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Information and Legislative Organization
Abstract
In this controversial book, Keith Krehbiel investigates and casts doubt upon a view of Congress held by many academics, journalists, and members of the lay public: that Congress is organized primarily to facilitate logrolling or "gains from trade" between legislators. The author puts forward an alternative "informational" theory that, unlike previous formal theories, highlights institutional needs and individual incentives for acquiring policy expertise. Using games with incomplete information, Krehbiel derives a set of unique and testable predictions about the organization of legislatures -- including the composition of committees and the procedures under which legislation is considered. Krehbiel's creative illustrations and nonmathematical presentation of formal theories make this book accessible to a diverse set of readers. The political relevance and testability of games with incomplete information will be appreciated by game theorists and economists, while the book's findings make it essential reading for political scientists who study American politics, political institutions, or democratic legislatures.
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The Limits of Lobbying: Null Effects from Four Field Experiments in Two State Legislatures
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“While lobbyists may also provide political information, such as the results of polls or the preferences of campaign donors, we focus on policy information as it is the basis of models of informational persuasion and lobbying (Krehbiel 1992).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Krehbiel, K.
- Venue
- University of Michigan Press eBooks
- Publisher
- University of Michigan Press
- Published
- 1991
- OpenAlex
- W2018400246
- Cited by
- 1,718
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 46.60
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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