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Consciousness: converging insights from connectionist modeling and neuroscience
Abstract
Over the past decade, many findings in cognitive neuroscience have resulted in the view that selective attention, working memory and cognitive control involve competition between widely distributed representations. This competition is biased by top-down projections (notably from prefrontal cortex), which can selectively enhance some representations over others. This view has now been implemented in several connectionist models. In this review, we emphasize the relevance of these models to understanding consciousness. Interestingly, the models we review have striking similarities to others directly aimed at implementing 'global workspace theory'. All of these models embody a fundamental principle that has been used in many connectionist models over the past twenty years: global constraint satisfaction.
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“feedback loops or reentrant connections are necessary for achieving global constraint satisfaction.”
From The Ergonomics of Learning: A Proposed Update to Bloom’s Taxonomy (2025) · cites this paper as Maia and Cleereman's (2005)
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“this model will need to include an additional category to account for the highly abstracted executive function mentioned in the literature of at least three previously covered theories (Maia and Cleereman, 2005;D'Esposito & Postle, 2015;Dove, 2011).”
From The Ergonomics of Learning: A Proposed Update to Bloom’s Taxonomy (2025) · cites this paper as Maia and Cleereman, 2005
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Maia, T. V., & Cleeremans, A.
- Venue
- Trends in Cognitive Sciences
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2005-08
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 397-404
- ISSN
- 1364-6613
- Cited by
- 64
- References
- 9
- Language
- en
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