Cited by 35Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceEmbodied and Extended CognitionFree Will and Agency

Integrating the global neuronal workspace into the framework of predictive processing: towards a working hypothesis

Whyte, Christopher J.·2019·Consciousness and Cognition

Abstract

Hohwy (2013) proposed an account of conscious access that integrates the global neuronal workspace (GNW) into the framework of predictive processing, a view that I term the predictive global neuronal workspace (PGNW). Whilst promising, the PGNW is theoretically underdeveloped and empirically underexplored. The aim of this article is to outline the empirical predictions that distinguish the PGNW from other workspace models. I do so by (i) placing the PGNW in close contact with experimental work and cashing out a set of predictions that distinguish it from the standard formulation of the GNW, (ii) exploring the evidence for the first of these predictions in the context of bistable perception and the conscious processing of auditory regularities, and (iii), contrasting the PGNW with Chanes and Barrett (2016) limbic workspace. Combined, these arguments show that the PGNW is both testable and supported by current evidence.

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Crossref · 10.1016/j.concog.2019.102763

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  • This may explain the historical affinity between Active Inference based accounts of consciousness and Global Workspace Theory.

    “This may explain the historical affinity between Active Inference based accounts of consciousness and Global Workspace Theory (Hohwy, 2013; Whyte, 2019), which identifies access consciousness as the primary (and perhaps exclusive) explanandum for the science of consciousness (Cohen & Dennett, 2011; Dehaene et al., 2006; Naccache, 2018).”

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Authors
Whyte, C. J.
Affiliations
The University of Sydney (AU)
Corresponding author
Whyte, Christopher J.
Venue
Consciousness and Cognition
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2019-08
Volume
73
Pages
102763
ISSN
1053-8100 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2951753437
Cited by
35
References
74
Citations by year
2026: 5 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 8
FWCI
0.75
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Consciousness and Cognition (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
Keywords
global neuronal workspace theory, predictive processing, conscious access, bistable perception, auditory regularity, empirical prediction
MeSH terms
Brain, Consciousness, Humans, Models, Biological, Perception, Anticipation, Psychological

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