Cited by 170Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceEmbodied and Extended CognitionCognitive Science and Education Research

The radical plasticity thesis: How the brain learns to be conscious.

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Cleeremans, Axel·2011·Frontiers in Psychology

Abstract

In this paper, I explore the idea that consciousness is something that the brain learns to do rather than an intrinsic property of certain neural states and not others. Starting from the idea that neural activity is inherently unconscious, the question thus becomes: How does the brain learn to be conscious? I suggest that consciousness arises as a result of the brain's continuous attempts at predicting not only the consequences of its actions on the world and on other agents, but also the consequences of activity in one cerebral region on activity in other regions. By this account, the brain continuously and unconsciously learns to redescribe its own activity to itself, so developing systems of meta-representations that characterize and qualify the target first-order representations. Such learned redescriptions, enriched by the emotional value associated with them, form the basis of conscious experience. Learning and plasticity are thus central to consciousness, to the extent that experiences only occur in experiencers that have learned to know they possess certain first-order states and that have learned to care more about certain states than about others. This is what I call the "Radical Plasticity Thesis." In a sense thus, this is the enactive perspective, but turned both inwards and (further) outwards. Consciousness involves "signal detection on the mind"; the conscious mind is the brain's (non-conceptual, implicit) theory about itself. I illustrate these ideas through neural network models that simulate the relationships between performance and awareness in different tasks.

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Research works printed but not linked: 5

  1. Chalmers D. J. (2007b). “Naturalistic dualism,” in The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, eds Velmans M. Schneider S. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing), 359– 368
  2. Humphrey N. (2006). Seeing Red. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
  3. LeDoux J. (2002). Synaptic Self. Harmondsworth: Viking Penguin
  4. O'Reilly R. C. Munakata Y. (2000). Computational Explorations in Cognitive Neuroscience: Understanding the Mind by Simulating the Brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
  5. Rumelhart D. E. McClelland J. L. (1986). Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition. Volume 1: Foundations. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press

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Authors
Cleeremans, A.
Affiliations
Université Libre de Bruxelles (BE)
Corresponding author
Cleeremans, Axel
Venue
Frontiers in Psychology
Published
2011
Volume
2
Pages
86-86
ISSN
1664-1078 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2073051210
Cited by
170
References
69
Citations by year
2026: 13 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 12 · 2022: 10 · 2021: 13 · 2020: 30 · 2019: 10 · 2018: 11 · 2017: 14 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 11 · 2014: 10 · 2013: 7 · 2012: 4
FWCI
10.31
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by
Locations
  • Frontiers in Psychology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Dépôt institutionnel de l'Université libre de Bruxelles (Université Libre de Bruxelles) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
Keywords
consciousness, neuroplasticity, learning, metarepresentation, prediction, self-representation, emotional value, neural network model

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