How digital media drive affective polarization through partisan sorting

In the paper

“This literature suggests that digital media do not isolate us from opposing ideas; au contraire, they bring us to interact with individuals outside our local bubble, and they throw us into a political war, in which we are forced to take sides (25–27).”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [25] C. A. Bail, Breaking the Social Media Prism: How to Make Our Platforms Less Polarizing (Princeton University Press, 2021). source
• ?Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  cites [26] A. Guess, B. Nyhan, B. Lyons, J. Reifler, Avoiding the echo chamber about echo chambers. Knight Foundation 2, 1– 25 (2018).
• Partly supported

  In “Political discourse as self-presentation” (page unavailable), the paper says messages from opposing groups are common on social media and can fuel outrage and strengthen group identity; it also describes a broader political culture war. But it says social media cluster users into echo chambers or filter bubbles, and it does not establish that users interact with people outside those groups or are forced to take sides. (LLM, conf=0.84)

  cites [27] P. Törnberg, J. Uitermark, Tweeting ourselves to death: The cultural logic of digital capitalism. Media Cult. Soc. 44, 1– 20 (2022). sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured

In the paper

“While the political divide has remained relatively stable in the United States in terms of issue positions (33), many other indicators point to a significant increase in partisan polarization and animosity in the mass public (18, 34): Democrats and Republicans are growing increasingly cold to each other, coming to dislike or even disdain their partisan opponents (15).”

What the sources say

• ?Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  cites [33] M. P. Fiorina, Unstable Majorities: Polarization, Party Sorting, and Political Stalemate (Hoover Press, 2017).
• Supported

  The stable-issue-positions clause is attributed to citation 33, not this paper. For the clause citing this paper, the Data and Methods—American National Election Studies section reports rising anger toward opposing presidential candidates from 1980 to 2012, alongside growing partisan social sorting; the Abstract describes an increasingly affectively polarized electorate. Page numbers are not provided in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.91)

  cites [18] L. Mason, A cross-cutting calm: How social sorting drives affective polarization. Public Opin. Q. 80, 351– 377 (2016). source
• ?Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  cites [34] Pew Research Center, Partisanship and Political Animosity in 2016: Highly Negative Views of the Opposing Party and Its Members (2016). https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2016/06/22/partisanship-and-political-animosity-in-2016/. Accessed 17 September 2022.
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [15] S. Iyengar, G. Sood, Y. Lelkes, Affect, not ideology: A social identity perspective on polarization. Public Opin. Q. 76, 405– 431 (2012). source

In the paper

“Research on social media data tells a similar story: while partisan social media users do tend to interact across the ideological divide (62), this interaction is not characterized by rational arguments and deliberation but tends to be contentious and conflictual, suggesting that users may not be engaging in good faith attempts at seeing things through other perspectives (98–100).”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [62] P. Barberá, J. T. Jost, J. Nagler, J. A. Tucker, R. Bonneau, Tweeting from left to right: Is online political communication more than an echo chamber? Psychol. Sci. 26, 1531– 1542 (2015). 26297377 source
• Partly supported

  Section 3 (Brexit and Twitter Islamophobia; page unavailable) says Islamophobic Twitter groups rarely converse with Muslims and instead establish an antagonistic relationship with them. Section 5.2 describes derogatory tweets intended to upset other users. This supports the contentious-interaction portion of the citing sentence, but the paper’s post-Brexit Islamophobia findings do not establish that characterization for partisan social media users generally. The separate claim that users interact across the ideological divide is cited to another source (62). (LLM, conf=0.85)

  cites [98] G. Evolvi, Hate in a tweet: Exploring internet-based islamophobic discourses. Religions (Basel) 9, 307 (2018). sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
• Partly supported

  The Conclusion reports that when interactions occurred between climate sceptics and believers on Twitter, they tended to be antagonistic and aimed at delegitimizing the other group rather than fostering constructive debate. This supports the contentious-interaction portion attributed to this source, but the study does not establish that pattern for partisan social media users generally. The separate claim that users interact across the ideological divide is cited to another source (62). (LLM, conf=0.85)

  cites [99] R. Moernaut, J. Mast, M. Temmerman, M. Broersma, Hot weather, hot topic. Polarization and sceptical framing in the climate debate on Twitter. Inform. Commun. Soc. 25, 1047– 1066 (2022). sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [100] A. Gruzd, J. Roy, Investigating political polarization on Twitter: A Canadian perspective. Policy Internet 6, 28– 45 (2014). source

In the paper

“This evidence has been taken to suggest that in contrast to the assumptions of the selective exposure hypothesis, social media is in fact characterized by intense interaction across the political divide (73).”

What the sources say

• Partly supported

  The Results (Coalitions and divisions in the debate; page unavailable) document antagonistic interaction between opposing groups in the Dutch Black Pete debate on Twitter. But the Conclusion and discussion says the study concerns one debate, time period, country, and platform, and leaves broader generalization to future research. It does not establish that social media generally is characterized by intense interaction across political divides. (LLM, conf=0.84)

  cites [73] A. Keuchenius, P. Törnberg, J. Uitermark, Why it is important to consider negative ties when studying polarized debates: A signed network analysis of a Dutch cultural controversy on Twitter. PLoS One 16, e0256696 (2021). 34464396 PMC8407581 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured

In the paper

“Studies on social media have found limited evidence for the described homogeneous clusters on most social media platforms: while users may be unlikely to rebroadcast content from the opposing side, they are often exposed to it and may even respond (11, 62–69).”

What the sources say

• Partly supported

  The Trench warfare dynamics section says there is little evidence that people avoid political diversity online, and the Conclusion reports that people frequently encounter opposing arguments and can interact with those holding opposite views. The paper does not establish this pattern across most social media platforms or address whether users rebroadcast opposing content; its Conclusion cautions that the dynamics may differ by platform. (LLM, conf=0.84)

  cites [11] R. Karlsen, K. Steen-Johnsen, D. Wollebaek, B. Enjolras, Echo chamber and trench warfare dynamics in online debates. Eur. J. Commun. 32, 257– 273 (2017). 28690351 PMC5482382 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [62] P. Barberá, J. T. Jost, J. Nagler, J. A. Tucker, R. Bonneau, Tweeting from left to right: Is online political communication more than an echo chamber? Psychol. Sci. 26, 1531– 1542 (2015). 26297377 source
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [63] S. Goel, W. Mason, D. J. Watts, Real and perceived attitude agreement in social networks. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 99, 611– 621 (2010). 20731500 source
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [64] E. Bakshy, S. Messing, L. A. Adamic, Exposure to ideologically diverse news and opinion on Facebook. Science 348, 1130– 1132 (2015). 25953820 source
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [65] E. Colleoni, A. Rozza, A. Arvidsson, Echo chamber or public sphere? Predicting political orientation and measuring political homophily in Twitter using big data. J. Commun. 64, 317– 332 (2014). source
• Partly supported

  The Blog Authors section says cross-ideological links are infrequent, but some involve substantive argument and conversation, supporting the possibility of responses to opposing views. The Homophily and Polarization in the Blogosphere section instead finds that 94% of political blog readers read only blogs from one ideological side. The paper studies political blogs, not most social media platforms, and does not establish that users are often exposed to opposing content. (LLM, conf=0.86)

  cites [66] E. Lawrence, J. Sides, H. Farrell, Self-segregation or deliberation? Blog readership, participation, and polarization in American politics. Perspect. Polit. 8, 141– 157 (2010). sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
• Partly supported

  The Introduction and Conclusion report that German and Italian Twitter users encountered opposing views, even though homogeneity was the modal outcome. The paper does not establish that homogeneous clusters have limited evidence across most social media platforms, nor do the cited passages assess whether users rebroadcast or respond to opposing content. Our copy provides no page numbers for these passages. (LLM, conf=0.86)

  cites [67] C. Vaccari, Of echo chambers and contrarian clubs: Exposure to political disagreement among German and Italian users of Twitter. Soc. Media Soc. 2, 1– 24 (2016). sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [68] S. Yardi, D. Boyd, Dynamic debates: An analysis of group polarization over time on twitter. Bull. Sci. Technol. Soc. 30, 316– 327 (2010). source
• Partly supported

  The Introduction and Discussion (pages unavailable) report that, in Reddit discussions of the 2016 US election, opposing political groups interacted more often than expected and Clinton supporters were particularly likely to answer Trump supporters. That supports the possibility of exposure and response, but the paper does not establish limited homogeneous clustering on most social media platforms; its Discussion describes echo chambers on other platforms. It also does not establish a general pattern of users declining to rebroadcast opposing content. (LLM, conf=0.88)

  cites [69] G. De Francisci Morales, C. Monti, M. Starnini, No echo in the chambers of political interactions on Reddit. Sci. Rep. 11, 2818 (2021). 33531520 PMC7854755 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured

In the paper

“In other words, partisans consume media from across the partisan divide but do not trust in what opposing media channels tell them.”

What the sources say

• Partly supported

  The Discussion (page not available) says exposure to cross-cutting information is relatively common. It also reports reduced overall trust in mainstream media and suggests people may discount challenging content. It does not establish that partisans specifically distrust what opposing media channels tell them; that conclusion is more definite and more source-specific than the paper's finding. (LLM, conf=0.86)

  cites [96] A. M. Guess, P. Barberá, S. Munzert, J. Yang, The consequences of online partisan media. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 118, e2013464118 (2021). 33782116 PMC8040813 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
• ?Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  cites [97] M. Jurkowitz, A. Mitchell, E. Shearer, M. Walker, US media polarization and the 2020 election: A nation divided (Pew Research Center, 2020). https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2020/01/24/u-s-media-polarization-and-the-2020-election-a-nation-divided/. Accessed 17 September 2022.

In the paper

“This has brought researchers to conclude that negative influence effect is elusive, with limited relevance for politics outside the laboratory (88, 90, 93–95): while we may be less influenced by our political opponents, we are unlikely to be negatively influenced by them.”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [88] D. M. Kahan, “The politically motivated reasoning paradigm, part 1: What politically motivated reasoning is and how to measure it” in Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences: An Interdisciplinary, Searchable, and Linkable Resource, R. A. Scott, S. M. Kosslyn, Eds. (John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, NJ, 2015), pp. 1– 16. source
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [90] T. Wood, E. Porter, The elusive backfire effect: Mass attitudes’ steadfast factual adherence. Polit. Behav. 41, 135– 163 (2019). source
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [93] R. S. Nickerson, Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. Rev. Gen. Psychol. 2, 175 (1998). source
• ?Could not verify

  Section 5.1 reports ideologically motivated reasoning in an experiment, and Section 3.3 discusses how biased assessment of evidence might polarize beliefs. Neither passage addresses whether messages from political opponents cause a negative influence or backfire effect, or whether such an effect is rare outside the laboratory. Searches for those terms and for opposing-message effects found no passage settling the claim. (LLM, conf=0.72)

  cites [94] D. M. Kahan, Ideology, motivated reasoning, and cognitive reflection: An experimental study. Judgm. Decis. Mak. 8, 407– 424 (2012). sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
• Partly supported

  The Summary and Conclusion reports no support for negative opinion shifts in the authors’ controlled experiments. It does not establish that the effect has limited relevance to politics outside the laboratory: the authors explicitly say they cannot exclude negative influence in field settings, and they did not study political opponents as such. (LLM, conf=0.86)

  cites [95] K. Takács, A. Flache, M. Mäs, Discrepancy and disliking do not induce negative opinion shifts. PLoS One 11, 1– 21 (2016). PMC4917087 27333160 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured

In the paper

“The model thus suggests rethinking digital media as not merely arenas for rational deliberation and political debate but as spaces for social identity formation and for symbolic displays of solidarity with allies and difference from outgroups (27).”

What the sources say

• Supported

  In “Political discourse as self-presentation,” the paper says social media strengthen group identities and that messages from opposing groups affirm common identities and intensify outgroup dislike. The same section describes political expression as symbolic self-presentation grounded in identity and group belonging. The Conclusion likewise says public discourse is drawn into a logic of identity and difference. (LLM, conf=0.91)

  cites [27] P. Törnberg, J. Uitermark, Tweeting ourselves to death: The cultural logic of digital capitalism. Media Cult. Soc. 44, 1– 20 (2022). source

In the paper

“When γ is high, ψ quickly reaches a high level; when γ is 0.5, ψ rises more slowly and settles on a lower value; and with γ = 0, ψ remains fixed at a low level.”

In the paper

“The result is the crystallization of conflicting identities and the intensification of polarization, driven by a process in which sorting begets sorting and polarization begets polarization.”

In the paper

“This paper provides a causal mechanism to explain this rise in polarization, by identifying how digital media may drive a sorting of differences, which has been linked to a breakdown of social cohesion and rising affective polarization.”

In the paper

“The suggested mechanism essentially turns the echo chamber on its head: it is not that isolation drives divergence of opinions but that the diverse and nonlocal interactions of digital media drive plural conflicts to align along partisan lines.”

In the paper

“At the same time, such exposure does not seem to lead to political moderation: individuals are readily influenced by those they view as already similar to themselves, while disregarding messages from those they view as the outgroup.”

In the paper

“The model thus suggests that digital media can intensify affective polarization by contributing to a runaway process in which more and more issues become drawn into a single growing social and cultural divide, in turn driving a breakdown of social cohesion.”

In the paper

“The suggestion of this paper is that these two points of empirical evidence may not only be reason to reject the echo chamber hypothesis (26), but they also provide the foundation for an alternative hypothesis for media polarization.”

In the paper

“Following the idea that we are more influenced by those similar to us, the node is then influenced as a function of the similarity with its interlocutors.”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [104] R. Axelrod, The dissemination of culture: A model with local convergence and global polarization. J. Conflict Resolut. 41, 203– 226 (1997). source

In the paper

“In summary, the empirical literature suggests that digitalization does not appear to lead to a reduction of interaction across political divide, but quite the opposite: it confronts us with diverse individuals, perspectives, and viewpoints, often in contentious ways.”

In the paper

“The degree to which political divisions have come to dominate cultural life, however, remains subject to academic debate, with a recent study finding that while some lifestyle preferences are politically polarized, most remain shared across the political divide (54).”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [54] S. Praet, A. M. Guess, J. A. Tucker, R. Bonneau, J. Nagler, What’s not to like? Facebook page likes reveal limited polarization in lifestyle preferences. Polit. Commun. 39, 311– 338 (2022). source

In the paper

“According to these scholars, sorting is thus central to understanding the rise in polarization and the growing sense of difference, distrust, and disdain between opposing partisans, suggesting that the causal link between digital media and polarization runs not through divergence of opinions but rather via the dynamics of partisan sorting (19).”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [19] M. Levendusky, The Partisan Sort: How Liberals Became Democrats and Conservatives Became Republicans (University of Chicago Press, 2009). source

In the paper

“The suggestion of this paper has been that these two points of empirical evidence may not only be reason to reject the echo chamber hypothesis (26), but that they also provide the foundation for an alternative emergent causal mechanism underlying the polarizing effects of digital media.”

What the sources say

• ?Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  cites [26] A. Guess, B. Nyhan, B. Lyons, J. Reifler, Avoiding the echo chamber about echo chambers. Knight Foundation 2, 1– 25 (2018).

In the paper

“Unless otherwise specified, the simulations here therefore use an empirically chosen metric for when convergence has occurred, verified on a large number of cases and with substantial margin: the simulation ends either when no update has occurred during 10 runs across the full number of agents or to prevent runs becoming infinitely stuck in a dynamic equilibrium, after 1,000,000 iterations.”

In the paper

“Digital media intensify polarization not as echo chambers but as a sorting machine, fueling a runaway social process that destabilizes plural societies by drawing more and more issues into a single expanding social and cultural divide.”

In the paper

“in turn reducing their mutual social influence which further intensifies the process of sorting.”

In the paper

“This is a striking result, showing that if individuals are more influenced by those who are similar to them, interaction outside of local bubbles can result in increased partisan sorting, in turn associated to affective polarization.”

In the paper

“it is not lack of exposure to competing ideas that lead to polarization but precisely that digital media brings us to interact outside of our local bubble.”

In the paper

“creating a maelstrom in which additional identities, beliefs, and cultural belonging become sucked into a growing and all-encompassing societal division, which threatens the very foundation of social cohesion.”

In the paper

“Digital media do not isolate us from opposing ideas; au contraire, they throw us into a national political war, in which we are forced to take sides.”