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Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives
Abstract
Timothy Besley, John McLaren; Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives, The Economic Journal, Volume 103, Issue 416, 1 January 1993, Pages 119–141, https:
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Metadata
- Authors
- Besley, T., & McLaren, J.
- Venue
- The Economic Journal
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1993-01
- Volume
- 103
- Issue
- 416
- Pages
- 119
- ISSN
- 0013-0133 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2122014785
- Cited by
- 579
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 12.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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