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Economics of Blockchain
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Metadata
- Authors
- Davidson, S., De Filippi, P., & Potts, J.
- Venue
- SSRN Electronic Journal
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2016
- ISSN
- 1556-5068 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2295894398
- Cited by
- 308
- References
- 76
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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