationally expensive, while habits or behaviors based on a “model-free” system (which encodes only the behavior’s “cached” or average value) may be efficient but inflexible.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Dual-process or associative-cybernetic approaches of Dickinson and Balleine and colleagues posit separate and co-existing action and habit memories.

“It should be noted that the dual-process or “associative-cybernetic” approaches of Dickinson and Balleine and colleagues (e.g., Balleine & Ostlund, 2007; de Wit & Dickinson, 2009; Dickinson, 2012) do posit separate and co-existing action and habit memories.”

• cites Balleine & Ostlund, 2007 sourceNot checked yet

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• cites de Wit & Dickinson, 2009 sourceNot checked yet

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• cites Dickinson, 2012 sourceNot checked yet

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

The development of a habit and automaticity is theoretically functional because it preserves limited space in working memory for processing other things.

“As noted earlier, the development of a habit and automaticity is theoretically functional because it preserves limited space in working memory for processing other things.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

On the attention-modulation account, the switch back to R-O after unexpected reinforcers or context change would be created by merely increasing attention to R and the consequent associative retrieval of O.

“On this account, the switch back to R-O after unexpected reinforcers or context change (Bouton et al., 2020; Steinfeld & Bouton, 2021; Trask et al., 2020) would be created by merely increasing attention to R (and the consequent associative retrieval of O).”

• cites Bouton et al., 2020 sourceNot checked yet

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• cites Steinfeld & Bouton, 2021 sourceNot checked yet

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• cites Trask et al., 2020 sourceNot checked yet

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Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The attention explanation is based on Pearce and Hall's (1980) theory of attention and its role in Pavlovian learning.

“The attention explanation given above is based on a well-known theory of attention and its role in Pavlovian learning (Pearce & Hall, 1980).”

• cites Pearce & Hall, 1980 sourceNot checked yet

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

The idea that the reinforcer must be predictable in order to create habit seems to lie outside the scope of existing habit theories.

“The other idea that the reinforcer must be predictable in order to create habit (Thrailkill et al., 2018, 2021) seems to lie outside the scope of existing habit theories.”

• cites Thrailkill et al., 2018, 2021Not checked yet

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May combine two claims.

Mackintosh's attention rule is consistent with a number of results, and contemporary approaches to attention and learning suppose that both the Mackintosh and Pearce-Hall rules can play a role in any situation.

“Mackintosh’s attention rule is consistent with a number of results (e.g., Le Pelley et al., 2016; Pearce & Mackintosh, 2010), and contemporary approaches to attention and learning now suppose that both the Mackintosh and Pearce-Hall rules can play a role in any situation (e.g., Le Pelley, 2004; Pearce & Mackintosh, 2010; see Chao et al., 2021, for recent discussion).”

• cites Le Pelley et al., 2016 sourceNot checked yet

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• cites Pearce & Mackintosh, 2010Not checked yet

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• cites Le Pelley, 2004 sourceNot checked yet

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May combine two claims.

Instead of erasing R-O, S-R exists along with it, coded by a separate circuit in the brain.

“However, instead of erasing R-O, S-R exists along with it, coded by a separate circuit in the brain (e.g., Balleine, 2019; Balleine & O'Doherty, 2010; Gruber & McDonald, 2012; Robbins et al., 2019).”

• cites Balleine, 2019Not checked yet

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• cites Balleine & O'Doherty, 2010 sourceNot checked yet

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• cites Gruber & McDonald, 2012 sourceNot checked yet

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Perhaps the habit context mostly modulates attention to the response instead of switching between S-R and R-O.

“Perhaps the habit context mostly modulates attention to the response instead of switching between S-R and R-O.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Surprising reinforcers may provide a form of context change to activate action after habit learning.

“To explain why the presentation of surprising reinforcers also seems to activate action after habit learning (Bouton et al., 2020; Trask et al., 2020), we could thus note that they may provide a form of context change (e.g., Bouton et al., 2021b).”

• cites Bouton et al., 2020 sourceNot checked yet

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• cites Trask et al., 2020 sourceNot checked yet

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• cites Bouton et al., 2021bNot checked yet

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May combine two claims.

In the habit context, the habit association is active and action is suppressed; outside the habit context, S-R is not activated and goal-direction (R-O) is expressed.

“The result of this simple mechanism is that in the habit context, the habit association is active and action is suppressed, whereas outside the habit context, S-R is not activated, and goal-direction(R-O) is expressed.”

May combine two claims.

In the authors' experiments, attention to the response was theoretically maintained by making the reinforcer uncertain from trial to trial; this maintained goal-direction and prevented habit.

“In our experiments (Thrailkill et al., 2018, 2021), attention to the response was theoretically maintained by making the reinforcer uncertain from trial to trial; this maintained goal-direction and prevented habit.”

• cites Thrailkill et al., 2018, 2021Not checked yet

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Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Mackintosh (1975) argued that attention increases (rather than decreases) to the best predictor of a reinforcer.

“In a different account of attention and learning, Mackintosh (1975) argued that attention increases (rather than decreases) to the best predictor of a reinforcer.”

• cites Mackintosh (1975) sourceNot checked yet

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May combine two claims.

Extended practice normally decreases attention to the response; when this occurs, habit is created, and the response can be elicited by S without the organism processing O.

“Extended practice will thus normally decrease attention to the response; when this occurs, habit is created, and the response can be elicited by S without the organism processing O.”

May combine two claims.

The Pearce-Hall rule predicts that attention to the response will decline with ratio schedules, and thus incorrectly implies habit.

“The Pearce-Hall rule predicts that attention to the response will decline – and thus incorrectly implies habit.”

May combine two claims.

Outcome uncertainty maintains attention to behavior and therefore action, whereas outcome predictability reduces it and creates habit.

“Outcome uncertainty maintains attention to behavior and therefore action, whereas outcome predictability reduces it and creates habit.6”

May combine two claims.

Habit is not a fixed endpoint; its acquisition does not erase R-O and make it permanently unavailable.

“Habit is not a fixed endpoint; its acquisition does not erase R-O and make it permanently unavailable.”

May combine two claims.

The research reviewed emphasizes that goal-direction is not erased during habit learning, and that it can be recovered under the right conditions.

“But the research reviewed here emphasizes that goal-direction is not erased during habit learning, and that it can be recovered under the right conditions.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The range of cues that can constitute context is arguably very wide, potentially including time, drug states, deprivation and stress states, and other behaviors.

“It is worth noting that the range of cues that can constitute context is arguably very wide, potentially including time, drug states, deprivation and stress states, and other behaviors among other things (e.g., Bouton, 2019; Bouton et al., 2021a, b).”

• cites Bouton, 2019 sourceNot checked yet

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• cites Bouton et al., 2021a, bNot checked yet

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Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The Rescorla-Wagner model and its extensions by Wagner emphasize that the reinforcer becomes less surprising and less processed as classical conditioning approaches asymptote.

“For example, the Rescorla-Wagner model (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) and its extensions by Wagner (e.g., Wagner, 1978, 1981, 2008; Wagner & Brandon, 1989) emphasize that the reinforcer becomes less surprising and less processed as classical conditioning approaches asymptote.”

• cites Rescorla & Wagner, 1972Not checked yet

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• cites Wagner, 1978, 1981, 2008Not checked yet

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• cites Wagner & Brandon, 1989Not checked yet

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May combine two claims.

Activation of S-R is context-dependent, either because the context itself provides the S associated with R, or because the context controls the second thing learned.

“Crucially, the activation of S-R is context-dependent, either because the context itself provides the S associated with R, or because (as we have seen in other retroactive interference paradigms) the context controls the second thing learned (e.g., Bouton, 1993; Nelson, 2002).”

• cites Bouton, 1993 sourceNot checked yet

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• cites Nelson, 2002 sourceNot checked yet

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May combine two claims.

With a ratio schedule, the higher the rate of responding, the higher the rate of reinforcement, and response rate is thus a good predictor of the reinforcer.

“With a ratio schedule, the higher the rate of responding, the higher the rate of reinforcement, and response rate is thus a good predictor of the reinforcer.”

May combine two claims.

If habits play a role in addiction, they may do so because the habit-action switch becomes sticky, making it difficult to switch back to goal-directed status once a habit is learned.

“If habits do play a role in addiction, they may do so because the habit-action switch becomes sticky (see also Balleine et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2014). As a consequence, once a habit is learned, it may be difficult to switch it back to goal-directed status.”

• cites Balleine et al., 2009 sourceNot checked yet

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• cites Lee et al., 2014 sourceNot checked yet

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Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

The organism will tune in a good predictor and tune out contemporaneous predictors that are not as good as the best one.

“Thus, if there is a good predictor, the organism will tune it in rather than tune it out. Crucially, the organism will also tune out contemporaneous predictors that are not as good as (or no better than) the best one.”

• cites Mackintosh (1975) sourceNot checked yet

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May combine two claims.

Although habit is eventually observed in instrumental learning, classically conditioned responding is still suppressed by reinforcer devaluation even after extensive training.

“Although things work this way in instrumental learning (i.e., habit is eventually observed), classically conditioned responding is still suppressed by reinforcer devaluation even after extensive training (e.g., Holland, 1990, 2005).”

• cites Holland, 1990, 2005Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

If an instrumental reinforcer were likewise less processed after asymptotic training, it could provide a different reason why reinforcer devaluation becomes ineffective: devaluation will not affect instrumental responding if the animal is not processing the reinforcer.

“If an instrumental reinforcer were likewise less processed after asymptotic training, it could provide a different reason why reinforcer devaluation becomes ineffective: Reinforcer devaluation will not affect instrumental responding if the animal is not processing the reinforcer.”

May combine two claims.

The two conclusions that goal-direction is not erased and that habits develop with reinforcer predictability are consistent with what we know about interference and attention in associative learning.

“The two conclusions are consistent with what we know about interference and attention in associative learning, which until now have had too little contact with the science of goal-directed actions and habits.”