The DOI matches its Crossref record.
An Argument for the Identity Theory
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Citations
Cited by
Davidson, D. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0199246270.001.0001 · Cited by 6,119
Searle, J. R. (1992) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/5834.001.0001 · Cited by 3,595
Psychophysical and theoretical identifications
Lewis, D. (1972) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048407212341301 · Cited by 1,580
Self-citationSimulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading
Goldman, A. I. (2006) · doi:10.1093/0195138929.001.0001 · Cited by 1,470
How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality
Gopnik, A. (1993) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00028636 · Cited by 967
From an Ontological Point of View
Heil, J. (2003) · doi:10.1093/0199259747.001.0001 · Cited by 888
Papineau, D. (2002) · doi:10.1093/0199243824.001.0001 · Cited by 884
No Work for a Theory of Grounding
Wilson, J. M. (2014) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2014.907542 · Cited by 782
Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap
Block, N., & Stalnaker, R. (1999) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2998259 · Cited by 621
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis
Jackson, F. (2000) · doi:10.1093/0198250614.001.0001 · Cited by 560
Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness
Perry, J. (2001) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4077.001.0001 · Cited by 485
Davidson, D. (2001) · Essays on Actions and Events · doi:10.1093/0199246270.003.0001 · Cited by 481
The psychology of folk psychology
Goldman, A. I. (1993) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00028648 · Cited by 469
Brain disorders? Not really: Why network structures block reductionism in psychopathology research
Borsboom, D., Cramer, A. O. J., & Kalis, A. (2019) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x17002266 · Cited by 468
Papineau, D. (2001) · Physicalism and its Discontents · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511570797.002 · Cited by 436
Harman, G. (1999) · doi:10.1093/0198238029.001.0001 · Cited by 409
Field, H. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0199242895.001.0001 · Cited by 373
Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception
Matthen, M. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199268509.001.0001 · Cited by 333
The cognitive basis of model-based reasoning in science
Nersessian, N. J. (2002) · The Cognitive Basis of Science · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511613517.008 · Cited by 313
Botterill, G., & Carruthers, P. (1999) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511612428 · Cited by 312
Feeling Pain and Being in Pain
Grahek, N. (2007) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/2978.001.0001 · Cited by 299
The harder problem of consciousness
Block, N. (2002) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/3655621 · Cited by 296
The Cognitive Basis of Science
(2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511613517 · Cited by 276
Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem
Balog, K. (1999) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2998286 · Cited by 242
Why panpsychism doesn’t help us explain consciousness
Goff, P. (2009) · dialectica · doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2009.01196.x · Cited by 163
Real Acquaintance and Physicalism
Goff, P. (2015) · Phenomenal Qualities · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712718.003.0005 · Cited by 79
Evolving across the explanatory gap.
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2019) · Philosophy Theory and Practice in Biology · doi:10.3998/ptpbio.16039257.0011.001 · Cited by 55
The influence of prior belief on scientific thinking
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2002) · The Cognitive Basis of Science · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511613517.011 · Cited by 22
Metadata
- Authors
- Lewis, D. K., & Journal of Philosophy, I.
- Venue
- Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 1966
- Volume
- 63
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 17-25
- ISSN
- 0022-362X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W100795840
- Cited by
- 1,134
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.