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Self-Image and Willful Ignorance in Social Decisions
Abstract
Avoiding information about adverse welfare consequences of self-interested decisions, or willful ignorance, is an important source of socially harmful behavior. To understand this issue, we analyze a Bayesian signaling model of an agent who cares about self-image and has the opportunity to learn the social benefits of a personally costly action. We show that willful ignorance can serve as an excuse for selfish behavior by obfuscating the signal about the decision-maker's preferences, and help maintain the idea that the agent would have acted virtuously under full information. We derive several behavioral predictions that are inconsistent with either outcome-based preferences or social-image concern and conduct experiments to test them. Our findings, as well as a number of previous experimental results, offer support for these predictions and thus, the broader theory of self-signaling. (JEL: D83, C72, C91)
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Metadata
- Authors
- Grossman, Z., & van der Weele, J. J.
- Venue
- Journal of the European Economic Association
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2016-12-15
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 173-217
- ISSN
- 1542-4766 (ISSN-L)
- 1542-4774
- OpenAlex
- W3122541898
- Cited by
- 310
- References
- 69
- FWCI
- 51.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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