CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 0

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Overcoming essentialism: evaluation of theories of consciousness by the lawful regularities they predict

Bassler, Mathis, Pennartz, Cyriel M A·2026·Neuroscience of Consciousness
DOI 10.1093/nc/niag069
Open this paper in CoChat — free account

Abstract

A common objection to consciousness research is that researchers cannot agree on what consciousness is. But how should a consensus on the nature of consciousness be reached? Does consciousness have essential features that one can be right or wrong about? Should we select theories of consciousness based on their descriptions of the essential features of experience alone? In this article, we will argue with the help of Popper that determining unquestionable essential features of consciousness is neither possible nor desirable. Instead, any account of what consciousness is, should be understood as a subjective selection of features and should not count as an insight. According to Popper, insights in science are achieved when novel regularities between observations are discovered that generalize to scientific laws. Furthermore, all results of research can be stated independently of the definitions that were used in their making. Therefore, no consensus on the nature of consciousness or on a theory of consciousness is needed for consciousness research to progress—in fact, a multitude of definitions and theories may be beneficial. Based on this, we argue that theories of consciousness be evaluated by their ability to propose concrete, testable laws rather than by their description of what consciousness is. Highlights How to define consciousness and how to determine its essential features are often considered to be major obstacles in consciousness research, but we argue in this article that this view is a misconception of scientific progress. According to Karl Popper, there is no way to determine indisputable essential features of a concept (such as consciousness), and it is also not the task of science to find essential features of concepts. Theories of consciousness often regard their definition of consciousness (what they consider its essential features) as an insight in itself, but we argue that definitions constitute untestable elements of a theory and should therefore not serve as a basis for evaluation of a theory. According to Popper, science progresses not by revealing essential features of concepts but when scientific laws that state regularities between observations are corroborated. In the process of proposing and testing scientific laws, concepts such as consciousness play only a temporary and subordinate role. We conclude that theories of consciousness should be solely evaluated by the scientific laws that they propose, which includes rejecting theories of consciousness that propose no laws at all and focusing on the predictive value of theories of consciousness in experimental settings.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1093/nc/niag069

Cites

1 of 1 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 55

  1. Aaronson, 2014, Giulio Tononi and me: A Phi-Nal Exchange
  2. Albantakis, 2023, Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms, PLoS Comput Biol, 19, e1011465, 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1011465 · DOI · Paper page
  3. Bayne, 2018, On the axiomatic foundations of the integrated information theory of consciousness, Neurosci Conscious, 2018, niy007, 10.1093/nc/niy007 · DOI · Paper page
  4. Blake, 2014, Can binocular rivalry reveal neural correlates of consciousness?, Philos Trans R Soc B Biol Sci, 369, 20130211, 10.1098/rstb.2013.0211 · DOI · Paper page
  5. Boly, 2017, Are the neural correlates of consciousness in the front or in the back of the cerebral cortex? Clinical and neuroimaging evidence, J Neurosci, 37, 9603, 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3218-16.2017 · DOI · Paper page
  6. Bridgman, 1927, The Logic of Modern Physics
  7. Carter, 2018, Conscious machines: Defining questions, Science, 359, 400.1, 10.1126/science.aar4163 · DOI
  8. Casali, 2013, A theoretically based index of consciousness independent of sensory processing and behavior, Sci Transl Med, 5, 198ra105, 10.1126/scitranslmed.3006294 · DOI · Paper page
  9. Casarotto, 2016, Stratification of unresponsive patients by an independently validated index of brain complexity, Ann Neurol, 80, 718, 10.1002/ana.24779 · DOI · Paper page
  10. Chalmers, 2012, Constructing the World
  11. Chis-Ciure, 2024, A measure centrality index for systematic empirical comparison of consciousness theories, Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 161, 105670, 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2024.105670 · DOI · Paper page
  12. Corcoran, 2026, Integrated information and predictive processing theories of consciousness: An adversarial collaborative review, Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 187, 106742, 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2026.106742 · DOI · Paper page
  13. Dehaene, 2001, Cerebral mechanisms of word masking and unconscious repetition priming, Nat Neurosci, 4, 752, 10.1038/89551 · DOI · Paper page
  14. Dehaene, 2017, What is consciousness, and could machines have it?, Science, 358, 486, 10.1126/science.aan8871 · DOI · Paper page
  15. Doerig, 2019, The unfolding argument: Why IIT and other causal structure theories cannot explain consciousness, Conscious Cogn, 72, 49, 10.1016/j.concog.2019.04.002 · DOI · Paper page
  16. Dwarakanath, 2023, Bistability of prefrontal states gates access to consciousness, Neuron, 111, 1666, 10.1016/j.neuron.2023.02.027 · DOI
  17. Evers, 2024, Assessing the commensurability of theories of consciousness: On the usefulness of common denominators in differentiating, integrating and testing hypotheses, Conscious Cogn, 119, 103668, 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103668 · DOI · Paper page
  18. Farisco, 2023, About the compatibility between the perturbational complexity index and the global neuronal workspace theory of consciousness, Neurosci Conscious, 2023, niad016, 10.1093/nc/niad016 · DOI · Paper page
  19. Ferrante, 2025, Adversarial testing of global neuronal workspace and integrated information theories of consciousness, Nature, 642, 133, 10.1038/s41586-025-08888-1 · DOI · Paper page
  20. Fleming, 2023, The integrated information theory of consciousness as pseudoscience, PsyArXiv, 10.31234/osf.io/zsr78 · DOI
  21. Francken, 2022, Cognitive ontology and the search for neural mechanisms: Three foundational problems, Synthese, 200, 378, 10.1007/s11229-022-03701-2 · DOI · Paper page
  22. Frässle, 2014, Binocular rivalry: Frontal activity relates to introspection and action but not to perception, J Neurosci, 34, 1738, 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4403-13.2014 · DOI · Paper page
  23. Irvine, 2013, Consciousness as a Scientific Concept: A Philosophy of Science Perspective, 10.1007/978-94-007-5173-6 · DOI · Paper page
  24. Josephson, 1994, Abductive Inference: Computation, Philosophy, Technology, 10.1017/CBO9780511530128 · DOI
  25. Kant, 1781, Critique of Pure Reason
  26. Kapoor, 2022, Decoding internally generated transitions of conscious contents in the prefrontal cortex without subjective reports, Nat. Commun, 13, 1535, 10.1038/s41467-022-28897-2 · DOI
  27. Kind A, 2023, What Is Consciousness?: A Debate, 10.4324/9780429324017 · DOI
  28. Klincewicz, 2025, What makes a theory of consciousness unscientific?, Nat Neurosci, 28, 689, 10.1038/s41593-025-01881-x · DOI
  29. Kuhn, 1970, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
  30. Lakatos, 1978, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Philosophical Papers, 10.1017/CBO9780511621123 · DOI · Paper page
  31. Mashour, 2020, Conscious processing and the global neuronal workspace hypothesis, Neuron, 105, 776, 10.1016/j.neuron.2020.01.026 · DOI · Paper page
  32. Mudrik, 2025, Unpacking the complexities of consciousness: Theories and reflections, Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 170, 106053, 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2025.106053 · DOI · Paper page
  33. Musgrave, 1965, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge
  34. Northoff, 2020, Neural signs and mechanisms of consciousness: Is there a potential convergence of theories of consciousness in sight?, Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 118, 568, 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2020.07.019 · DOI · Paper page
  35. Pennartz, 2009, Identification and integration of sensory modalities: Neural basis and relation to consciousness, Conscious Cogn, 18, 718, 10.1016/j.concog.2009.03.003 · DOI · Paper page
  36. Pennartz, 2022, What is neurorepresentationalism? From neural activity and predictive processing to multi-level representations and consciousness, Behav Brain Res, 432, 113969, 10.1016/j.bbr.2022.113969 · DOI · Paper page
  37. Pennartz, 2019, Indicators and criteria of consciousness in animals and intelligent machines: An inside-out approach, Front Syst Neurosci, 13, 25, 10.3389/fnsys.2019.00025 · DOI · Paper page
  38. Pitts, 2012, Visual processing of contour patterns under conditions of inattentional blindness, J Cogn Neurosci, 24, 287, 10.1162/jocn_a_00111 · DOI · Paper page
  39. Pitts, 2014, Gamma band activity and the P3 reflect post-perceptual processes, not visual awareness, NeuroImage, 101, 337, 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2014.07.024 · DOI · Paper page
  40. Popper, 1935, Logik der Forschung, vii, 246, 10.1007/978-3-7091-4177-9 · DOI
  41. Popper, 1945, The Open Society and its Enemies
  42. Popper, 1962, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge
  43. Popper, 1959, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 53, 10.1063/1.3060577 · DOI · Paper page
  44. Quine, 1951, Two Dogmas of Empiricism
  45. Salmon, 1981, Rational prediction, Br J Philos Sci, 32, 115, 10.1093/bjps/32.2.115 · DOI
  46. Sergent, 2021, Bifurcation in brain dynamics reveals a signature of conscious processing independent of report, Nat Commun, 12, Article 1, 10.1038/s41467-021-21393-z · DOI · Paper page
  47. Seth, 2021, Being you
  48. Seth, 2022, Theories of consciousness, Nat Rev Neurosci, 23, Article 7, 10.1038/s41583-022-00587-4 · DOI · Paper page
  49. Storm, 2024, An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness, Neuron, 112, 1531, 10.1016/j.neuron.2024.02.004 · DOI · Paper page
  50. Takahashi, 2025, Testing the role of spontaneous activity in visuospatial perception with patterned optogenetics, PLoS One, 20, e0318863, 10.1371/journal.pone.0318863 · DOI
  51. Tal, 2020, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020)
  52. Tononi, 2016, Integrated information theory: From consciousness to its physical substrate, Nat Rev Neurosci, 17, 450, 10.1038/nrn.2016.44 · DOI · Paper page
  53. Vugt, 2018, The threshold for conscious report: Signal loss and response bias in visual and frontal cortex, Science, 360, 537, 10.1126/science.aar7186 · DOI · Paper page
  54. Yaron, 2022, The ConTraSt database for analysing and comparing empirical studies of consciousness theories, Nat Hum Behav, 6, 593, 10.1038/s41562-021-01284-5 · DOI · Paper page
  55. Zhang, 2001, EEG complexity as a measure of depth of anesthesia for patients, IEEE Trans Biomed Eng, 48, 1424, 10.1109/10.966601 · DOI

Metadata

Authors
Bassler, M., & Pennartz, C. M. A.
Venue
Neuroscience of Consciousness
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
2026
Volume
2026
Issue
1
ISSN
2057-2107
DOI
10.1093/nc/niag069
Cited by
0
References
1
Language
en
Licence
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ (vor, 305 d)
Funders
  • Human Brain Project Specific Grant Agreement 3 (945539)
  • Templeton World Charity Foundation (TWCF#0646)

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review