Cited by 747Virtual Reality Applications and ImpactsPsychosomatic Disorders and Their TreatmentsHallucinations in medical conditions

Out-of-body experience and autoscopy of neurological origin

Open access
Blanke, Olaf, Landis, Theodor, Spinelli, Laurent, Seeck, Margitta·2004·Brain

Abstract

During an out-of-body experience (OBE), the experient seems to be awake and to see his body and the world from a location outside the physical body. A closely related experience is autoscopy (AS), which is characterized by the experience of seeing one's body in extrapersonal space. Yet, despite great public interest and many case studies, systematic neurological studies of OBE and AS are extremely rare and, to date, no testable neuroscientific theory exists. The present study describes phenomenological, neuropsychological and neuroimaging correlates of OBE and AS in six neurological patients. We provide neurological evidence that both experiences share important central mechanisms. We show that OBE and AS are frequently associated with pathological sensations of position, movement and perceived completeness of one's own body. These include vestibular sensations (such as floating, flying, elevation and rotation), visual body-part illusions (such as the illusory shortening, transformation or movement of an extremity) and the experience of seeing one's body only partially during an OBE or AS. We also find that the patient's body position prior to the experience influences OBE and AS. Finally, in five patients, brain damage or brain dysfunction is localized to the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). These results suggest that the complex experiences of OBE and AS represent paroxysmal disorders of body perception and cognition (or body schema). The processes of body perception and cognition, and the unconscious creation of central representation(s) of one's own body based on proprioceptive, tactile, visual and vestibular information-as well as their integration with sensory information of extrapersonal space-is a prerequisite for rapid and effective action with our surroundings. Based on our findings, we speculate that ambiguous input from these different sensory systems is an important mechanism of OBE and AS, and thus the intriguing experience of seeing one's body in a position that does not coincide with its felt position. We suggest that OBE and AS are related to a failure to integrate proprioceptive, tactile and visual information with respect to one's own body (disintegration in personal space) and by a vestibular dysfunction leading to an additional disintegration between personal (vestibular) space and extrapersonal (visual) space. We argue that both disintegrations (personal; personal-extrapersonal) are necessary for the occurrence of OBE and AS, and that they are due to a paroxysmal cerebral dysfunction of the TPJ in a state of partially and briefly impaired consciousness.

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Crossref · 10.1093/brain/awh040

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  • A mean lesion overlap analysis in five patients with OBEs centers on the TPJ.

    “The figure shows results of a mean lesion overlap analysis in five patients with OBEs.The analysis centers on the TPJ.”

    From Empirical perspectives from the self-model theory of subjectivity: a brief summary with examples (2007) · cites this paper as Blanke et al., 2004

    The Anatomy section and Fig. 4 caption report a mean lesion overlap analysis of five patients centered on the temporo-parietal junction. But the Fig. 2 caption identifies patients in the lesion analysis with both out-of-body experiences (OBEs) and autoscopy (AS), so describing all five as patients with OBEs is not supported. (LLM, conf=0.88)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Because the conscious body model is phenomenally transparent, we fully identify with its representational content and are consciously present as bodily selves.

    “Because this conscious body model is phenomenally transparent because it cannot introspectively be recognized as a model, we fully identify with its representational content and are consciously present as bodily selves (self-identification) [6,7,23,24].”

    From Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood (2009) · cites this paper as [23]

    Theoretical considerations (page unavailable) describes a central representation of one’s body, and Discussion Phenomenology (page unavailable) reports preserved self-recognition during autoscopic experiences. The paper does not say that the body model is phenomenally transparent or that inability to recognize it introspectively causes full identification with its content. (LLM, conf=0.83)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Out-of-body experiences are associated with a sense of disembodiment and people always self-identify with the illusory body as represented.

    “Out-of-body experiences are associated with a sense of disembodiment and people always self-identify with the illusory body as represented.”

    From Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood (2009) · cites this paper as [23]

    The Theoretical considerations section links OBEs with disembodiment, and Visual phenomenology reports that all three OBE patients localized their perspective in a second, parasomatic body. This supports the self-location aspect, but the paper does not establish that people always self-identify with an illusory body across OBEs generally; its observation is limited to the patients studied. Page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.85)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • In heautoscopy, self-identification either refers to the illusory body as represented, the physical body as represented, or to both in alternation.

    “Self-identification either refers to the illusory body as represented, the physical body as represented or to both in alternation [23,27,49] (Box 2).”

    From Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood (2009) · cites this paper as [23]

    The Discussion (Phenomenology) and Fig. 5 (Theoretical considerations; page not provided) describe heautoscopy as involving visual perspectives from the physical and illusory bodies, sometimes in alternation. They do not establish the more specific claim that self-identification shifts between those bodies; visual perspective and self-identification are not the same finding. (LLM, conf=0.82)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • In heautoscopy, self-location and weak first-person perspective might change their experienced position between the illusory and physical body and can occur in rapid alternation.

    “Moreover, self-location and weak 1PP might change their experienced position (between the position of the illusory and the physical body as represented) and this can occur in rapid alternation.”

    From Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood (2009) · cites this paper as [23]

    The Discussion Phenomenology section reports rapid alternation between parasomatic and physical visuo-spatial perspectives in heautoscopy, supporting the first-person-perspective part of the claim. It also says these patients did not feel out of their bodies, so the paper does not establish that their experienced self-location alternated between the two bodies. Page numbers are not available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.85)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

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Cites

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4 of the 91 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 25

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Sorted by citations

Authors
Blanke, O., Landis, T., Spinelli, L., & Seeck, M.
Affiliations
University Hospital of Geneva (CH)
Corresponding author
Blanke, Olaf
Venue
Brain
Published
2004-02
Volume
127
Issue
2
Pages
243-258
ISSN
  • 0006-8950 (ISSN-L)
  • 1460-2156
OpenAlex
W2099202374
Cited by
747
References
91
Citations by year
2026: 18 · 2025: 35 · 2024: 26 · 2023: 32 · 2022: 25 · 2021: 32 · 2020: 23 · 2019: 41 · 2018: 31 · 2017: 40 · 2016: 27 · 2015: 37 · 2014: 43 · 2013: 35 · 2012: 25
FWCI
48.96
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Brain (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Infoscience (Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne) (submittedVersion)
  • Infoscience (Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
Funders
  • National Science Foundation
  • Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung (67105, 65323, 68105)
  • Fondation Leenaards
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Human-Computer Interaction › Virtual Reality Applications and Impacts
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Psychiatry and Mental health › Psychosomatic Disorders and Their Treatments
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Hallucinations in medical conditions
Keywords
out-of-body experiences, autoscopy, temporoparietal junction, body perception, body schema, vestibular illusions, extrapersonal space, proprioception, neurological patients, sensory integration
MeSH terms
Body Image, Depersonalization, Electric Stimulation, Electroencephalography, Female, Hallucinations, Humans, Magnetic Resonance Imaging, Male, Psychophysiology, Space Perception, Epilepsy, Complex Partial

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