Corporate governance and the cost of debt: Evidence from director limited liability and indemnification provisions
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Citations
Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
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A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243 · cited 1×
“Much of the corporate governance literature centers on the alignment of the incentives of management and shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Becht et al., 2003).”
BackgroundDeterminants of corporate borrowing
Myers, S. C. (1977) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(77)90015-0 · Cited by 13,169 · cited 1×
“Coincidentally, low-risk operating strategies may result in a reduction of the “agency costs of debt” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977), which ultimately would inure to shareholders’ benefit.”
BackgroundEstimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches
Petersen, M. A. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn053 · Cited by 10,746
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535162 · Cited by 6,120
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261677 · Cited by 5,083 · cited 1×
“We follow Jensen and Murphy (1990) and run an OLS regression on the change in total CEO compensation (ΔCEO compensation) on the change in market capitalization (ΔSW), and interact the High L-index (High G-index) dummy with ΔSW to test the effect of the L-index (G-index) 20 A lower monitoring…”
MethodCorporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance
Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W., & Larcker, D. F. (1999) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(98)00058-0 · Cited by 4,335 · cited 2×
“In Model 3, we further examine this by testing whether the predicted reduction of the cost of debt due to our L-index is associated with higher performance, similar to the methodology in Core et al. (1999). We use the empirical model in Model 3 of Table 2 to calculate the predicted reduction of the cost of debt due to…”
Outside directors and CEO turnover
Weisbach, M. S. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90053-0 · Cited by 4,234 · cited 1×
“The control variables follow the literature (Weisbach, 1988; Denis et al., 1997; Huson et al., 2001; Dahya et al., 2002).”
BackgroundEnjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2003) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/376950 · Cited by 3,777 · cited 1×
“…strategies that are suboptimal from shareholders’ perspective, due to their concerns for the private benefits from control and their non-diversified firm-specific human capital (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; John et al., 2008; Kempf et al., 2009; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Pathan, 2009).”
Bank governance, regulation and risk taking
Laeven, L. A., & Levine, R. E. (2008) · Cited by 3,269
Boards: Does one size fit all☆
COLES, J., DANIEL, N., & NAVEEN, L. (2008) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.08.008 · Cited by 3,075 · cited 1×
“Our first variable to proxy for this demand is a principal factor from the standardized values of firm size, the number of business segments and leverage, following Coles et al. (2008).”
BackgroundWhat Matters in Corporate Governance?
Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., & Ferrell, A. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn099 · Cited by 2,906
Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers
Amihud, Y., & Lev, B. (1981) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003575 · Cited by 2,772 · cited 1×
“Although there is debate in the literature regarding the risk-taking preference of managers/directors (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Holmstrom and Costa, 1986; Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1992; Adams et al., 2005), the evidence largely supports the proposition that managers/directors prefer conservative…”
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure
Jensen (Deceased), M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1998) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.94043 · Cited by 2,749
Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature
Hermalin, B., & Weisbach, M. (2001) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w8161 · Cited by 2,498
The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey
Adams, R. B., Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2010) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.48.1.58 · Cited by 2,358 · cited 1×
“Prior research has focused primarily on how stock and stock options, board composition, and reputational concerns provide the incentives for directors to fulfill their monitoring and advisory functions (e.g., see the review by Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Adams et al., 2010).”
Corporate Governance and Risk‐Taking
JOHN, K., LITOV, L., & YEUNG, B. (2008) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01372.x · Cited by 1,806 · cited 3×
“…strategies that are suboptimal from shareholders’ perspective, due to their concerns for the private benefits from control and their non-diversified firm-specific human capital (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; John et al., 2008; Kempf et al., 2009; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Pathan, 2009).”
Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns
MASULIS, R. W., WANG, C., & XIE, F. (2007) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01259.x · Cited by 1,772
Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2001) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530152466269 · Cited by 1,740
The determinants of corporate board size and composition: An empirical analysis
Boone, A. L., Casares Field, L., Karpoff, J. M., & Raheja, C. G. (2007) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.05.004 · Cited by 1,719
Bradley, M., Desai, A., & Kim, E. H. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90030-x · Cited by 1,701
Self-citationPowerful CEOs and Their Impact on Corporate Performance
Adams, R. B., Almeida, H., & Ferreira, D. (2005) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhi030 · Cited by 1,664
Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?
FICH, E. M., & SHIVDASANI, A. (2006) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00852.x · Cited by 1,660
The effects of corporate governance on firms’ credit ratings
Ashbaugh-Skaife, H., Collins, D. W., & LaFond, R. (2006) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2006.02.003 · Cited by 1,319
Board size and the variability of corporate performance
Cheng, S. (2008) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.10.006 · Cited by 1,203 · cited 5×
“It is notable from Model 4 of Table 3 that CEO power is negative and significant, rather than positive as reported in Adams et al. (2005) and Cheng (2008).17 The signs of the other 17 We note the difference between our definition of the CEO power and theirs: they define a CEO as being powerful if…”
InfluentialBhojraj, S., & Sengupta, P. (2003) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/344114 · Cited by 1,189
Free Cash Flow and Stockholder Gains in Going Private Transactions
LEHN, K., & POULSEN, A. (1989) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1989.tb04390.x · Cited by 1,096 · cited 2×
“We follow Lehn and Poulsen (1989) to calculate the free cash flow, and interact a dummy indicating whether the free cash flow is above the sample median with the L-index (G-index) in the spread regression.”
Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A Long‐Term Perspective
Huson, M. R., Parrino, R., & Starks, L. T. (2001) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00405 · Cited by 1,070 · cited 2×
“The control variables follow the literature (Weisbach, 1988; Denis et al., 1997; Huson et al., 2001; Dahya et al., 2002).”
Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?
Fich, E. M., & Shivdasani, A. (2012) · Corporate Governance · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-31579-4_10 · Cited by 1,051 · cited 1×
“Fich and Shivdasani (2006) document that if the majority of outside directors hold at least two outside directorships and hence are considered “busy”, the board will not be effective.”
Strong boards, CEO power and bank risk-taking
Pathan, S. (2009) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.02.001 · Cited by 1,031
The costs of entrenched boards
Bebchuk, L. A., & Cohen, A. (2005) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.12.006 · Cited by 986
Business Behavior, Value and Growth.
Fisher, M. R., & Baumol, W. J. (1962) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2228457 · Cited by 888
Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors
YERMACK, D. (2004) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00699.x · Cited by 840
Top‐Management Compensation and Capital Structure
JOHN, T. A., & JOHN, K. (1993) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04026.x · Cited by 812 · cited 1×
“It is expected that the conflict of interest between shareholders and bondholders intensifies with the deterioration of a firm’s credit quality (Bodie and Taggart, 1978; John and John, 1993).”
BackgroundCorporate Governance and Control
Becht, M., Bolton, P., & Röell, A. (2003) · Handbook of the Economics of Finance · doi:10.1016/s1574-0102(03)01005-7 · Cited by 795 · cited 1×
“Much of the corporate governance literature centers on the alignment of the incentives of management and shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Becht et al., 2003).”
Ownership structure and top executive turnover
Denis, D. J., Denis, D. K., & Sarin, A. (1997) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(97)00016-0 · Cited by 776 · cited 2×
“The control variables follow the literature (Weisbach, 1988; Denis et al., 1997; Huson et al., 2001; Dahya et al., 2002).”
Zhou, X. (2001) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(01)00085-x · Cited by 689 · cited 1×
“The time-series stability of the L-index motivates our choice of ordered-probit and pooled OLS as the primary econometric models (Zhou, 2001).”
MethodManagerial Incentives and Capital Management
Holmstrom, B., & Costa, J. R. I. (1986) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884180 · Cited by 671 · cited 1×
“Although there is debate in the literature regarding the risk-taking preference of managers/directors (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Holmstrom and Costa, 1986; Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1992; Adams et al., 2005), the evidence largely supports the proposition that managers/directors prefer conservative…”
ResultDoes Corporate Governance Matter to Bondholders?
Klock, M. S., Mansi, S. A., & Maxwell, W. F. (2005) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.1017/s0022109000001940 · Cited by 613 · cited 7×
“…that the G-index is negatively related to ratings and positively related to spreads are in contrast with most of the existing literature (e.g., Klock et al., 2005; ACL; Chava et al., 14 The results with respect to CEO option holdings and earnings quality hold with a first-difference (change)…”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialLinck, J. S., Netter, J. M., & Yang, T. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn084 · Cited by 597 · cited 2×
“Prior literature is not very helpful in answering this 29 Linck et al. (2009) searched all proxy and financial statements of New York incorporated firms (New York requires firms to disclose information about D&O insurance) and S&P 500 firms in 1998, 2001, and 2004, but were only able to find…”
BackgroundMethodManagerial Conservatism, Project Choice, and Debt
Hirshleifer, D., & Thakor, A. V. (1992) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/5.3.437 · Cited by 555 · cited 1×
“…there is debate in the literature regarding the risk-taking preference of managers/directors (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Holmstrom and Costa, 1986; Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1992; Adams et al., 2005), the evidence largely supports the proposition that managers/directors prefer conservative…”
ResultThe Cadbury Committee, Corporate Performance, and Top Management Turnover
Dahya, J., McConnell, J. J., & Travlos, N. G. (2002) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00428 · Cited by 552 · cited 1×
“The control variables follow the literature (Weisbach, 1988; Denis et al., 1997; Huson et al., 2001; Dahya et al., 2002).”
BackgroundOUTSIDE DIRECTORS AND CEO TURNOVER
Weisbach, I. (1988) · Cited by 500
The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation?
Romano, R. (1991) · The Journal of Law Economics and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a037007 · Cited by 463 · cited 1×
“…or weakly positive effect of these provisions on stock prices (Bhagat et al., 1987; Netter and Poulsen, 1989; Janjigian and Bolster, 1990; Romano, 1991; Brook and Rao, 1994; Heron and Lewellen, 1998).4 Focusing exclusively on shareholders, these authors assert that the empirical evidence…”
BackgroundDo Shareholder Rights Affect the Cost of Bank Loans?
Chava, S., Livdan, D., & Purnanandam, A. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn111 · Cited by 415
Managerial Agency and Bond Covenants
Chava, S., Kumar, P., & Warga, A. (2010) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhp072 · Cited by 343
Bondholder Wealth Effects in Mergers and Acquisitions: New Evidence from the 1980s and 1990s
Billett, M. T., King, T. D., & Mauer, D. C. (2004) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00628.x · Cited by 335
Kempf, A., Ruenzi, S., & Thiele, T. (2009) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.05.001 · Cited by 290 · cited 1×
“…strategies that are suboptimal from shareholders’ perspective, due to their concerns for the private benefits from control and their non-diversified firm-specific human capital (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; John et al., 2008; Kempf et al., 2009; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Pathan, 2009).”
BackgroundOn the Corporate Demand for Directors' and Officers' Insurance
Core, J. E. (1997) · The Journal of Risk and Insurance · doi:10.2307/253912 · Cited by 278 · cited 1×
“It is expected that directors of larger firms, financially distressed firms, growth firms, and firms with more shareholders may benefit more from the LLI provisions, as these firms are more likely to be sued (Core, 1997; Gische, 2000).”
BackgroundCorporate Governance and Control
Becht, M., Bolton, P., & Röell, A. A. (2002) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.343461 · Cited by 252
Managerial Opportunism? Evidence from Directors' and Officers' Insurance Purchases
Chalmers, J. M. R., Dann, L. Y., & Harford, J. (2002) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00436 · Cited by 241
A Returns-Based Representation of Earnings Quality
Ecker, F., Francis, J., Kim, I., Olsson, P. M., & Schipper, K. (2006) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.1521/accr.2006.81.4.749 · Cited by 229
Core, J. (2000) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/16.2.449 · Cited by 225 · cited 1×
“Second, Core (2000) and Chalmers et al. (2002) argue that the purchase of D&O insurance represents opportunistic behavior on the part of managers and, as such, is often closely related to the quality of corporate governance.”
BackgroundBoard classification and managerial entrenchment: Evidence from the market for corporate control
Bates, T. W., Becher, D. A., & Lemmon, M. L. (2008) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.03.007 · Cited by 210 · cited 1×
“1+t t 11 Therefore, similar to the incidences of classified boards as documented in the literature (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Masulis et al., 2007; Bates et al., 2008; Chen, 2010), it appears that most LLI provisions were also established prior to 1990, presumably at the height of hostile takeovers,…”
FUTURE INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND THE VALUE OF THE CALL PROVISION ON A BOND
Bodie, Z., & Taggart, R. A. (1978) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1978.tb02056.x · Cited by 180 · cited 1×
“It is expected that the conflict of interest between shareholders and bondholders intensifies with the deterioration of a firm’s credit quality (Bodie and Taggart, 1978; John and John, 1993).”
BackgroundTop Management Incentives and the Pricing of Corporate Public Debt
Ortiz‐Molina, H. (2006) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.1017/s0022109000002088 · Cited by 165 · cited 8×
“Our results that the G-index is negatively related to ratings and positively related to spreads are in contrast with most of the existing literature (e.g., Klock et al., 2005; ACL; Chava et al., 14 The results with respect to CEO option holdings and earnings quality hold with a first-difference (change) regression mod…”
InfluentialThe market for corporate control and the cost of debt
Qiu, J., & Yu, F. (2009) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.10.002 · Cited by 159 · cited 10×
“Our results that the G-index is negatively related to ratings and positively related to spreads are in contrast with most of the existing literature (e.g., Klock et al., 2005; ACL; Chava et al., 14 The results with respect to CEO option holdings and earnings quality hold with a first-difference (change) regression mod…”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialBoard Compensation Practices and Agency Costs of Debt
Ertugrul, M., & Hegde, S. P. (2007) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.09.004 · Cited by 145
The effect of state antitakeover laws on the firm's bondholders
Francis, B. B., Hasan, I., John, K., & Waisman, M. (2009) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2009.12.006 · Cited by 142
Kempf, A., Thiele, T., & Ruenzi, S. (2007) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.964923 · Cited by 95
Creditor Protection Laws and the Cost of Debt
Mansi, S., Maxwell, W. F., & Wald, J. K. (2009) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/605566 · Cited by 66 · cited 2×
“Mansi et al. (2009) document that firms incorporated in states with more restrictive payout statutes enjoy a lower cost of debt.”
BackgroundResultClassified Boards, the Cost of Debt, and Firm Performance
Chen, D. (2012) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2012.07.015 · Cited by 66
Self-citationAn Empirical Analysis of the Reincorporation Decision
Heron, R. A., & Lewellen, W. G. (1998) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.2307/2331131 · Cited by 58 · cited 2×
“…that allows firms to include the provisions for director liability limitation in their charters, is related to the attraction of directors is Heron and Lewellen (1998), who find that firms reincorporated into a state with the statute for director liability limitation added more independent…”
BackgroundState Corporation Laws and Shareholders: The Recent Experience
Netter, J. M., & Poulsen, A. B. (1989) · Financial Management · doi:10.2307/3665647 · Cited by 48 · cited 1×
“Previous work finds either a non-significant or weakly positive effect of these provisions on stock prices (Bhagat et al., 1987; Netter and Poulsen, 1989; Janjigian and Bolster, 1990; Romano, 1991; Brook and Rao, 1994; Heron and Lewellen, 1998).4 Focusing exclusively on shareholders, these authors…”
BackgroundBoard Classification and Managerial Entrenchment: Evidence from the Market for Corporate ControlPreprint
Becher, D. A., Bates, T. W., & Lemmon, M. L. (2006) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.923408 · Cited by 45
The Monitoring and Advisory Functions of Corporate Boards: Theory and Evidence
Chen, D. (2008) · Maryland Shared Open Access Repository (USMAI Consortium) · doi:10.13016/m2m27k · Cited by 18
Self-citation
Cited by
Trust, social capital, and the bond market benefits of ESG performance
Amiraslani, H., Lins, K. V., Servaes, H., & Tamayo, A. (2023) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-021-09646-0 · Cited by 222
“However, since prior studies have shown strong governance to be beneficial to bondholders (e.g., Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003; Klock et al. 2005; Bradley and Chen 2011, 2015), we also control for governance in our estimations.”
Metadata
- Authors
- Bradley, M., & Chen, D.
- Venue
- Journal of Corporate Finance
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2011-02
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 83-107
- ISSN
- 0929-1199 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2169440430
- Cited by
- 166
- References
- 67
- FWCI
- 23.63
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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