Governing Without a Fundamental Direction of Time: Minimal Primitivism About Laws of Nature
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Abstract
The Great Divide in metaphysical debates about laws of nature is between Humeans, who think that laws merely describe the distribution of matter, and non-Humeans, who think that laws govern it. On our view, laws govern by constraining the physical possibilities. Our view captures the essence of the governing view without taking on extraneous commitments about the direction of time or dynamic production. Moreover, as a version of primitivism, our view requires no reduction / analysis of laws in terms of universals, powers, or dispositions. Our view accommodates several potential candidates for fundamental laws, including the principle of least action, the Past Hypothesis, the Einstein equation of general relativity, and even controversial examples found in the Wheeler-Feynman theory of electrodynamics and retrocausal theories of quantum mechanics. By understanding governing as constraining, non-Humeans who accept MinP have the same freedom to contemplate a wide variety of candidate fundamental laws as Humeans do.
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## TL;DR
The paper proposes Minimal Primitivism (MinP): fundamental laws are primitive, nonreducible facts that govern by constraining physical possibilities, without requiring a fundamental direction of time or dynamic production. It argues that this view can accommodate a wide range of candidate laws in physics, including the principle of least action, the Past Hypothesis, the Einstein equation, and even Wheeler-Feynman and retrocausal theories.
## Key findings
- MinP says fundamental laws are “primitive facts” that govern by constraining the physical possibilities; the paper explicitly states that governing does not require laws to dynamically produce later states from earlier ones or to presuppose a fundamental direction of time.
- The view is designed to accommodate diverse kinds of laws: the paper names the principle of least action, the Past Hypothesis, the Einstein equation, Wheeler-Feynman electrodynamics, and retrocausal quantum theories as compatible examples.
- In comparisons with alternatives, the paper argues MinP avoids the main restrictions of:
- Humean Reductionism, because laws are not reducible to the Humean mosaic and are mind-independent;
- Platonic Reductionism, because it does not require universals or necessitation relations;
- Aristotelian Reductionism, because it does not require dispositions;
- Maudlinian Primitivism, because it does not require dynamic production or a fundamental temporal direction.
- The paper also claims MinP can treat laws such as Gauss’s law, the Past Hypothesis, and the Einstein equation as fundamental even when they are not dynamical laws; it also says the view can accommodate time-reversal symmetry and closed timelike curves.
## Methods
- Conceptual/metaphysical argument: the paper surveys four existing accounts of laws of nature and then develops MinP as an alternative.
- Case-based analysis: it tests MinP against several examples from physics, including Hamiltonian mechanics, the principle of least action, the Past Hypothesis, Maxwell/Gauss-type constraint laws, the Einstein equation, Wheeler-Feynman electrodynamics, GRW, Bohmian mechanics, and retrocausal models.
- Comparative analysis: it contrasts MinP with Humean, Platonic, Aristotelian, and Maudlinian views in terms of governance, explanation, time asymmetry, and the kinds of laws each can accommodate.
## Limitations
- The paper itself says several issues are left open, especially how best to understand probabilistic laws on MinP; it offers “five interpretive options” but does not take a firm stance.
- The paper says a comparative analysis of its “constraint explanation” with other accounts is left to future work.
- Evident from the text: the argument is philosophical and conceptual rather than empirical, so it does not report experiments or data.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
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Claims the paper makes
2 Valid · 6 Not valid · 39 Not checked · 182 Own results and interpretations
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“If it is plausible that PH is a candidate fundamental law (Chen, 2020), then the metaphysical account of laws should make room for a boundary condition to be a fundamental law.”
§ Governing Without A Fundamental Direction of Time: Minimal Primitivism about Laws of Nature > 3.3.2 Non-Dynamical Constraint Laws
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Chen, 2020 source
The citation is offered for the antecedent that PH is plausibly a candidate fundamental law, and Chen's paper asserts exactly that as its central 'Nomic Status' thesis (1 Introduction, p. 4: 'Nomic Status The Past Hypothesis is a candidate fundamental law of nature'; 3 Why the Past Hypothesis is Law-Like, p. 18; 5 Conclusion, p. 34: 'PH is a candidate fundamental law of nature'). The consequent is also defended in the paper, which argues that Humeanism and a minimal non-Humeanism have room for boundary-condition laws (3.3, p. 25; 4.1 Boundary Condition Laws?, pp. 29-30), so the conditional reading attributed here is not overstated. (LLM, conf=0.90)
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Similarly, MinP is compatible with Goldstein and Tumulka (2003)'s model of two opposite directions of time.”
§ Governing Without A Fundamental Direction of Time: Minimal Primitivism about Laws of Nature > 3.3.1 Dynamical Laws
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Goldstein and Tumulka (2003) source
The citation is offered to identify Goldstein & Tumulka's model, and our copy is exactly that model: Section 2 (p. ~559) defines the 'microcausal arrow of time' C pointing towards the past, with the velocity law depending on the past-C light cone (Sections 2 and 3), and Section 2 states that the thermodynamic arrow may be chosen 'either the same as or opposite to C,' with the opposite choice being what lets the model display nonlocal behaviour. Section 4 adds that on the particle level 'causation is effectively in both time directions.' The assertion that MinP is compatible with this model is the citing authors' own conclusion and is not something this source could support or contradict; the part attributed to the source (the existence and content of a two-opposite-arrows model) is fully borne out. (LLM, conf=0.88)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“They do not require anything else to exist.”
§ Governing Without A Fundamental Direction of Time: Minimal Primitivism about Laws of Nature > 3.1 The View
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: unclear — It is unclear why the paper says it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“With Humean Reductionism, nothing ultimately explains the patterns in the Humean mosaic.”
§ Governing Without A Fundamental Direction of Time: Minimal Primitivism about Laws of Nature > 2.2 Platonic Reductionism
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The N relation, though called a necessity relation, holds contingently among universals.”
§ Governing Without A Fundamental Direction of Time: Minimal Primitivism about Laws of Nature > 2. Necessity.
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: unclear — It is unclear why the paper says it holds.
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“See Chen (2022) for a discussion of this possibility, called “fundamental nomic vagueness.” On MinP, fundamental nomic vagueness implies that there are vague fundamental facts. Whether fundamental nomic vagueness exists in our world is a subtle question. (It is related to the issue of whether the ontic quantum state o…”
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Adlam, E. (2022) · Foundations of Physics · doi:10.1007/s10701-022-00546-0 · Cited by 90
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“But as argued in refs (Adlam, 2022; Chen & Goldstein, 2021), the dynamic production picture is increasingly under threat in contemporary physics.”
BackgroundInfluential
Metadata
- Authors
- Chen, E. K., & Goldstein, S.
- Affiliations
- University of California San Diego (US)
- Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey (US)
- Corresponding author
- Chen, Eddy Keming
- ORCID
- Chen, Eddy Keming
- Venue
- Jerusalem Studies in Philosophy and History of Science
- Publisher
- Springer International Publishing
- Published
- 2022
- Pages
- 21-64
- ISSN
- 2524-4248 (ISSN-L)
- 2524-4256
- OpenAlex
- W3199072627
- Cited by
- 69
- References
- 119
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 24 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 24
- FWCI
- 216.86
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- Licence
- cc-by-sa
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- www.springer.com/tdm (vor)
- Locations
- Jerusalem studies in philosophy and history of science (publishedVersion)
- PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh) (acceptedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh) (acceptedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (cc-by)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Logic and Philosophy of Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- laws of nature, metaphysics of law, primitivism, Humeanism, direction of time, fundamental law, principle of least action, Past Hypothesis, Wheeler-Feynman electrodynamics, retrocausality, dynamical laws
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