Incarceration, Recidivism, and Employment
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 57 of the 57 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 1 of the 21 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
Using a random judge design and panel data from Norway, we estimate that imprisonment discourages further criminal behavior, with reoffense probabilities falling by 29 percentage points and criminal charges dropping by 11 over a 5-year period. Ordinary least squares mistakenly reaches the opposite conclusion. The decline is driven by individuals not working prior to incarceration; these individuals increase participation in employment programs and raise their future employment and earnings. Previously employed individuals experience lasting negative employment effects. These findings demonstrate that time spent in prison with a focus on rehabilitation can be preventive for a large segment of the criminal population.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
Using random assignment of Norwegian criminal cases to judges as an instrument, this paper finds that incarceration causally reduces subsequent criminal behavior, contrary to OLS estimates showing a positive association. The preventive effect is concentrated among defendants who were not employed before incarceration, for whom prison increases job-training participation and employment while cutting recidivism.
Key findings
- IV estimates show incarceration lowers the probability of reoffending within 5 years by 27 percentage points and reduces the number of criminal charges over the same period by 10.
- OLS estimates are positive: with all controls, incarceration is associated with a 6.6 percentage point higher probability of ever being charged over months 1–60 and 4.128 more charges.
- The reduction in crime is driven by the previously non-employed: their likelihood of reoffending within 5 years falls from 96% to 50% (a 46 percentage point reduction), and they commit 22 fewer crimes; their employment rate rises by 40 percentage points within 5 years, and job-training participation rises by 34 percentage points.
- For previously employed defendants, incarceration has no significant effect on reoffending or number of charges, but causes an immediate 25 percentage point drop in employment that persists to 5 years.
Methods
- The paper links Norwegian administrative court, crime, prison, and labor-market registers covering the entire population, using a baseline sample of 33,509 non-confession criminal cases processed 2005–2009, with 23,345 unique defendants and 500 judges.
- It exploits the random assignment of cases to judges who differ in stringency, measured as the leave-out mean judge incarceration rate in other cases, as an instrumental variable for incarceration in 2SLS models estimating local average treatment effects.
- The paper reports first-stage, reduced-form, IV, and OLS estimates, plus specification checks for random assignment, exclusion, monotonicity, and heterogeneity by prior labor-market attachment.
Limitations
- The paper states that it is a proof-of-concept and that evidence from other settings or populations would be useful to assess generalizability.
- The paper notes that it observes charges, not actual crimes, so it is theoretically possible that ex-convicts learn to avoid being caught rather than reduce criminal activity; it argues this is unlikely because incarceration increases formal-sector employment.
- The text makes evident that the findings are specific to Norway’s rehabilitative prison system, short average prison time (175 days actual time served), and institutional context, and that IV estimates apply to compliers whose incarceration status could change with judge assignment.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
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Claims the paper makes
1 Valid · 2 Not valid · 14 Not checked · 228 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“While one could omit the 12 months on either side of treatment in an attempt to avoid the Ashenfelter dip, this would assume the pre-treatment changes are caused by transitory shocks rather than a trend break (see the discussion in Ashenfelter and Card, 1985).”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Ashenfelter and Card, 1985 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The paper’s Section C models pre-training earnings differences as both transitory and trend-related, and its discussion of symmetric difference-in-differences estimators says their choice requires maintained assumptions. It does not discuss omitting exactly 12 months on either side of treatment; it also finds that transitory earnings shocks can persist for years. The citation supports the concern about assuming a transitory dip rather than a trend change, but not the specific 12-month rule. (LLM, conf=0.85)
hedgedstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“and the average number of criminal charges falls by 22.”
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“we find that imprisonment discourages further criminal behavior”
- Also stated in: § 1 Introduction · plain
“First, imprisonment discourages further criminal behavior.”
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Also stated in: § 1 Introduction · plain
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Among these individuals, imprisonment increases participation in programs directed at improving employability and reducing recidivism”
- Also stated in: § 1 Introduction · plain
“Among these individuals, imprisonment increases participation in programs directed at improving employability and reducing recidivism”
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Also stated in: § 1 Introduction · plain
A result the paper states — it cites no source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“This drop is driven almost entirely by defendants losing their job with their previous employer while they are in prison.”
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
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- The quote only partly states this claim. 22
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Bhuller et al. (2020) use a judge leniency design and provide causal evidence that inmates who serve longer sentences in Norway are less prone to reoffend.”
From Prison Rehabilitation Programs: Efficiency and Targeting (2021) · cites this paper as Bhuller et al. (2020)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“and research has documented convincing evidence of substantial rehabilitative effects (Landersø, 2015; Bhuller et al., 2020; Hjalmarsson and Lindquist, 2020).”
From Prison Rehabilitation Programs: Efficiency and Targeting (2021) · cites this paper as Bhuller et al., 2020
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“There is, however, increasing evidence suggesting prison establishments that emphasize rehabilitation can reduce recidivism (Landersø, 2015; Mastrobuoni and Terlizzese, 2019; Bhuller et al., 2020; Lotti, 2020; Hjalmarsson and Lindquist, 2020).”
From Prison Rehabilitation Programs: Efficiency and Targeting (2021) · cites this paper as Bhuller et al., 2020
The cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“Recent evidence suggests incarceration can favor rehabilitation (Landersø, 2015; Bhuller et al., 2020; Hjalmarsson and Lindquist, 2020)”
From Prison Rehabilitation Programs: Efficiency and Targeting (2021) · cites this paper as Bhuller et al., 2020
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Table A9. Tests for the Monotonicity Assumption.
“31,827”
§ 5.1 Main Results
“Note: Baseline sample consisting of non-confession criminal cases processed 2005-2009 (N=31,287 in month 60 after decision).”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ 6.3 The Role of Job Loss and Job Training Programs
“we follow the previously employed defendants from years 2 to 5 after their court case (after virtually all incarcerated individuals should be out of prison), and track whether their first employment, if any, during this period was with the same firm as they worked in before the court case.”
§ Appendix Figures and Tables
“Change in Employer: Months 1-60 after Decision”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
“By month 60, incarceration increases labor supply by 2,700 hours per individual, translating into more than 550 additional hours per year.”
Reported 550 · recomputed 540
Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Bhuller, M., Dahl, G. B., Løken, K. V., & Mogstad, M.
- Affiliations
- Statistics Norway (NO)
- National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
- Center for Economic and Policy Research (US)
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2020-04
- Volume
- 128
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1269-1324
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2516386981
- Cited by
- 335
- References
- 42
- Citations by year
- 2026: 35 · 2025: 51 · 2024: 66 · 2023: 49 · 2022: 53 · 2021: 24 · 2020: 22
- FWCI
- 57.26
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- hdl.handle.net
- Licence
- cc-by-nc-sa
- Locations
- Journal of Political Economy (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- NORA - Norwegian Open Research Archives (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-sa)
- NORA - Norwegian Open Research Archives (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Funders
- Norges Forskningsråd
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Criminal Justice and Corrections Analysis
- Social Sciences › Law › Criminal Justice and Penology
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Crime Patterns and Interventions
- Keywords
- incarceration, recidivism, employment, criminal behavior, employment programs, earnings, rehabilitation, criminal justice policy
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