Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 32 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We have done our utmost to identify as many lab experimental papers in labor economics as possible, and to represent the results of these papers accurately.Given the volume of recent research in this area and the deadline we have faced in writing this review, it is inevitable that we have missed some important work.We also sincerely hope that we have not mischaracterized any paper's conclusions.The authors apologize for these limitations in advance and nevertheless hope that our review provides a helpful guide to the 'lab labor' literature to date The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
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Citations
Cites
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“The first experiment to demonstrate this point is Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini (2003), who find that women appear to be less effective than men in competitive environments, despite the fact that their performance is similar to that of males when the environment is competitive.”
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Gender and Competition at a Young Age
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“This result is confirmed in Gneezy and Rustichini (2004), a field experiment with school children (aged 9-10) in Israel.”
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On the Nature of Fair Behavior
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“Falk and Fehr (2003) provide the concrete example of testing tournament theory (e.g., Lazear and Rosen 1981), where contestants should in equilibrium choose effort levels to equate marginal effort with marginal gain.”
Do Women Shy Away From Competition? Do Men Compete Too Much?
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SELF‐SELECTION AND THE EFFICIENCY OF TOURNAMENTS
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The psychological sting of stigma: The costs of attributing ostracism to racism
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Cited by
A Structural Analysis of Disappointment Aversion in a Real Effort Competition
Gill, D., & Prowse, V. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.1.469 · Cited by 673
The Morale Effects of Pay Inequality*
Breza, E., Kaur, S., & Shamdasani, Y. (2018) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjx041 · Cited by 370
Gender and the labor market: What have we learned from field and lab experiments?
Azmat, G., & Petrongolo, B. (2014) · Labour Economics · doi:10.1016/j.labeco.2014.06.005 · Cited by 314
Kool, W., & Botvinick, M. (2018) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0401-9 · Cited by 288
A multidisciplinary survey on discrimination analysis
Romei, A., & Ruggieri, S. (2014) · The Knowledge Engineering Review · doi:10.1017/s0269888913000039 · Cited by 288
Metadata
- Authors
- Charness, G., & Kuhn, P.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 2010-04
- OpenAlex
- W1484518888
- Cited by
- 130
- References
- 32
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.