Cited by 360Evolutionary Psychology and Human BehaviorEvolutionary Game Theory and CooperationLanguage and cultural evolution

Dynamical evolutionary psychology: Individual decision rules and emergent social norms.

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Kenrick, Douglas T., Li, Norman P., Butner, Jonathan·2003·Psychological Review

Abstract

A new theory integrating evolutionary and dynamical approaches is proposed. Following evolutionary models, psychological mechanisms are conceived as conditional decision rules designed to address fundamental problems confronted by human ancestors, with qualitatively different decision rules serving different problem domains and individual differences in decision rules as a function of adaptive and random variation. Following dynamical models, decision mechanisms within individuals are assumed to unfold in dynamic interplay with decision mechanisms of others in social networks. Decision mechanisms in different domains have different dynamic outcomes and lead to different sociospatial geometries. Three series of simulations examining trade-offs in cooperation and mating decisions illustratehow individual decision mechanisms and group dynamics mutually constrain one another, and offer insights about gene-culture interactions.

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Crossref · 10.1037/0033-295x.110.1.3

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186 of 186 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Modal group behavior is very sensitive to individual differences among group members.

    “More generally, their work suggests that modal group behavior is very sensitive to individual differences among group members (and, hence, small changes in group makeup: Kenrick et al., 2003).”
  • The game models of Kenrick et al. (2003) describe how small changes in the makeup of a group can, under the right conditions, produce dramatic changes in group norms.

    “In related work, the game models of Kenrick et al. (2003) describe how small changes in the makeup of a group can, under the right conditions, produce dramatic changes in group norms.”

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Authors
Kenrick, D. T., Li, N. P., & Butner, J.
Affiliations
Arizona State University (US)
Venue
Psychological Review
Published
2003-01
Volume
110
Issue
1
Pages
3-28
ISSN
  • 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-1471
OpenAlex
W2102214098
Cited by
358
References
195
Citations by year
2026: 5 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 17 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 18 · 2018: 17 · 2017: 13 · 2016: 10 · 2015: 27 · 2014: 18 · 2013: 16 · 2012: 21
FWCI
22.39
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
other-oa
Locations
  • Psychological Review (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Singapore Management University Institutional Knowledge (InK) (Singapore Management University) (submittedVersion)
  • Singapore Management University Institutional Knowledge (InK) (Singapore Management University) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Cultural Studies › Language and cultural evolution
Keywords
evolutionary psychology, dynamical systems, decision rules, social norms, emergent norms, individual differences, gene-culture coevolution, cooperation, mating decisions, social networks, group dynamics, adaptive variation
MeSH terms
Adaptation, Psychological, Culture, Decision Making, Female, Humans, Interpersonal Relations, Male, Psychology, Sexual Behavior, Social Behavior

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