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Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations
Open accessAbstract
The bulk of corporate governance theory examines the agency problems that arise from two extreme ownership structures: 100% small shareholders or one large, controlling owner combined with small shareholders. In this paper, we question the empirical validity of this dichotomy. In fact, one-third of publicly listed firms in Europe have multiple large owners, and the market value of firms with multiple blockholders differs from firms with a single large owner and from widely held firms. Moreover, the relationship between corporate valuations and the distribution of cash-flow rights across multiple large owners is consistent with the predictions of recent theoretical models.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Laeven, L., & Levine, R.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2007-12-10
- Volume
- 21
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 579-604
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W2889649708
- Cited by
- 595
- References
- 57
- FWCI
- 63.02
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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