Uncalculating cooperation is used to signal trustworthiness
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Abstract
Significance: Human prosociality presents an evolutionary puzzle, and reciprocity has emerged as a dominant explanation: cooperating today can bring benefits tomorrow. Reciprocity theories clearly predict that people should only cooperate when the benefits outweigh the costs, and thus that the decision to cooperate should always depend on a cost–benefit analysis. Yet human cooperation can be very uncalculating: good friends grant favors without asking questions, romantic love “blinds” us to the costs of devotion, and ethical principles make universal moral prescriptions. Here, we provide the first evidence, to our knowledge, that reputation effects drive uncalculating cooperation. We demonstrate, using economic game experiments, that people engage in uncalculating cooperation to signal that they can be relied upon to cooperate in the future.
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Cited by
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A Networked ${N}$ -Player Trust Game and Its Evolutionary Dynamics
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Metadata
- Authors
- Jordan, J. J., Hoffman, M., Nowak, M. A., & Rand, D. G.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2016-07-20
- Volume
- 113
- Issue
- 31
- Pages
- 8658-8663
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- OpenAlex
- W2400510500
- Cited by
- 212
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 47.98
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- Funders
- John Templeton Foundation (N/A)
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