Cited by 273Digital Platforms and EconomicsDigital Games and MediaBusiness Strategy and Innovation

Platform Architecture and Quality Trade-offs of Multihoming Complements

Cennamo, Carmelo, Ozalp, Hakan, Kretschmer, Tobias·2018·Information Systems Research

Abstract

Multihoming, the decision to design a complement to operate on multiple platforms, is becoming increasingly common in many platform markets. Perceived wisdom suggests that multihoming is beneficial for complement providers as they expand their market reach, but it reduces differentiation among competing platforms as the same complements become available on different platforms. We argue that complement providers face trade-offs when designing their products for multiple platform architectures—they must decide how far to specialize the complement to each platform’s technological specifications. Because of these trade-offs, multihoming complements can have different quality performance across platforms. In a study of the U.S. video game industry, we find that multihoming games have lower-quality performance on a technologically more complex console than on a less complex one. Also, games designed for and released on a focal platform have lower-quality performance on platforms they are subsequently multihomed to. However, games that are released on the complex platform with a delay suffer a smaller drop in quality on complex platforms. This has important implications for platform competition, and for managers considering expanding their reach through multihoming. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.2018.0779 .

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  • Multihoming carries important costs for complementors which tend to increase with the technological distance between platforms and different versions of platform architecture.

    “multihoming carries important costs for the complementors (Armstrong and Wright 2007) which tend to increase with the technological distance between platforms and different versions of platform architecture”

    From Smart Timing for Smart Products? Complementor Multihoming in Nascent Platform Markets (2026) · cites this paper as Cennamo et al. 2018

    Section 2, “Multihoming: The Benefits and Implications” (page not available), says differences in platform architecture can increase multihoming costs. Section 3.2, “Complex vs. Simple Platform Technology,” links differences in platform complexity to greater resource-allocation and integration tradeoffs for complementors. These passages support the claim about technological differences between platforms, but do not establish that costs increase across different versions of a platform architecture. (LLM, conf=0.78)

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  • Most studies in the platform literature have centered around complementors' market entry strategies and have mainly examined single-platform settings.

    “Most studies in this field have centered around complementors' market entry strategies (Ceccagnoli et al. 2012;Cennamo et al. 2018;Corts and Lederman 2009;Huang et al. 2013;Kapoor and Agarwal 2017), and they have mainly examined single-platform settings (Ceccagnoli et al. 2012;Kapoor and Agarwal 2017).”

    From Smart Timing for Smart Products? Complementor Multihoming in Nascent Platform Markets (2026) · cites this paper as Cennamo et al. 2018

    The Introduction says the literature generally treats complementors’ multihoming choice as a trade-off between market size and costs, which supports a focus on platform participation decisions. But this paper’s stated question concerns the quality of complements developed for multiple platforms, rather than market entry strategies. The citing sentence attributes the separate single-platform claim to other sources, not to Cennamo et al. (LLM, conf=0.78)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Research on complementor multihoming has largely been conducted in mature platform contexts where platform dynamics have been reduced to interactions between two dominant platforms, leading to a one-off multihoming decision with only one multihoming option.

    “research on complementor multihoming has largely been conducted in mature platform contexts where platform dynamics have been reduced to the interactions between two dominant platforms; consequently, complementors face a one-off multihoming decision with only one multihoming option”

    From Smart Timing for Smart Products? Complementor Multihoming in Nascent Platform Markets (2026) · cites this paper as Cennamo et al. 2018

    The Introduction (page unavailable) says existing multihoming research largely neglects technological dynamics, and §3 describes a common assumption that complementors decide whether to multihome without further platform-specific investment. The copy does not say that research was largely conducted in mature markets with two dominant platforms, or that complementors consequently faced a one-off decision with only one multihoming option. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • The paper's findings contradict prior research that emphasized negative effects of multihoming on complement quality.

    “Our findings contradict prior research that emphasized the negative effects of multihoming on complement quality (Cennamo et al., 2018;Kang et al., 2019).”

    From What role do data network effects play for multihoming complements? An empirical analysis of platform complementors’ strategies for consumer value creation (2025) · cites this paper as Cennamo et al., 2018

    The Introduction and Discussion and Conclusion report lower quality for multihomed games on more complex consoles and for games released with a delay. But the Estimation Approach says the study compares the same multihomed game across platforms, not multihomed games with singlehomed games. The source therefore supports conditional quality trade-offs, not a general negative effect of multihoming on complement quality. (LLM, conf=0.86)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Homing costs usually arise from the adaptation, coordination, and communication requirements associated with joining a new platform.

    “Nevertheless, research suggests that homing costs usually arise from the adaptation, coordination, and communication requirements (Kogut and Zander 1992) associated with joining a new platform (Cennamo et al. 2018;Kapoor and Lee 2013).”

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Authors
Cennamo, C., Ozalp, H., & Kretschmer, T.
Affiliations
  • Bocconi University (IT)
  • University of Leeds (GB)
  • Centre for Economic Policy Research (GB)
Venue
Information Systems Research
Published
2018-06
Volume
29
Issue
2
Pages
461-478
ISSN
  • 1047-7047 (ISSN-L)
  • 1526-5536
OpenAlex
W2784585839
Cited by
273
References
10
Citations by year
2026: 39 · 2025: 38 · 2024: 37 · 2023: 43 · 2022: 31 · 2021: 22 · 2020: 35 · 2019: 17 · 2018: 9 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 1
FWCI
34.68
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Information Systems Research (publishedVersion)
  • White Rose Research Online (University of Leeds, The University of Sheffield, University of York) (acceptedVersion)
  • Archivio istituzionale della Ricerca - Bocconi (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Digital Games and Media
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Business Strategy and Innovation
Keywords
multihoming, platform architecture, platform competition, video games, console games, product specialization, technological complexity, quality trade-offs, platform markets, market reach

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