Shareholders’ Say on Pay: Does It Create Value?
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Abstract
Congress and activists recently proposed giving shareholders a say (vote) on executive pay. We find that when the House passed the Say-on-Pay Bill, the market reaction was significantly positive for firms with high abnormal chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, with low pay-for-performance sensitivity, and responsive to shareholder pressure. However, activist-sponsored say-on-pay proposals target large firms, not those with excessive CEO pay, poor governance, or poor performance. The market reacts negatively to labor-sponsored proposal announcements and positively when these proposals are defeated. Our findings suggest that say-on-pay creates value for companies with inefficient compensation but can destroy value for others.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Cai, J., & Walkling, R. A.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2010-12-23
- Volume
- 46
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 299-339
- ISSN
- 0022-1090 (ISSN-L)
- 1756-6916
- OpenAlex
- W3121408839
- Cited by
- 367
- References
- 60
- FWCI
- 66.40
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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