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Why and how access consciousness can account for phenomenal consciousness

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Naccache, Lionel · 2018 · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
Cited by 141

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

According to a popular distinction proposed by the philosopher Ned Block in 1995, our conscious experience would overflow the very limited set of what we can consciously report to ourselves and to others. He proposed to coin this limited consciousness ‘Access Consciousness' (A-Cs) and to define ‘Phenomenal Consciousness’ as a much richer subjective experience that is not accessed but that would still delineate the extent of consciousness. In this article, I review and develop five major problems raised by this theory, and show how a strict A-Cs theory can account for our conscious experience. I illustrate such an A-Cs account within the global workspace (GW) theoretical framework, and revisit some seminal empirical findings and neuropsychological syndromes. In this strict A-Cs perspective, subjective reports are not conceived as the mere passive broadcasting of information to the GW, but as resulting from a dynamic and active chain of internal processes that notably include interpretative and belief attribution stages. Finally, I list a set of testable predictions, of unsolved questions and of some counterintuitive hypotheses. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access’.

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Crossref · 10.1098/rstb.2017.0357

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Citations

Cites

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Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Naccache, L.
Venue
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
Published
2018-07-30
Volume
373
Issue
1755
Pages
20170357
ISSN
  • 0962-8436 (ISSN-L)
  • 1471-2970
OpenAlex
W2884959134
Cited by
141
References
22
FWCI
18.20
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green
Licence
royalsociety.org/journals/ethics-policies/data-sharing-mining/ (tdm)
Funders
  • Académie des Sciences (Prix Lamonica de Neurologie 2016)
  • Fondation pour la Recherche Médicale (Equipe FRM 2015)

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