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Governing Without a Fundamental Direction of Time: Minimal Primitivism About Laws of Nature

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Chen, Eddy Keming, Goldstein, Sheldon · 2022 · Jerusalem Studies in Philosophy and History of Science

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 112 of the 119 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 2 of the 49 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Abstract

The Great Divide in metaphysical debates about laws of nature is between Humeans, who think that laws merely describe the distribution of matter, and non-Humeans, who think that laws govern it. On our view, laws govern by constraining the physical possibilities. Our view captures the essence of the governing view without taking on extraneous commitments about the direction of time or dynamic production. Moreover, as a version of primitivism, our view requires no reduction / analysis of laws in terms of universals, powers, or dispositions. Our view accommodates several potential candidates for fundamental laws, including the principle of least action, the Past Hypothesis, the Einstein equation of general relativity, and even controversial examples found in the Wheeler-Feynman theory of electrodynamics and retrocausal theories of quantum mechanics. By understanding governing as constraining, non-Humeans who accept MinP have the same freedom to contemplate a wide variety of candidate fundamental laws as Humeans do.

Overview

CoChat Summary

## TL;DR

The paper proposes Minimal Primitivism (MinP): fundamental laws are primitive, nonreducible facts that govern by constraining physical possibilities, without requiring a fundamental direction of time or dynamic production. It argues that this view can accommodate a wide range of candidate laws in physics, including the principle of least action, the Past Hypothesis, the Einstein equation, and even Wheeler-Feynman and retrocausal theories.

## Key findings

  • MinP says fundamental laws are “primitive facts” that govern by constraining the physical possibilities; the paper explicitly states that governing does not require laws to dynamically produce later states from earlier ones or to presuppose a fundamental direction of time.
  • The view is designed to accommodate diverse kinds of laws: the paper names the principle of least action, the Past Hypothesis, the Einstein equation, Wheeler-Feynman electrodynamics, and retrocausal quantum theories as compatible examples.
  • In comparisons with alternatives, the paper argues MinP avoids the main restrictions of:
  • Humean Reductionism, because laws are not reducible to the Humean mosaic and are mind-independent;
  • Platonic Reductionism, because it does not require universals or necessitation relations;
  • Aristotelian Reductionism, because it does not require dispositions;
  • Maudlinian Primitivism, because it does not require dynamic production or a fundamental temporal direction.
  • The paper also claims MinP can treat laws such as Gauss’s law, the Past Hypothesis, and the Einstein equation as fundamental even when they are not dynamical laws; it also says the view can accommodate time-reversal symmetry and closed timelike curves.

## Methods

  • Conceptual/metaphysical argument: the paper surveys four existing accounts of laws of nature and then develops MinP as an alternative.
  • Case-based analysis: it tests MinP against several examples from physics, including Hamiltonian mechanics, the principle of least action, the Past Hypothesis, Maxwell/Gauss-type constraint laws, the Einstein equation, Wheeler-Feynman electrodynamics, GRW, Bohmian mechanics, and retrocausal models.
  • Comparative analysis: it contrasts MinP with Humean, Platonic, Aristotelian, and Maudlinian views in terms of governance, explanation, time asymmetry, and the kinds of laws each can accommodate.

## Limitations

  • The paper itself says several issues are left open, especially how best to understand probabilistic laws on MinP; it offers “five interpretive options” but does not take a firm stance.
  • The paper says a comparative analysis of its “constraint explanation” with other accounts is left to future work.
  • Evident from the text: the argument is philosophical and conceptual rather than empirical, so it does not report experiments or data.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1007/978-3-030-96775-8_2

Cites

112 of 113 references verified0 citation errors · 1 not checkable

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Figures

Figure 1 The Mandelbrot set with continuously colored environment. Picture created by Wolfgang Beyer with the program Ultra Fractal 3, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0, via Wikimedia Commons
Figure 1 The Mandelbrot set with continuously colored environment. Picture created by Wolfgang Beyer with the program Ultra Fractal 3, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0, via Wikimedia CommonsCC-BY-SA · From the PDF

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Claims the paper makes

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Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 6

  1. Choi, S., & Fara, M. (2021). Dispositions. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, Spring 2021 edition.
  2. Ghirardi, G. (2018). Collapse theories. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, fall 2018 edition.
  3. Goldstein, S. (2017). Bohmian mechanics. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, summer 2017 edition.
  4. Kraut, R. (2017). Plato. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, Fall 2017 edition.
  5. Lewis, D. (1986). Philosophical papers II. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  6. Penrose, R. (1979). Singularities and time-asymmetry. In S. Hawking, & W. Israel (Eds.), General relativity (pp. 581–638). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Chen, E. K., & Goldstein, S.
Affiliations
  • University of California San Diego (US)
  • Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey (US)
Corresponding author
Chen, Eddy Keming
Venue
Jerusalem Studies in Philosophy and History of Science
Published
2022
Pages
21-64
ISSN
  • 2524-4248 (ISSN-L)
  • 2524-4256
OpenAlex
W3199072627
Cited by
69
References
119
Citations by year
2026: 7 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 24 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 24
FWCI
216.86
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Jerusalem studies in philosophy and history of science (publishedVersion)
  • PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh) (acceptedVersion, cc-by-sa)
  • PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh) (acceptedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (cc-by)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Logic and Philosophy of Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Keywords
laws of nature, metaphysics of law, primitivism, Humeanism, direction of time, fundamental law, principle of least action, Past Hypothesis, Wheeler-Feynman electrodynamics, retrocausality, dynamical laws

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